Non-proliferation and Pakistan
Friday, May 22, 2009
Daily Times, Pakistan
Friday, May 22, 2009
INSIGHT:Ejaz Haider
Any discussion of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, what the country needs and whether it should be augmenting its capability has to unfold in the backdrop of the global security environment and what the “leaders” intend to do
Is it a coincidence that this month of May, in the run-up to the 11th anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, has seen a spate of negative articles and views in the US and Indian press about Pakistan’s nuclear capability, the danger to the country’s nuclear arsenal from extremists “about to take over” and Pakistan’s efforts to enhance its capability? Maybe; maybe not.
While we shall return in a subsequent piece to the theme of why Pakistan is being singled out for special treatment, let us for now cast a cursory glance at the global non-proliferation regime to see where matters stand.
Mohamed ElBaradei, the outgoing director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in a recent interview to The Guardian, has “warned of a new nuclear age”.
Mr ElBaradei, who headed the Agency for 11 years, has said that the current non-proliferation regime is in danger of falling apart because “Any regime...has to have a sense of fairness and equity and it is not there”. According to him, “We still live in a world where if you have nuclear weapons, you are buying power, you are buying insurance against attack. That is not lost on those who do not have nuclear weapons, particularly in [conflict] regions.”
His prediction: the coming years will see what he calls “virtual nuclear weapons states” or “virtual wannabe nuclear weapons states”. These states will develop nuclear-weapons know-how while remaining technically compliant with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. How?
They will develop the expertise to “produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium and possess the know-how to make warheads, but...stop just short of assembling a weapon”. Without crossing the line, they would not be in breach of the NPT and yet could develop, deploy and use a nuclear weapon within a couple of months.
“This is the phenomenon we see now and what people worry about in Iran. And this phenomenon goes much beyond Iran. Pretty soon...you will have nine weapons states and probably another 10 or 20 virtual weapons states.”
Why is this so?
He makes plain in the interview that the regime is not fair. And he wants the United States and Russia, that possess 95 percent of the world’s arsenal (27,000 weapons) between them, to take the lead before the April 2010 RevCon (NPT review conference) by going for deep strategic cuts, reaffirming the internationally agreed ban on tests and on the production of weapons-grade fissile material — and these as first, immediate steps towards full disarmament.
“If some of this concrete action is taken before the NPT [conference], you would have a completely different environment. All these so-called virtual weapons states, or virtual wannabe weapons states, will think twice...because then the major powers will have the moral authority to go after them and say: ‘We are doing our part of the bargain. Now it is up to you.’”
The “fairness” argument is important. The NPT was discriminatory from the word go. But its discriminatory nature was diluted through a three-pronged strategy: non-proliferation; disarmament; and the right to fuel cycle.
Those who had not tested until 1967 would not cross the line; those who already had nuclear weapons would negotiate in good faith and move towards total disarmament; those who did not possess nuclear weapons would, nonetheless, have the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA inspections and safeguards.
Most importantly, however, a nuclear weapons state in a conflict will NEVER use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state.
But Article VI of the NPT (disarmament) has remained a dead letter even though there have been bilateral SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties) treaties between the US and the USSR/Russia. START III, promising deep cuts, got stalled because of differences over NATO’s eastward expansion and US plans to build a missile defence shield. When the US, under President George W Bush, pulled out of the ABM Treaty (anti-ballistic missile) in 2002, START III was superseded by SORT (strategic offensive reductions). SORT, much weaker in intent and purpose, has been criticised on various counts.
The bilateral process for all practical purposes is stalled and Russia is seriously into modernising its arsenal.
In 2002, the US also came out with its NPR (nuclear posture review) which talked about TNWs (tactical nuclear weapons) and, more disturbingly, using them for operational purposes against elusive enemies. The term employed was “forward deterrence”. The two roles envisaged for these weapons were bunker-busting and earth penetration. The most important step in this regard was the decision by the US Congress to revoke the (then) 10-year-old Spratt-Furse ban on the research and development of weapons below a 5 kiloton yield and the allocation of funds for R&D.
