Aid with strings
Saturday, May 23, 2009
Editorial, Dawn, Pakistan
Saturday, 23 May, 2009
AS the economic assistance package for Pakistan winds its way through the House and Senate committees of the US Congress, the talk of ‘aid with strings’ has not gone away. For reasons to do largely with the relative influence of the non-proliferation and Indian lobbies in the US Congress versus the weaker Pakistani lobby there, issues such as the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, the case of Dr A.Q. Khan and Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorist acts on Indian soil keep being linked to the authorisation of the centrepiece of the US economic strategy on Pakistan: the $1.5bn-a-year non-military assistance floated first in the form of the Biden-Lugar Senate bill and now known as the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act 2009 in the US House of Representatives. Furthermore, there is still debate about ‘benchmarks’ and ‘verification processes’ and the ‘need for transparency’ whenever the aid bill comes up for discussion.
Clearly, the debate in US circles is tone-deaf. Linking economic aid to Pakistan’s perceived past sins on the nuclear front and to its relations with India are a red flag to the uber-nationalists here and make the promise of an end to the era of a ‘transactional’ relationship between the US and Pakistan ring hollow. And the continuing talk of onerous conditions on how the money is to be spent makes it appear less like a mature relationship between two states and more akin to a parent giving her child money with pedantic warnings of responsibility ringing in the child’s ear. Nevertheless, there is a need here to understand the US legislative process and the intent of the Obama administration. The final bill that the president will eventually sign will be a compromise between the House, Senate and the Obama administration. Leaving aside the criticisms and conditionalities raised by some members of Congress at the moment, the central idea of the assistance is to help Pakistan improve the delivery of basic services to its people — that is not likely to change in the final analysis and the path to doing so with a minimum of fuss will be found, or else it will defeat the purpose of the assistance. So what will the final bill look like in all likelihood? Something that hews closely to Adm Mike Mullen’s sensible advice: “I would only ask as we condition things we create as much flexibility as we can and then look at it over time, as opposed to heavy conditions up front that almost make it impossible to get started.”
Source
Saturday, 23 May, 2009
AS the economic assistance package for Pakistan winds its way through the House and Senate committees of the US Congress, the talk of ‘aid with strings’ has not gone away. For reasons to do largely with the relative influence of the non-proliferation and Indian lobbies in the US Congress versus the weaker Pakistani lobby there, issues such as the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, the case of Dr A.Q. Khan and Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorist acts on Indian soil keep being linked to the authorisation of the centrepiece of the US economic strategy on Pakistan: the $1.5bn-a-year non-military assistance floated first in the form of the Biden-Lugar Senate bill and now known as the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act 2009 in the US House of Representatives. Furthermore, there is still debate about ‘benchmarks’ and ‘verification processes’ and the ‘need for transparency’ whenever the aid bill comes up for discussion.
Clearly, the debate in US circles is tone-deaf. Linking economic aid to Pakistan’s perceived past sins on the nuclear front and to its relations with India are a red flag to the uber-nationalists here and make the promise of an end to the era of a ‘transactional’ relationship between the US and Pakistan ring hollow. And the continuing talk of onerous conditions on how the money is to be spent makes it appear less like a mature relationship between two states and more akin to a parent giving her child money with pedantic warnings of responsibility ringing in the child’s ear. Nevertheless, there is a need here to understand the US legislative process and the intent of the Obama administration. The final bill that the president will eventually sign will be a compromise between the House, Senate and the Obama administration. Leaving aside the criticisms and conditionalities raised by some members of Congress at the moment, the central idea of the assistance is to help Pakistan improve the delivery of basic services to its people — that is not likely to change in the final analysis and the path to doing so with a minimum of fuss will be found, or else it will defeat the purpose of the assistance. So what will the final bill look like in all likelihood? Something that hews closely to Adm Mike Mullen’s sensible advice: “I would only ask as we condition things we create as much flexibility as we can and then look at it over time, as opposed to heavy conditions up front that almost make it impossible to get started.”
Source
Labels: Pakistan's Nukes, Taliban, Terrorism, US Aid, US Pakistan Relations
posted @ 10:48 AM,
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