Balance the ‘negativity’ of refugee camps
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Editorial, Daily Times, Pakistan,
May 17, 2009
As the Pakistan army moves into the decisive phase of its operation in Malakand Division, those opposed to military action have resurfaced and are repeating their arguments. The reason for this resurfacing is the TV spectacle of the refugee camps as they take in the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the battle zone. What do the critics propose in place of the military option? Nothing new here too: dialogue. They were the winners in the past, and troops were indeed withdrawn from many places in the face of an alarmed world, and “talks” started. But that advice was empirically proved untenable.
What then should be done now? The fighting started because “talks” had come to a bad end. It wasn’t only an absence of mutual adjustment between the NWFP government and Sufi Muhammad on how the sharia is to be implemented. A telephone intercept had shown that warlord Fazlullah had no intention of keeping his side of the bargain to end fighting and disarm. He sent in his thugs and captured Buner and subjected the population there to great cruelty even as he denied action in Buner. Should Pakistan have sat back and let this happen as Sufi Muhammad denigrated democracy and rejected the Constitution of Pakistan?
There was discord in the country over the policy of “talks”. There was a powerful section among the opinion-makers who asked the government not to talk because the Taliban used it only to reorganise and enhance their combat strength. But they were ignored, thanks to attacks on them on TV channels, because their view was seen as echoing the policies of “foreign powers”. After that a lot of people, including retired army officers, began talking about the Pakistan Army not being trained for insurgencies and how the war against Taliban could never be won.
Now the “pro-talks” faction has made a comeback in the wake of the plight of the refugee camps. Of course, this means that those who reject the operation are completely ignoring the success of the military operation in its early and difficult phase. The tally of the Taliban killed against state troops killed is very impressive if you keep in mind that those who attack an entrenched foe usually lose more men. The Taliban are on the run and some are trying to escape from the vice of Taliban control after shaving off their beards.
A rare report (The News, May 16) taking a close look at the army operation has disclosed that the much publicised “collateral damage” used by the “pro-talks” faction is not really as bad as commonly thought. The team of investigators belonging to the NGO that has issued the report has found that the Taliban casualties announced by the army are in indeed genuine and that the army has successfully avoided killing the local population “collaterally”. To balance the negativity of the images coming from the refugee camps the NGO makes the following recommendation:
“It is suggested to the army to issue the photos or video clips of the killed Taliban to the media and of the destroyed Taliban installations. Local people and the IDPs often know the Taliban and location of their installations. They would confirm that the dead were indeed the Taliban and the installations shown as destroyed indeed belonged to the Taliban. This is important because it will ensure transparency and reassure people of the success being achieved in the war”.
Why imagine the Taliban as the perfect warriors and our army as “unprepared”? As long as the Taliban are human they will be subject to change of mind when shown images of what is happening to their militants. As the refugees watch the “positive” images they will be more and more persuaded to shake off their conditioning in favour of “the inflictor of pain”. The rest of Pakistan too will learn from these positive images not to believe the TV channels and not to believe the “defence experts” who tell us that the army is not trained to fight the Taliban. *
May 17, 2009
As the Pakistan army moves into the decisive phase of its operation in Malakand Division, those opposed to military action have resurfaced and are repeating their arguments. The reason for this resurfacing is the TV spectacle of the refugee camps as they take in the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the battle zone. What do the critics propose in place of the military option? Nothing new here too: dialogue. They were the winners in the past, and troops were indeed withdrawn from many places in the face of an alarmed world, and “talks” started. But that advice was empirically proved untenable.
What then should be done now? The fighting started because “talks” had come to a bad end. It wasn’t only an absence of mutual adjustment between the NWFP government and Sufi Muhammad on how the sharia is to be implemented. A telephone intercept had shown that warlord Fazlullah had no intention of keeping his side of the bargain to end fighting and disarm. He sent in his thugs and captured Buner and subjected the population there to great cruelty even as he denied action in Buner. Should Pakistan have sat back and let this happen as Sufi Muhammad denigrated democracy and rejected the Constitution of Pakistan?
There was discord in the country over the policy of “talks”. There was a powerful section among the opinion-makers who asked the government not to talk because the Taliban used it only to reorganise and enhance their combat strength. But they were ignored, thanks to attacks on them on TV channels, because their view was seen as echoing the policies of “foreign powers”. After that a lot of people, including retired army officers, began talking about the Pakistan Army not being trained for insurgencies and how the war against Taliban could never be won.
Now the “pro-talks” faction has made a comeback in the wake of the plight of the refugee camps. Of course, this means that those who reject the operation are completely ignoring the success of the military operation in its early and difficult phase. The tally of the Taliban killed against state troops killed is very impressive if you keep in mind that those who attack an entrenched foe usually lose more men. The Taliban are on the run and some are trying to escape from the vice of Taliban control after shaving off their beards.
A rare report (The News, May 16) taking a close look at the army operation has disclosed that the much publicised “collateral damage” used by the “pro-talks” faction is not really as bad as commonly thought. The team of investigators belonging to the NGO that has issued the report has found that the Taliban casualties announced by the army are in indeed genuine and that the army has successfully avoided killing the local population “collaterally”. To balance the negativity of the images coming from the refugee camps the NGO makes the following recommendation:
“It is suggested to the army to issue the photos or video clips of the killed Taliban to the media and of the destroyed Taliban installations. Local people and the IDPs often know the Taliban and location of their installations. They would confirm that the dead were indeed the Taliban and the installations shown as destroyed indeed belonged to the Taliban. This is important because it will ensure transparency and reassure people of the success being achieved in the war”.
Why imagine the Taliban as the perfect warriors and our army as “unprepared”? As long as the Taliban are human they will be subject to change of mind when shown images of what is happening to their militants. As the refugees watch the “positive” images they will be more and more persuaded to shake off their conditioning in favour of “the inflictor of pain”. The rest of Pakistan too will learn from these positive images not to believe the TV channels and not to believe the “defence experts” who tell us that the army is not trained to fight the Taliban. *
Labels: IDPs, Refugees, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 11:03 AM,
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