Madrassas and militancy
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Labels: Madrassas, Militancy, Pseudo Islamization, Terrorism, War on Terror
posted @ 11:07 AM,
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11 militants die in Dir Upper
Saturday, June 20, 2009
PESHAWAR: Eleven Taliban combatants were killed in Doog Darra area of Dir Upper by armed villagers and artillery shelling by security forces as the militants started fleeing the area after giving up resistance.
Also, the Chitral police arrested 10 fleeing militants, including an Afghan national, who was in an injured condition, when they sneaked into the district to escape the villagersí onslaught. The armed villagers have ringed the Taliban militants, led by Afghan commander Amir Khitab, since June 6 in the mountains in Doog Darra area.
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Labels: Dir, Malakand Operation, Militancy, War on Terror
posted @ 9:32 AM,
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Curbing extremism
Friday, June 12, 2009
AN amendment to the Pakistan aid bill moved in the US Congress requires, among other things, that Islamabad implement economic, legal and social reforms that would discourage “violent Islamic extremism”. Pakistani citizens must demand the same from their government. The fight against extremism in any form concerns Pakistan most deeply and directly, for as events in the country’s north-western areas illustrate, extremism and the militancy it sponsors represent a potent threat to the writ of the state. Firstly, of course, the militants must be effectively neutralised. The army operation should be taken to its logical conclusion and all areas be brought under the control of the government, while the millions of people affected must be rehabilitated. Reconstruction efforts need be initiated, in which regard the involvement of local people may well prove invaluable. Not only would they have an idea of where the money is best spent but such involvement would help return to them a sense of ownership.
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Labels: Extremism, Madrassas, Militancy, Terrorism, US Aid
posted @ 9:49 AM,
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Pakistan’s Hunt for Militants May Extend to Al-Qaeda
Thursday, June 11, 2009
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Labels: Al Qaeda, Militancy, Military Operation, Swat Operation, Taliban, War on Terror, Zardari
posted @ 9:44 AM,
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More military solutions
Sunday, June 7, 2009
By Huma Yusuf
Sunday, 07 Jun, 2009
TO manage the war against the Taliban in the long run, the Pakistan Army and the government have to keep up a careful balancing act: military offensives and political manouevring, development and resource allocation, monitoring and intervention must go hand in hand.
But a recent development threatens to throw things off balance. The Pakistan Counter-insurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) announced last month could over-militarise the solution to the problem of entrenched militancy. The PCCF, approved by the Obama administration in May, is a $400m annual allowance to provide the Pakistan military with training and equipment for counter-insurgency missions. The US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee added an additional $700m for the PCCF in its Pakistan aid package as well. Under the PCCF, the US Central Command can work directly with the Pakistan Army to bolster its counter-terrorism capabilities.
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Labels: Extremism, Militancy, Military Operation, Taliban, War on Terror
posted @ 10:12 AM,
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Time for Holbrooke to play Durand
Saturday, June 6, 2009
Dawn, Pakistan
By Nasser Yousaf
Saturday, 06 Jun, 2009
THAT Sir Mortimer Durand was the statesman consummate he has left irrefutable proof thereof. In the early autumn of 1893, Durand left Peshawar for Kabul and stayed there as a special guest of Amir Abdur Rehman.
He returned to Peshawar two months later with the priceless trophy of the ‘Durand Line’ drawn between the British and Afghan areas of influence in the heretofore no-man’s Frontier region.
Those were not easy times either. British India had taken the railways into the heart of Afghan lands through the mythical Khojak Tunnel in the rugged Balochistan terrain. Amir Abdur Rehman was incensed and it appeared that the formidable Afghan emotions would be hard to cool down. Employing all the craft that he possessed, the Afghan amir had made stealthy arrangements to pen every single word that Durand, who spoke fluent Persian, uttered during their fateful meetings. But all such moves on the part of the Afghan ruler came to naught as an astute Durand carried the day through sifting and demarcating the respective spheres over which the two would have the right to exercise suzerainty.
More than a century later, Durand lies buried in obscurity in the Christian cemetery in Dera Ismail Khan. The area all around is up in spiralling flames and the world knows little about how to put out the raging fire. Although the sanctity of the Line is scarcely known to have been observed owing to the fact that the same people have for eons lived on either side of it, it had a symbolically sobering effect on relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. But new actors or non-state actors — the Taliban — have since emerged on the scene. Britain has since been replaced by the US as the reigning power and Mr Richard Holbrooke has unwittingly been chosen to act as Mortimer Durand.