During his campaign and after he took office, President Obama has talked about tightening the non-proliferation regime while referring to the long-term goal of banning the bomb. But the emphasis is again on Iran and North Korea without any reference to changing the global security paradigm that continues to suffer from the concepts of pre-emption and preventive wars or pulling in Israel which stays totally outside any scrutiny.
Similarly, while Obama talked about ratifying the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), no visible movement has been made to that end. The pledge to stop the development of new nuclear weapons has not overtly ruled out the RRW (reliable replacement warhead) programme. The RRW is supposed to replace the LEP (life extension programme), which is part of the larger SSP (stockpile stewardship programme), and meant to replace weapons components without testing (for details, see CRS Report dated September 12, 2008).
The efforts to tighten the regime are unlikely to work without, as Mr ElBaradei has pointed out, reducing global insecurity, which stems, specifically, from developments since 2001.
Interestingly, in January this year, a taskforce set up by Robert Gates, who Obama has retained as his defence secretary, and headed by James Schlesinger, a former defence secretary, recommended upgrading the US nuclear arsenal. Many US experts and officials agree and recommend modernising weapons and even resuming testing. The CRS report itself, after referring to an article in the Wall Street Journal, jointly authored by George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn (“A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”; January 4, 2007; p.15), rejects that view and supports funding for RRW.
Mr ElBaradei himself, in June 2006, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post supporting the US-India civil nuclear deal and while denying that the NPT bestowed any “legitimacy” on the five first-generation NWSs, argued that some framework was needed to also pull in Pakistan and Israel into the non-proliferation regime. He seems to have rethought his position with the interview cited above. Equally, however, he is clear that the initiative towards a nuclear zero is in the hands of the US and Russia.
Any discussion of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, what the country needs and whether it should be augmenting its capability has to unfold in the backdrop of the global security environment and what the “leaders” intend to do. Pakistan does not exist in a vacuum.
To that we shall return subsequently.
Source
Friday, May 22, 2009
INSIGHT:Ejaz Haider
Any discussion of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, what the country needs and whether it should be augmenting its capability has to unfold in the backdrop of the global security environment and what the “leaders” intend to do
Is it a coincidence that this month of May, in the run-up to the 11th anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, has seen a spate of negative articles and views in the US and Indian press about Pakistan’s nuclear capability, the danger to the country’s nuclear arsenal from extremists “about to take over” and Pakistan’s efforts to enhance its capability? Maybe; maybe not.
While we shall return in a subsequent piece to the theme of why Pakistan is being singled out for special treatment, let us for now cast a cursory glance at the global non-proliferation regime to see where matters stand.
Mohamed ElBaradei, the outgoing director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in a recent interview to The Guardian, has “warned of a new nuclear age”.
Mr ElBaradei, who headed the Agency for 11 years, has said that the current non-proliferation regime is in danger of falling apart because “Any regime...has to have a sense of fairness and equity and it is not there”. According to him, “We still live in a world where if you have nuclear weapons, you are buying power, you are buying insurance against attack. That is not lost on those who do not have nuclear weapons, particularly in [conflict] regions.”
His prediction: the coming years will see what he calls “virtual nuclear weapons states” or “virtual wannabe nuclear weapons states”. These states will develop nuclear-weapons know-how while remaining technically compliant with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. How?
They will develop the expertise to “produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium and possess the know-how to make warheads, but...stop just short of assembling a weapon”. Without crossing the line, they would not be in breach of the NPT and yet could develop, deploy and use a nuclear weapon within a couple of months.
“This is the phenomenon we see now and what people worry about in Iran. And this phenomenon goes much beyond Iran. Pretty soon...you will have nine weapons states and probably another 10 or 20 virtual weapons states.”
Why is this so?
