Talks in Malakand?
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Editorial, Dawn, Pakistan
Sunday, 17 May, 2009
PRIME Minister Gilani has once again floated the idea of talks with the militants in Malakand division, suggesting through his parliamentary affairs minister that dialogue is possible if the militants lay down their arms and come to the negotiating table. While there is nothing wrong in principle with talks, realistically it is difficult to see the government’s latest offer going anywhere. First, what is there left to talk about? The TTP had demanded the imposition of Sharia in Malakand, which they got with the Nizam-i-Adl Regulation. But once the state had made that concession, the real agenda of the militants revealed itself: they want territorial control of Malakand and a hermetically sealed system of governance cut off from the rest of Pakistan in which they call the shots. That is a preposterous position and one the state simply cannot negotiate on. Second, who benefits from negotiations at this stage? With a military operation already underway, the clear beneficiary would be the militants. In the past the TTP has used negotiations to create breathing space for itself and to dig in further. A pause at this time, when at long last there is political and public support for a military operation and the army is on the verge of beginning the real fighting in Swat, would be disastrous for the state’s attempt to reassert its writ in Malakand. Third, the condition that the militants lay down their arms before resuming talks is a non-starter. Why would the militants do so? They have shown no inclination in the past to accept such a condition and doing so right now would turn dialogue into surrender talks. With the state’s ability to wage a successful counter-insurgency yet to be proved, the militants have hardly any reason to disarm and surrender.
All of this raises the question: why did the government float the idea of talks again at this point in time? The clues to the answer can be found in the once again changing political climate in the country. An all-parties conference has been convened for tomorrow in Islamabad at which the prime minister will likely face criticism from the opposition parties and even some coalition allies on the military operation in Malakand. So the government may have been hoping to pre-empt some of the harshest criticism by reminding the country that it does not have a one-pronged strategy of using just force to tackle the militancy crisis. The government has always maintained that its strategy is three-pronged — dialogue, development and deterrence — and that it is willing to negotiate and talk where appropriate. Essentially, by reminding everyone of its ‘reasonable’ stance against militancy, the government may be hoping to head off the more ‘unreasonable’ criticisms. But the government must also stand firm at this time: popular or unpopular, the military operation in Malakand is necessary.
Sunday, 17 May, 2009
PRIME Minister Gilani has once again floated the idea of talks with the militants in Malakand division, suggesting through his parliamentary affairs minister that dialogue is possible if the militants lay down their arms and come to the negotiating table. While there is nothing wrong in principle with talks, realistically it is difficult to see the government’s latest offer going anywhere. First, what is there left to talk about? The TTP had demanded the imposition of Sharia in Malakand, which they got with the Nizam-i-Adl Regulation. But once the state had made that concession, the real agenda of the militants revealed itself: they want territorial control of Malakand and a hermetically sealed system of governance cut off from the rest of Pakistan in which they call the shots. That is a preposterous position and one the state simply cannot negotiate on. Second, who benefits from negotiations at this stage? With a military operation already underway, the clear beneficiary would be the militants. In the past the TTP has used negotiations to create breathing space for itself and to dig in further. A pause at this time, when at long last there is political and public support for a military operation and the army is on the verge of beginning the real fighting in Swat, would be disastrous for the state’s attempt to reassert its writ in Malakand. Third, the condition that the militants lay down their arms before resuming talks is a non-starter. Why would the militants do so? They have shown no inclination in the past to accept such a condition and doing so right now would turn dialogue into surrender talks. With the state’s ability to wage a successful counter-insurgency yet to be proved, the militants have hardly any reason to disarm and surrender.
All of this raises the question: why did the government float the idea of talks again at this point in time? The clues to the answer can be found in the once again changing political climate in the country. An all-parties conference has been convened for tomorrow in Islamabad at which the prime minister will likely face criticism from the opposition parties and even some coalition allies on the military operation in Malakand. So the government may have been hoping to pre-empt some of the harshest criticism by reminding the country that it does not have a one-pronged strategy of using just force to tackle the militancy crisis. The government has always maintained that its strategy is three-pronged — dialogue, development and deterrence — and that it is willing to negotiate and talk where appropriate. Essentially, by reminding everyone of its ‘reasonable’ stance against militancy, the government may be hoping to head off the more ‘unreasonable’ criticisms. But the government must also stand firm at this time: popular or unpopular, the military operation in Malakand is necessary.
Labels: Malakand, Militants, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 11:25 AM,
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