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Labels: Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, Durand Line, Militancy, Pak Afghan Border, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 9:51 AM,
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Suicide bombing kills 40 in Dir mosque
Saturday, June 06, 2009
* Over 70 injured as suicide bomber rips through worshippers in Hayagai Sharqai village of Upper Dir during Friday prayers
* Toll likely to rise as several people trapped under debris of severely damaged mosque
LOWER DIR: At least 40 people were killed and another 70 injured on Friday when a suicide bomber blew himself up outside a mosque in Hayagai Sharqai village in Upper Dir district, sources said.
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Labels: Dir, Extremism, Militancy, Suicide Attacks, Suicide Bombing, Taliban, Terrorism, War on Terror
posted @ 9:06 AM,
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Pakistan Swat leader aides arrested
Friday, June 5, 2009
Friday, June 05, 2009
The Pakistani military has arrested the deputy and spokesman to Sufi Muhammad, the cleric who brokered a now defunct peace deal in Pakistan's Swat valley.
The aids were arrested during a raid in the town of Amandara in Malakand district on Thursday.
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Labels: Extremism, Militancy, Military Operation, Sufi Muhammad, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 8:14 PM,
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Pakistan Says Tide Has Turned in Swat; Refugees Not So Sure
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, June 5, 2009
SWABI, Pakistan, June 4 -- Pakistan's army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, declared Thursday that the tide had "decisively turned" in the military's battle against Taliban extremists in the Swat Valley, but displaced Pakistanis in a sprawling tent city here said it was still unsafe for them to return home.
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Labels: Extremism, IDPs, Militancy, Military Operation, Refugees, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 8:10 PM,
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PM urges US to waive Pakistan's debt to overcome economic problems
Friday, June 05, 2009
ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilanion Friday called upon the United States to write off its debt to help Pakistan overcome the present economic difficulties accentuated by the war on terror, growing crisis of IDPs and the negative impact of global recession.
The Prime Minister was talking to Richard Holbrooke, US Special Envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan who called on him at PM House.
The Prime Minister urged the US administration to initiate action through the US Congress for substantial increase in aid for Pakistan as well as fast track much-needed military supplies for Pakistan's campaign against terrorism.
The Prime Minister acknowledged that the US had assisted Pakistan in providing relief to the dislocated people of Malakand Division by providing an aid package of more than US $300 million.
He hoped that the major European and Muslim world countries would follow the United States and come forward with their timely assistance.
The Prime Minister said the nation was united on the vitalissue of army operation against Taliban.
The Government of Pakistan and all the national institutions were fully on board in fighting the menace of terror and there was national cohesion and spirit of reconciliation on national issues among all the political stakeholders, he added.
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke responded that the US would look into Pakistan's request for the debt write-off and measures were being taken to accelerate the pace of military supplies to Pakistan.
Holbrooke while dilating upon his trip to the camps for dislocated persons expressed appreciation on the overall conditions there.
He praised the tradition of Pashtoon-wali and the traditional hospitality of the people of Pakistan in accommodating the displaced people in their homes and catering for IDPs needs despite their own meagre resources.
Source
Labels: Economy, Militancy, Taliban, Terrorism, US Aid, US Pakistan Relations, War on Terror
posted @ 7:50 PM,
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Assessing the Taliban threat
Friday, June 05, 2009
COMMENT: Shaukat Qadir
It is time for the usually silent but irrelevant majority to stand up collectively to be counted and become relevant, if only to ensure that the political leadership does not waver again.
It was unusual to hear public statements by three out of the four 4-star generals in Pakistan within a span of 24 hours on April 25 and 26, 2009. The address by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff was to the biannual passing out parade at the military academy; a public event routinely covered by the media and, therefore, perhaps not so significant.
However, the same day, the army chief, after a meeting with his senior commanders, issued a statement to “dispel doubts being expressed about Pakistan’s future by certain quarters”, and assert that a country of 170 million people with a vibrant democracy, which is fully backed by the armed forces, is in no danger of falling apart and that ‘the operational pause’ — a military term for taking a breather in the midst of an ongoing operation, usually for logistic reasons, though sometimes due to other compulsions (in Swat) — was intended to give reconciliatory forces a chance and should not be construed as a concession to militants. Gen Kayani added that the Pakistan Army was fully capable of dealing with the Taliban threat.
On April 26, the air chief, addressing airmen in Islamabad, stated that the Pakistan Air Force stood behind the army to provide support to it whenever required.
There are two facts that need to be fully comprehended to understand the significance of the last two statements.
