Pakistan in Media

Daily Times, Pakistan
ANALYSIS:Ijaz Hussain
Wednesday, May 20, 2009

The Pakistani government should absolutely seek a quid pro quo from India for the right to transit trade. The argument that this right is no longer important for India because it has found an alternative route from the Chahbahar port is without much substance

The Memorandum of Understanding on transit trade that the Gilani government recently signed with the Afghan government in Washington is proving to be a hot potato.

Opposition political parties are out to wreck it on the ground that through this MoU, the government has granted India the right of transit trade to Afghanistan and beyond. The PMLN has threatened street agitation if the government does not back down on the issue.

The military, including the army chief and the ISI, have reportedly expressed apprehensions about the said MoU. The Foreign Office spokesperson on his part has rubbished the idea that Pakistan has granted any right of transit trade to India. He has contended that the MoU is nothing more than an MoU, and that Pakistan and Afghanistan will finalise an agreement by the end of the year. Besides, India, in his view, has no place in the MoU as Pakistan deals with all issues concerning India, including trade, on a bilateral track.

Given this explanation, aren’t the apprehensions unfounded? And if so, shouldn’t the controversy be put to rest?

The opposition’s apprehensions appear justified when we juxtapose them with the text of the MoU and other available evidence. It is true that the MoU does not mention India by name. However, reference to it is unmistakable when one looks at the opening paragraph which, while emphasising the need to improve the conditions of international and cross-border trade, recognises the advantages of greater regional and global trade linkages and export-oriented business development.

This is also evident from another clause that proposes to establish “a transit corridor connecting Pakistan’s border areas with Afghanistan and giving the two countries access to each other’s neighbouring countries”.

It is equally noteworthy that after the signing of the MoU, the Afghan president, in an interview to an American television channel, also confirmed that the document in question was not specific to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and that it was regional in character. Given this admission, it is pertinent to ask: to whom does the term “regional” refer to, if not India?

Secretary Hillary Clinton’s statement that the conclusion of the MoU was an “historic” event and that the agreement had been “under discussion for 43 years without resolution” also supports this conclusion because, honestly speaking, there is nothing “historic” about signing of the Pak-Afghan transit trade agreement except India. Nor has the subject been under discussion for over four decades in relation to Afghanistan; however, it certainly has been with reference to India.

Notwithstanding the above controversy, is it in Pakistan’s interest to grant India the right to use Pakistani territory for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia?

To address this question, we need to examine the objections that have been advanced against it. First, it is contended that Pakistan’s trade with Afghanistan will suffer because cheaper Indian products will come to replace Pakistani products. This argument applies mutatis mutandis to ISAF, which too imports goods from Pakistan for reconstruction purposes. It is also argued that smuggled cheaper Indian goods would flood Pakistani markets as do at present the goods of other countries that Afghanistan imports under the existing APTA. It is argued that this will be a sure recipe for haemorrhaging Pakistan’s economy.

Finally, critics point out that India, which is trying to destabilise Pakistan by fuelling insurgency in Balochistan and FATA, could misuse the right by transporting military material in Indian vehicles to Afghanistan, which will undermine the security of Pakistan.

Most of these arguments on the face of it look convincing. However, on close scrutiny they lack substance. Take for example the argument that the grant of this right will lead to replacement of Pakistani products by those of India. This may be largely true but it is also an acknowledgement that our products are not internationally competitive. The remedy for this is not to employ negative tactics but to be competitive.

As to the argument that smuggled, cheaper Indian products will flood the Pakistani markets, again the apprehensions are not unfounded. However, the remedy for this does not lie in closing the Afghan market to Indian products or products from other countries, but for Pakistan and Afghanistan to devise effective ways and means to tackle the problem of smuggling.

As to apprehensions about Pakistan’s security, they are genuine but a way can be found to take care of them.

As against the above view, there is another perspective that fervently favours granting India the right of transit trade through Pakistan. According to this view, it would be highly beneficial for Pakistan as it will not only lead to its economic development but also help build political bridges between the two nuclear foes.

It further contends that this would be a continuation of the “exception” under which Pakistan agreed to let the gas pipeline from Iran go through its territory to India; and that in fact the only change will be that it will replace the pipeline (which appears to be currently out of equation) with the road.

Finally, it maintains that Pakistan’s present policy to refuse India the transit right till the resolution of the Kashmir dispute has not paid off as India is using the Iranian port of Chahbahar for trade with Afghanistan and beyond.

There are no two opinions about the soundness of the need for Pakistan to exploit its geo-strategic location. Similarly, the other viewpoint as outlined above has considerable merit. However, it is not fair to suggest, as the protagonists of this viewpoint seem to do, that Pakistan should agree to gratuitously accord India the right of transit trade through Pakistani territory. Acting upon this advice will be comparable to Musharraf’s decision to abandon the UN Kashmir resolutions without seeking anything in return from India.

The Pakistani government should absolutely seek a quid pro quo for the grant of this right. The argument that this right is no longer important for India because it has found an alternative route from the Chahbahar port is without much substance. If it were true, why would India be so keen to seek it and that too surreptitiously? The fact of the matter is that the Iranian route cannot replace the Wahga-Khyber route as it is longer (by 800 kilometres), cumbersome and eventually costlier.

Here the question arises: what quid pro quo can Pakistan seek from India? It can ask the latter to do the following: withdraw the support that it is extending to insurgents in Balochistan and FATA; withdraw its troops from the eastern border to the positions that they held before the Mumbai incident; resume the peace process with the view to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

Will India be prepared to make these concessions? Given the fact that President Zardari made an enormous concession to India in Washington by granting it the right of transit trade through Pakistan, it would be surprising if he did so without getting an adequate quid pro quo. There may have been some kind of understanding between the two countries along the above lines. Is our guess warranted? Only time will tell.