He makes plain in the interview that the regime is not fair. And he wants the United States and Russia, that possess 95 percent of the world’s arsenal (27,000 weapons) between them, to take the lead before the April 2010 RevCon (NPT review conference) by going for deep strategic cuts, reaffirming the internationally agreed ban on tests and on the production of weapons-grade fissile material — and these as first, immediate steps towards full disarmament.
“If some of this concrete action is taken before the NPT [conference], you would have a completely different environment. All these so-called virtual weapons states, or virtual wannabe weapons states, will think twice...because then the major powers will have the moral authority to go after them and say: ‘We are doing our part of the bargain. Now it is up to you.’”
The “fairness” argument is important. The NPT was discriminatory from the word go. But its discriminatory nature was diluted through a three-pronged strategy: non-proliferation; disarmament; and the right to fuel cycle.
Those who had not tested until 1967 would not cross the line; those who already had nuclear weapons would negotiate in good faith and move towards total disarmament; those who did not possess nuclear weapons would, nonetheless, have the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA inspections and safeguards.
Most importantly, however, a nuclear weapons state in a conflict will NEVER use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state.
But Article VI of the NPT (disarmament) has remained a dead letter even though there have been bilateral SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties) treaties between the US and the USSR/Russia. START III, promising deep cuts, got stalled because of differences over NATO’s eastward expansion and US plans to build a missile defence shield. When the US, under President George W Bush, pulled out of the ABM Treaty (anti-ballistic missile) in 2002, START III was superseded by SORT (strategic offensive reductions). SORT, much weaker in intent and purpose, has been criticised on various counts.
The bilateral process for all practical purposes is stalled and Russia is seriously into modernising its arsenal.
In 2002, the US also came out with its NPR (nuclear posture review) which talked about TNWs (tactical nuclear weapons) and, more disturbingly, using them for operational purposes against elusive enemies. The term employed was “forward deterrence”. The two roles envisaged for these weapons were bunker-busting and earth penetration. The most important step in this regard was the decision by the US Congress to revoke the (then) 10-year-old Spratt-Furse ban on the research and development of weapons below a 5 kiloton yield and the allocation of funds for R&D.
During his campaign and after he took office, President Obama has talked about tightening the non-proliferation regime while referring to the long-term goal of banning the bomb. But the emphasis is again on Iran and North Korea without any reference to changing the global security paradigm that continues to suffer from the concepts of pre-emption and preventive wars or pulling in Israel which stays totally outside any scrutiny.
Similarly, while Obama talked about ratifying the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), no visible movement has been made to that end. The pledge to stop the development of new nuclear weapons has not overtly ruled out the RRW (reliable replacement warhead) programme. The RRW is supposed to replace the LEP (life extension programme), which is part of the larger SSP (stockpile stewardship programme), and meant to replace weapons components without testing (for details, see CRS Report dated September 12, 2008).
The efforts to tighten the regime are unlikely to work without, as Mr ElBaradei has pointed out, reducing global insecurity, which stems, specifically, from developments since 2001.
Interestingly, in January this year, a taskforce set up by Robert Gates, who Obama has retained as his defence secretary, and headed by James Schlesinger, a former defence secretary, recommended upgrading the US nuclear arsenal. Many US experts and officials agree and recommend modernising weapons and even resuming testing. The CRS report itself, after referring to an article in the Wall Street Journal, jointly authored by George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn (“A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”; January 4, 2007; p.15), rejects that view and supports funding for RRW.
Mr ElBaradei himself, in June 2006, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post supporting the US-India civil nuclear deal and while denying that the NPT bestowed any “legitimacy” on the five first-generation NWSs, argued that some framework was needed to also pull in Pakistan and Israel into the non-proliferation regime. He seems to have rethought his position with the interview cited above. Equally, however, he is clear that the initiative towards a nuclear zero is in the hands of the US and Russia.
Any discussion of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, what the country needs and whether it should be augmenting its capability has to unfold in the backdrop of the global security environment and what the “leaders” intend to do. Pakistan does not exist in a vacuum.
To that we shall return subsequently.
Source
Labels: Pakistan's Nukes
posted @ 12:43 PM,
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