First, that the current hierarchy of the armed forces, especially the Army, is determined to adhere to the principle of civilian supremacy and ensure that democracy is given every opportunity to flourish; thus the italicisation of ‘fully backed’ in the army chief’s statement above. This is a fact that many abroad, and even most Pakistanis, find difficult to comprehend, which is not surprising given our history.
Second, the comments made by the army and the air chiefs were made in-house and not covered by the media. In these instances, the Inter-Services Public Relations department issues a statement that contains only the portion approved by the concerned chief, intended for public consumption.
In the wake of the takeover of Swat by the Taliban, the army was under considerable criticism for permitting this to happen. The chief’s statement was, obviously, intended to explain that the decision to use force rested with the political government. It is my opinion that, coupled with the air chief’s statement, it was also intended to be a public announcement that the armed forces were cognisant of the growing threat from the Taliban and had made every effort to convince the political leadership of it.
Under the current circumstances, that is the farthest the military can go, to tell the political leadership that it is erring in its Taliban appeasement policy, and that there can be no successful ‘peace deal’ with these people.
Everybody is aware that the Pakistani Taliban are far from a monolithic structure. The Mehsud Taliban have their own leader, as do the Wazirs and the Mohmands. Fazlullah reigns in Swat. None are prepared to accept the supremacy of another. Taliban apologists cite this to support the idea of making peace deals with individual warlords to wean them away from Al Qaeda and their support base in Afghanistan, and weaken them through their disunity. Others are concerned about the possibility of their joining forces and the dimensions of the threat from a unified Taliban, were that to happen.
The truth is that these factions of the Taliban will never be united, but that does not diminish the threat they pose. It is my view that there is no ‘future threat’; the threat is already here.
To understand this, it is necessary to understand Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has never consisted of more than two thousand hardcore individuals, which was in the post-9/11 scenario when it was organising resistance to the US invasion of Afghanistan. Usually, as at present, it has less than one thousand. It relies on ‘outsourcing’ its teachings; there are never more than a couple of dozen Al Qaeda ‘advisors’ in a region to plan operations and train operatives. That is the number that is to be found in each of the troubled areas of Pakistan.
Once this is considered, it becomes obvious that the various Pakistani chapters of the Taliban do not need to unite to multiply their threat to the country, the region, and indeed the world. While they are not a monolithic structure in Pakistan, they are a monolithic structure under Al Qaeda. Their threat is multiplying by the day, and in their apparent disunity lies a greater danger: they are like multiple pincers of one army, with separate objectives and, while one may be forced to retreat, the other accelerates.
There is a horrifying, deadly method to their madness: they are creating chaos. The theory of chaos propounded some decades ago states, in effect, that, ‘when faced with a series of events that should have a connection but no apparent connection can be found, stop looking for connections; link them through their effects’.
Once we do that, it becomes obvious that the threat could not be more real and unless the political leadership stops playing the Ostrich, the threat will only keep growing to uncontrollable proportions. It is still not too late, but it soon will be.
Finally, it appears the political government has decided that enough is enough. The prime minister has promised that the recently started military operations will run their course throughout the NWFP and eliminate this threat once and for all. Time will tell but, perhaps, it is time for the usually silent but irrelevant majority to stand up collectively to be counted and become relevant, if only to ensure that the political leadership does not waver again.
This article is a modified version of one originally written for the daily National. The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
Source
Labels: Al Qaeda, Extremism, Militancy, Military Operation, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 7:42 PM,
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Wanted: better laws
Thursday, June 4, 2009
Thursday, 04 Jun, 2009
THE release of Hafiz Saeed raises many questions about the sincerity and efficacy of the state in quashing jihadi networks that operate on its soil. It may have been a full bench of the Lahore High Court that ordered Saeed’s release, but the fact is the court was left with little option given the prosecution’s reliance on weak grounds for the extension of the preventive detention of Saeed while he possibly awaits trial on charges related to the Mumbai attacks last November. At the heart of the issue here is really the question of whether Pakistan’s legal framework is adequate for dealing with men such as Saeed who are the ideological leaders and figureheads of groups which may be engaged in terrorist activities either abroad or on Pakistani soil. Do we have the laws that can put such people out of business while acknowledging the difficulty of tracing any particular crime to a group’s top leadership? It appears not. Clearly, this is a matter for parliament to debate and to draw up a set of a laws as Pakistan presses ahead in its counter-insurgency activities in the northwest and Fata. The issue is bigger than just Hafiz Saeed and the Mumbai attacks — it extends to militant leaders like Maulana Fazlullah and Baitullah Mehsud, too. Imagine a scenario in which Fazlullah or Mehsud are captured by the state and are held for trial: is it beyond the realm of possibility that they too may be set free on technicalities because the laws of the land are inadequate to deal with such leaders?
