Assessing the Taliban threat
Friday, June 5, 2009
Daily Times, Pakistan
Friday, June 05, 2009
COMMENT: Shaukat Qadir
It is time for the usually silent but irrelevant majority to stand up collectively to be counted and become relevant, if only to ensure that the political leadership does not waver again.
It was unusual to hear public statements by three out of the four 4-star generals in Pakistan within a span of 24 hours on April 25 and 26, 2009. The address by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff was to the biannual passing out parade at the military academy; a public event routinely covered by the media and, therefore, perhaps not so significant.
However, the same day, the army chief, after a meeting with his senior commanders, issued a statement to “dispel doubts being expressed about Pakistan’s future by certain quarters”, and assert that a country of 170 million people with a vibrant democracy, which is fully backed by the armed forces, is in no danger of falling apart and that ‘the operational pause’ — a military term for taking a breather in the midst of an ongoing operation, usually for logistic reasons, though sometimes due to other compulsions (in Swat) — was intended to give reconciliatory forces a chance and should not be construed as a concession to militants. Gen Kayani added that the Pakistan Army was fully capable of dealing with the Taliban threat.
On April 26, the air chief, addressing airmen in Islamabad, stated that the Pakistan Air Force stood behind the army to provide support to it whenever required.
There are two facts that need to be fully comprehended to understand the significance of the last two statements.
First, that the current hierarchy of the armed forces, especially the Army, is determined to adhere to the principle of civilian supremacy and ensure that democracy is given every opportunity to flourish; thus the italicisation of ‘fully backed’ in the army chief’s statement above. This is a fact that many abroad, and even most Pakistanis, find difficult to comprehend, which is not surprising given our history.
Second, the comments made by the army and the air chiefs were made in-house and not covered by the media. In these instances, the Inter-Services Public Relations department issues a statement that contains only the portion approved by the concerned chief, intended for public consumption.
In the wake of the takeover of Swat by the Taliban, the army was under considerable criticism for permitting this to happen. The chief’s statement was, obviously, intended to explain that the decision to use force rested with the political government. It is my opinion that, coupled with the air chief’s statement, it was also intended to be a public announcement that the armed forces were cognisant of the growing threat from the Taliban and had made every effort to convince the political leadership of it.
Under the current circumstances, that is the farthest the military can go, to tell the political leadership that it is erring in its Taliban appeasement policy, and that there can be no successful ‘peace deal’ with these people.
Everybody is aware that the Pakistani Taliban are far from a monolithic structure. The Mehsud Taliban have their own leader, as do the Wazirs and the Mohmands. Fazlullah reigns in Swat. None are prepared to accept the supremacy of another. Taliban apologists cite this to support the idea of making peace deals with individual warlords to wean them away from Al Qaeda and their support base in Afghanistan, and weaken them through their disunity. Others are concerned about the possibility of their joining forces and the dimensions of the threat from a unified Taliban, were that to happen.
The truth is that these factions of the Taliban will never be united, but that does not diminish the threat they pose. It is my view that there is no ‘future threat’; the threat is already here.
To understand this, it is necessary to understand Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has never consisted of more than two thousand hardcore individuals, which was in the post-9/11 scenario when it was organising resistance to the US invasion of Afghanistan. Usually, as at present, it has less than one thousand. It relies on ‘outsourcing’ its teachings; there are never more than a couple of dozen Al Qaeda ‘advisors’ in a region to plan operations and train operatives. That is the number that is to be found in each of the troubled areas of Pakistan.
Once this is considered, it becomes obvious that the various Pakistani chapters of the Taliban do not need to unite to multiply their threat to the country, the region, and indeed the world. While they are not a monolithic structure in Pakistan, they are a monolithic structure under Al Qaeda. Their threat is multiplying by the day, and in their apparent disunity lies a greater danger: they are like multiple pincers of one army, with separate objectives and, while one may be forced to retreat, the other accelerates.
There is a horrifying, deadly method to their madness: they are creating chaos. The theory of chaos propounded some decades ago states, in effect, that, ‘when faced with a series of events that should have a connection but no apparent connection can be found, stop looking for connections; link them through their effects’.
Once we do that, it becomes obvious that the threat could not be more real and unless the political leadership stops playing the Ostrich, the threat will only keep growing to uncontrollable proportions. It is still not too late, but it soon will be.
Finally, it appears the political government has decided that enough is enough. The prime minister has promised that the recently started military operations will run their course throughout the NWFP and eliminate this threat once and for all. Time will tell but, perhaps, it is time for the usually silent but irrelevant majority to stand up collectively to be counted and become relevant, if only to ensure that the political leadership does not waver again.