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Labels: Extremism, Judiciary, Justice, Laws, Militancy, Parliment, Terrorism
posted @ 11:20 AM,
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Pakistan and America
opinion : Brian Cloughley
Pakistan and America have different problems concerning terrorism. And one of the greatest problems is the arrogant presumption by Washington that Islamabad must do as it is told
The American General David Petraeus said last week that “anti-US sentiment has been increasing in Pakistan”, and that if more of the appalling photographs of torture of US-held prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan were released by the Pentagon to be seen by the world, then loathing would become even more intense.
He is right about the level of anti-American feeling, and acknowledged that “63 percent of Pakistanis still oppose cooperating with US counter-terror operations”. It is doubtful, however, that release of another batch of pictures showing American soldiers subjecting people to the most hideous indignities would raise that percentage by much.
But nobody can blame anyone in Pakistan for objecting strongly to the fact that American “counter-terror operations” involve illegal attacks on the sovereign territory of Pakistan that have killed so many women and children.
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Labels: Drone Attacks, Extremism, Militancy, Taliban, Terrorism, US Pakistan Relations
posted @ 9:49 AM,
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Tragedy saved
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
The News Inernational, Pakistan
Wednesday, June 03, 2009
A potentially explosive hostage situation has been averted through the prompt action of security forces. Had they not acted, engaging militants in a fierce gun-battle after talks failed, 71 students and nine staff members of the army-run Razmak cadet college in North Waziristan would have been whisked away to a secret location. Their fate would then have lain in the hands of ruthless savages who we all know have no humanity in them that can prevent them from inflicting the most horrible of crimes on those they kidnap, and it makes little difference to them even if their victims are young, innocent students. The possibility of tragedy, then, would have clouded the air, perhaps for days. The prompt army action to rescue the hostages must be commended. The fact that the militants were able to abduct 80 people, travelling from the college to Bannu after the institution closed for the summer break, shows that their capacity remains intact. Indeed, it is being reported that the militants from Swat, Dir and other places have been fleeing into Waziristan and assembling there. Their audacious act of abduction shows they are eager to fight on and will resort to all available means to do so. It is however encouraging that unlike the past, the military backed by the Frontier Corps acted decisively and swiftly, blocking of routes and intercepting the kidnapped students. Pakistan's army, which has already gained the status of heroes in the eyes of citizens, has further consolidated this position in the public mind.
But there are also lessons to be learned in what has happened. In Waziristan at least the militants remain largely untouched, their networks apparently intact. If there is to be success in the final goal of wiping out militancy – which after all is the raison d'etre of the battle we are seeing now, the operation must be extended fully and forcefully into the inhospitable stretches of Waziristan. There have been indications of a plan to begin the operation in Waziristan very soon. Preparations for this are already on. There must be no change in this resolve. Indeed the final struggle will need to be coordinated with Kabul, given the routes that lie across the border. The most recent terrorist outrage, targeting students who were in many cases mere children, underscores why this war must be won. Only when the last stretches of territory too have been conquered will we feel safer and more secure.
Source
Labels: Extremism, Kidnapping, Militancy, Razmak Cadet College, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 11:06 AM,
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The illegality of drones
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
By Dr Tariq Hassan
Tuesday, 02 Jun, 2009
MEMBERS of the United Nations are categorically required by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state.
Yet, the United States, a founding member of the UN, has in its relations with Pakistan used both with impunity.
The missile attacks by the drones in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are not only continuing as a sad legacy of the Bush era, they seem to be increasing under the current Obama administration. Being of the same vintage as the writer — from Harvard Law School — and a product of international law professors like Louis B. Sohn who was a great proponent of the UN, one had expected President Obama to have more respect for international law and institutions. This expectation, though grounded in the youthful idealism instilled by Professor Sohn, was witnessed in President Obama’s early pronouncements on the closure of the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay.
Having earned tremendous respect among international lawyers for his principled stand on Guantanamo Bay, President Obama seems to be faltering on the issue of US drone attacks in Pakistan. Besides their manifest illegality, the drone attacks are unjust since they cause civilian casualties. Even though the drone attacks are intended to kill suspected militants, the US acknowledges the fact that they cause ‘collateral damage’.
Thousands of people have fled their homes in the tribal areas to escape the indiscriminate and unwarranted attacks and have become refugees in their own country. The number of these internally displaced persons is increasing by the day and the situation is fast becoming unmanageable and doing little to gain the support of the people for the so-called war on terror.
The US does not have any legal right to launch missile attacks on Pakistan through drones or otherwise. Under international law, it is only entitled to self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter which preserves “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations”. This limited use of force under Article 51 is an exception to the general prohibition prescribed by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
The language of Article 51 does not allow pre-emptive attacks. As a matter of established practice, acts of self-defence are legitimate only if they meet certain preconditions. Accordingly, the use of force in self-defence is permitted only (i) in case of necessity, where there is an attack and the use of force is necessary to repel it and is defensive in nature; and (ii) to the extent that the defensive use of force is proportionate to the attack and not punitive in nature. Although some states assert the right of pre-emptive self-defence in order to avert attacks, where there is threat of imminent attack there is generally no consensus among international scholars.
The US drone attacks fail on all counts. They are not carried out to repel an attack and instead constitute preemptive strikes which not only use disproportionate but also deceptive force against suspected militants and innocent civilians.
It is important to bear in mind that the UN Security Council, while recognising and reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter in Resolutions 1368 and 1373 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the US, did not authorise the use of force in any way. Even later, UNSC resolutions such as Resolution 1540, made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which provides for enforcement action), to combat terrorism did not provide for the use of force. Therefore, the use of force in Pakistan by the US is not consistent with its obligations under the UN Charter.
The US has sought to legitimise its interventions in Pakistan by other means. For example, former President Bush authorised the military cross-border use of force from Afghanistan into Pakistan by means of domestic legislation. Sanctioning the concept of hot pursuit across international boundaries through domestic legislation is of no legal consequence. Sanctioned killing across borders not only negates due process it precludes accountability as well. In any event, domestic measures do not limit or override international obligations in any way and adversely affect international relations instead.
There is mounting criticism at all levels in Pakistan against the US drone attacks. However, the US continues unabashedly to carry out targeted killings of suspected terrorists through drone attacks in Pakistan. Needless to say this drastic measure used as a counter-terrorism strategy is not consistent with either conventional or customary international law. The use of force against non-state actors, particularly targeted killing, is not only proscribed by the general principles of international human rights law but also by specific rules of international criminal law and the laws of war.
No one has or can be granted a licence to kill under international law. Extra-judicial killings, outside the realm of war, at the international level remain a crime and are included in international criminal activities like genocide. Moreover, unwarranted killings even during war constitute war crimes (e.g. wilful killing; killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer any means of defence, has surrendered; killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to a hostile nation or army; and killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary).
Nothing can be more treacherous than killing and wounding through the stealth action of drones. The drone attacks are, therefore, a clear violation of established international norms and practices. In any case, whether legal or not, the drone attacks are not helping
Washington’s counter-terrorism efforts.
Under the circumstances, President Obama should take the moral high ground and review his administration’s policy of such targeting inside Pakistan. Even if it is not willing to reassess its legal position, Washington must re-evaluate it in the light of public policy given the moral hazard created by the immense human suffering produced by the attacks.
The writer, a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, is a lawyer based in Islamabad.
tariq@post.harvard.edu.
Source
Labels: Al Qaeda, American Drones, Drone Attacks, Extremism, Militancy, Taliban, Terrorism, UNO, US Pakistan Relations
posted @ 11:41 AM,
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Next phase in Buner?
Tuesday, 02 Jun, 2009
AS more villages, towns and cities in Malakand division are cleared and held by the security forces, the NWFP and federal governments are gearing up for IDPs to return to their homes in some areas and begin to piece together their lives. Interior Minister Rehman Malik has said that 90 per cent of Buner has now been cleared of militants and told the IDPs from the area that it is safe to return home. Crucially, NWFP Information Minister Iftikhar Hussain announced on Sunday, “The leave of NWFP government’s employees except teachers in Buner district has been cancelled and they have been directed to report for duty [from June 1].” Additionally, staff handling the local electricity, telephone and gas networks and officers of the town municipal authorities have also been asked to return to duty. What this means then is that the local administration in Buner, as has already been promised in Mingora, Swat, is to be reactivated quickly and the area made habitable for the local population once again. If the plan is carried out as efficiently as possible, it will undoubtedly be a tremendous boost to the beleaguered people of Buner — and would offer hope to the IDPs from other areas that the state will help them resettle in their homes in due time.