This article is a modified version of one originally written for the daily National. The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
Source
Friday, June 05, 2009
COMMENT: Shaukat Qadir
It is time for the usually silent but irrelevant majority to stand up collectively to be counted and become relevant, if only to ensure that the political leadership does not waver again.
It was unusual to hear public statements by three out of the four 4-star generals in Pakistan within a span of 24 hours on April 25 and 26, 2009. The address by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff was to the biannual passing out parade at the military academy; a public event routinely covered by the media and, therefore, perhaps not so significant.
However, the same day, the army chief, after a meeting with his senior commanders, issued a statement to “dispel doubts being expressed about Pakistan’s future by certain quarters”, and assert that a country of 170 million people with a vibrant democracy, which is fully backed by the armed forces, is in no danger of falling apart and that ‘the operational pause’ — a military term for taking a breather in the midst of an ongoing operation, usually for logistic reasons, though sometimes due to other compulsions (in Swat) — was intended to give reconciliatory forces a chance and should not be construed as a concession to militants. Gen Kayani added that the Pakistan Army was fully capable of dealing with the Taliban threat.
On April 26, the air chief, addressing airmen in Islamabad, stated that the Pakistan Air Force stood behind the army to provide support to it whenever required.
There are two facts that need to be fully comprehended to understand the significance of the last two statements.
First, that the current hierarchy of the armed forces, especially the Army, is determined to adhere to the principle of civilian supremacy and ensure that democracy is given every opportunity to flourish; thus the italicisation of ‘fully backed’ in the army chief’s statement above. This is a fact that many abroad, and even most Pakistanis, find difficult to comprehend, which is not surprising given our history.
Second, the comments made by the army and the air chiefs were made in-house and not covered by the media. In these instances, the Inter-Services Public Relations department issues a statement that contains only the portion approved by the concerned chief, intended for public consumption.
In the wake of the takeover of Swat by the Taliban, the army was under considerable criticism for permitting this to happen. The chief’s statement was, obviously, intended to explain that the decision to use force rested with the political government. It is my opinion that, coupled with the air chief’s statement, it was also intended to be a public announcement that the armed forces were cognisant of the growing threat from the Taliban and had made every effort to convince the political leadership of it.
Under the current circumstances, that is the farthest the military can go, to tell the political leadership that it is erring in its Taliban appeasement policy, and that there can be no successful ‘peace deal’ with these people.
Everybody is aware that the Pakistani Taliban are far from a monolithic structure. The Mehsud Taliban have their own leader, as do the Wazirs and the Mohmands. Fazlullah reigns in Swat. None are prepared to accept the supremacy of another. Taliban apologists cite this to support the idea of making peace deals with individual warlords to wean them away from Al Qaeda and their support base in Afghanistan, and weaken them through their disunity. Others are concerned about the possibility of their joining forces and the dimensions of the threat from a unified Taliban, were that to happen.
The truth is that these factions of the Taliban will never be united, but that does not diminish the threat they pose. It is my view that there is no ‘future threat’; the threat is already here.
To understand this, it is necessary to understand Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has never consisted of more than two thousand hardcore individuals, which was in the post-9/11 scenario when it was organising resistance to the US invasion of Afghanistan. Usually, as at present, it has less than one thousand. It relies on ‘outsourcing’ its teachings; there are never more than a couple of dozen Al Qaeda ‘advisors’ in a region to plan operations and train operatives. That is the number that is to be found in each of the troubled areas of Pakistan.
Once this is considered, it becomes obvious that the various Pakistani chapters of the Taliban do not need to unite to multiply their threat to the country, the region, and indeed the world. While they are not a monolithic structure in Pakistan, they are a monolithic structure under Al Qaeda. Their threat is multiplying by the day, and in their apparent disunity lies a greater danger: they are like multiple pincers of one army, with separate objectives and, while one may be forced to retreat, the other accelerates.
There is a horrifying, deadly method to their madness: they are creating chaos. The theory of chaos propounded some decades ago states, in effect, that, ‘when faced with a series of events that should have a connection but no apparent connection can be found, stop looking for connections; link them through their effects’.
Once we do that, it becomes obvious that the threat could not be more real and unless the political leadership stops playing the Ostrich, the threat will only keep growing to uncontrollable proportions. It is still not too late, but it soon will be.
Finally, it appears the political government has decided that enough is enough. The prime minister has promised that the recently started military operations will run their course throughout the NWFP and eliminate this threat once and for all. Time will tell but, perhaps, it is time for the usually silent but irrelevant majority to stand up collectively to be counted and become relevant, if only to ensure that the political leadership does not waver again.
This article is a modified version of one originally written for the daily National. The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
Source
Labels: Al Qaeda, Extremism, Militancy, Military Operation, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 7:42 PM,
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