Perhaps most critical to the resettlement phase is the revival of the local police forces. A primary target of the militants, the police have been decimated and demoralised. Yet, security at the local level can best be ensured by a police force with sufficient numbers and resources. From this point of view, it is welcome to see that the police force in Buner has returned to conduct joint operations with the army. Given the knowledge that a local police officer would have of neighbourhoods and the local population, the police are a vital cog in the house-to-house searches that are necessary to flush out the remaining militants trying to hide among the population. And from the perspective of sending a positive signal to a frightened population that normality is being restored, the sight of local police officers patrolling neighbourhoods is infinitely more reassuring than soldiers armed to the teeth and brought in from outside areas.
Elsewhere, it is reassuring to see the federal government has not taken its eye off the ball and is trying to keep its focus on the operation in Malakand division. President Zardari chaired a meeting of top political, administrative and security officials on Monday, indicating that the government at least understands the need for the various arms of the state to stay informed about each others’ actions. We have said it before and we’ll say it again: a counter-insurgency can only be successful if the full force of the state — political, administrative and military — is brought to bear against the militants.
Source
Labels: Buner, Extremism, IDPs, Militancy, Military Operation, Refugees, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 11:02 AM,
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The myth of the soldier
Tuesday, June 02, 2009
insight: Ejaz Haider
If a state is faced with an existential threat, and knowing as we do that we cannot find an army of our choice but have to make do with the one we have, would it serve us better to help recreate the myth or highlight the ugly truths?
Nasir Abbas Mirza has written an incisive article in these pages and raised many points. (“Taking care of myths”, Daily Times, June 1) Without challenging his arguments, because I agree with him for the most part, let me consider his broad thrust since he mentioned an article written by me.
Mirza opened his article thus: “In military matters, myths and perceptions are more important than reality. This may be in conflict with our ideals of truth-seeking and truth-telling, but this order must not be disturbed at any cost. Otherwise the results can be, and have been, regretful.”
Without going into the issue of “truth-seeking and truth-telling” because that is tangential to this discussion and offers its own complexities, let me say that myth-making is not just a phenomenon that preserves religion and the profession of soldiering. It is the essence of collective life. Without myths, states and societies can neither be built nor sustained.
Mirza knows this. Hence his contention that “this order [myths and perceptions] must not be disturbed at any cost. Otherwise the results can be, and have been, regretful”. He then goes on to find fault with the military as an institution that has failed to nurture these myths, allowing instead “ugly truth” and “reality” to creep in.
There is a litany of charges beyond this point and I agree with all. For instance, he is dead right in arguing that “The military [in Pakistan] has never encouraged institution building” which is why “Today, the island of excellence needs support of other institutions that are not there”.
I would go a step further and say that the military itself, as an institution, has shown remarkable deterioration and I state this in support of Mirza’s contention that “It is foolhardy to be smug about the fact that the military can remain an island of excellence in a sea of morass”.
Yet, here’s the problem. If a state is faced with an existential threat, and knowing as we do that we cannot find an army of our choice but have to make do with the one we have, would it serve us better to help recreate the myth or highlight the ugly truths that have now become a staple of our drawing room chatter?
When I wrote the article in support of what Ayeda Naqvi had written (“Where is our yellow ribbon?”, Daily Times, May 5), I had to choose between using the institutional framework to put down the army and focussing on the man who goes down fighting to save others. I chose the latter because while it makes eminent academic sense to do the army — or any other institution — to death, it does not serve much purpose as part of addressing a threat.
In my article, I did not dismiss the institutional failures of the military. In fact, I made clear that the military (I would rather say the army) has much to answer for. It would require a book to deal with the issue and because this is exactly the issue I was researching in 2002-3 as a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, I can safely say that there is much embarrassment in its details for the army.
Therefore, within the framework he has used, Mirza is spot on. Why should the people stand up for the army when the institution has not allowed itself to remain a “misfit in our world”, a brilliant observation incidentally.
If the institution is to be challenged, as it should be, I will be the first to hold accountable the army for the deaths of and injuries to officers and men cleaning up Swat for us because the policies that have created the current monster gestated in the womb of the GHQ.
From that perspective, need I say that the soldier is getting the worst of his own institution — and he is paying for it with his blood? My mention of The Charge of the Light Brigade had a reason. As I wrote, “That charge is a good reference to make the point. It should not have been made. Whoever planned it screwed it up. That must be debated and criticised. But equally, the men who went in and carried it out must be honoured.” Let me add, more so, because they knew “Someone had blunder’d”.
Fighting also involves the myth of the just cause. Who is to decide what cause is just? But is that the question to which any man can provide an honest answer when facing the barrel of a gun? Even so, Mirza’s arguments, in the long term, we can only dismiss at our own peril. And they go beyond the institution of the army to the nature of the state itself.
Frantz Fanon talked about the state as “merely the corporeal incarnation of the national spirit” in what Pheng Cheah describes as Fanon’s “biogenetic schema for understanding the relationship of the nation-people to the state”: hence the reference to a “mechanism awaiting animation”.
There is of course much literature on the post-colonial state. From the lines I have quoted above, it should be clear that most of it is so dense and abstruse that one begins to understand the complexity of the issue at hand by the very fact that it cannot be rendered into any known language.
But leaving that aside, on the simpler side, Benedict Anderson did us all much good by arguing that a nation is an imagined community “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”.
This is only sustainable through myths and the process of myth-making and selective rendering of history is nothing if not that. Intellectuals don’t like it, as they shouldn’t. But the paradox is that if they were asked to construct something in place of nations and nation-states, they couldn’t come up with anything. Indeed, for the most part, many have ended up creating, or helped create, the worst states.
Small wonder that the post-colonial peoples get down to the task of building nation-states and remain stuck instead with “the anticlimactic betrayal of the promise of freedom in decolonisation, in which, as a result of its consummated marriage to the postcolonial state, the nation-people becomes subordinated to particularistic state imperatives”.
In English this means the dream gone sour; instead of the people forming a state organic in nature and representing them and their interests, they now have a monster that forces them into obeying it for reasons that increasingly begin to seem external to the interests of the very people who are supposed to be represented by the state.
That is where the problem lies. It is not so much the issue of the Pakistan Army having a country but the identity of the state itself and what and whose interests it represents. Of course one can pull in theorists of state and make the issue even more complex by trying to define the state itself and figuring out where it is situated in relation to society. One can even invoke Foucault and go into an eternal cycle of despair. But the fact is that it is to avoid these very doubts that myths are created. They are meant to keep things simple and infuse some certainty, arguably artificial, into individual and collective life.
Heck! Even families have myths. In this fight, we need the myth of the soldier.
Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
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Labels: Extremism, Militancy, Military Operation, Soldier, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 10:57 AM,
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What we’re up against in Waziristan
Tuesday, June 02, 2009
The Taliban of Baitullah Mehsud suffered 25 dead after their attacks on army checkposts in South Waziristan and the Jandola frontier region were repulsed on Sunday. The attacks happened in the wake of the demand made by Baitullah that the army should leave “his area”. A similar demand had emanated from North Waziristan from his branch outfit there and other warlords with whom he is acting in cooperation. Sensing the coming storm, the local population is fleeing South Waziristan to swell the tide of refugees caused by Taliban atrocities in the semi-tribal areas under the NWFP government. The Army Public College Hangu was attacked on Sunday and its administrator cruelly done to death.
Baitullah Mehsud has suffered a defeat in Swat and his telephone call saying the Taliban should leave the area was intercepted by the army. The government has already announced that the army will go for Baitullah in his fastness of South Waziristan and this time everyone knows it means business, untied to any parliamentary resolution to evacuate the affected areas and allow “talks” with the killers. It is clear that skirmishes with the men of Baitullah Mehsud have already started and that the Taliban are forewarned about what they might face in the days to come. The truth is that they also knew what was coming in Swat but were shocked by the impact of the military attack.
As Swat is pacified in the days to come and the refugees start returning to their homes amid reinforced local administration, it will be time to think about the phenomenon of Baitullah Mehsud, the biggest warlord on both sides of the Durand Line, who has the backing of Al Qaeda and its international brigade of terrorists. It will be in order here to outline the organisational strength and firepower of this warlord with the help of the just-published book written by a Pashtun scholar Aqeel Yusufzai, titled Talibanisation (Urdu).
Baitullah Mehsud, born in Bannu, is from the Badwi Khel tribe, and his Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), while headquartered in Makin in South Waziristan, has branchline groups complete with their own commanders in North Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur and Khyber. Thanks to the jihadi groups once supported by the Pakistani state and because of their affiliations with Al Qaeda, TTP has its supporting manpower in all the four provinces, particularly in South Punjab where first contacts were made between Sipah Sahaba and its Arab patrons. The Pakistani press has already taken note of. Commanders Qari Hussain, Rais Khan, Salim Sakin, Azmatullah are his front-leaders in South Waziristan while Qari Hussain specialises in training suicide-bombers.
After tasting the toughness of his subordinate Taliban group in the Malakand division, one can estimate the kind of power he will use when challenged. In North Waziristan, considered a territory of the Jalaluddin Haqqani group, he has Nur Syed Amir, Faqir Dawar and Haji Aftab Khan; the last-named also charged with looking after Baitullah’s foreign guests from the Arab world, Central Asia, Chechnya in Russia and Xinjiang in China. Commanders who lead bands of Taliban marauders in other agencies are: Hakimullah (Orakzai and Kurram with 8,000 men), Rehmanullah and Hazrat Ali (Khyber, 1,200), Umar Khalid (Mohmand, 5,000), and Faqir Muhammad (Bajaur, 5,000). Baitullah himself is estimated to dispose of 30,000 warriors, supplemented with Tahir Yuldashev’s 4,000 Uzbeks and other “foreigners”. The TTP could have nearly 50,000 men at its disposal. If you also count the non-Baitullah Taliban, the total estimate comes to over 100,000.
According to some estimates, Baitullah could have in his kitty around Rs 4 billion to spend annually. This money comes from drugs facilitated by Al Qaeda contacts, Arab money from the Gulf, money made from kidnapping for ransom, looting of banks, smuggling and “protection money” in general. He has weapons produced in Russia, the US and India, and has been looting explosives produced at the Wah munitions factory. His strength has been built up during a period of benign neglect in Islamabad, which has been focusing on India as the country’s premier threat. But Swat has proved that the Taliban can be taken on and defeated. The national consensus is there and crucial international support in these lean times is forthcoming too. *
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Labels: Counter Insurgency, Extremism, Insurgency, Militancy, Military Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas, Waziristan
posted @ 10:49 AM,
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Taliban kidnap 500 students, teachers in FR Bannu
Tuesday, June 02, 2009
MIRANSHAH/PESHAWAR: Taliban gunmen were accused Monday of brazen abduction of a convoy of 30 buses carrying more than 500 students and staff of Razmak Cadet College (of North Waziristan) in Frontier Region (FR) Bannu.
They were on their way to Bannu after the college closed for its summer vacation, town police chief Iqbal Marwat said.
“Only two buses carrying some 25 students reached Bannu,” Marwat said, adding that about 28 buses carrying around 400 students were missing.
“They have been kidnapped by Taliban militants,” Marwat told AFP.
The college is an army-run educational institution for civilians. Those kidnapped include students and civilian staff, he said.
Officials told Daily Times the convoy reached Kajori checkpost on the border of North Waziristan and FR Bannu safe, but were abducted from Marwat Kanal area in Baqakhel police precincts.
“Militants started firing in the air to stop the vehicles and then they forcibly drove them to unknown place,” Javed Alam, vice principal of the college, told a private television channel. APP quoted Alam as saying that only 15 students and five teachers had been abducted.
“We were in a convoy of around 30 vehicles, escorted by tribal police, when masked men stopped our vehicles and started asking questions,” said Mohammad Shafiq, a ninth grade student among those who fled.
“They asked us whether we are army recruits, first they were questioning us in Urdu and then in Pashto,” he said. “They stopped us for some time but allowed most of those students who were from the tribal areas to go,” Shah Hussain, another student in the same class said. haji mujtaba/agencies
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Labels: Bannu, Extremism, Kidnapping, Militancy, Military Operation, Miranshah, Razmak Cadet College, Students, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas
posted @ 10:40 AM,
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Go home – or else!
Tuesday, June 02, 2009
According to an official announcement made by the interior ministry on Sunday 31st May, all the militants have now been ejected from Buner and it is safe for IDPs to return to their homes – that is, if they have homes to return to. The announcement contains an order to government officers who were employed in the civil administration of Buner to return as well and furthermore to return with all speed – and if they don't then they may suffer unspecified consequences. To say that this directive lacks sensitivity understates the case by several orders of magnitude. Those who fled Buner took only what they were able to carry, and they were totally unprepared for the upheaval of their lives – as were other IDPs. They are now dispersed through a range of camps, government schools and private houses. Some will be registered and others not. Some will have heard the message from the government and others not. Some may be in a position to return to Buner immediately – but it is far more likely that many of them will not be able to make the required response. Who is going to transport them? Are the areas where they lived truly clear of the Taliban and are the army and the paramilitary forces there in sufficient strength to ensure that they can now hold the ground they have taken?
It is said that the Mardan, Rustam, Ambala, Daggar and Sultanwas roads have been cleared and it is safe for IDPs to travel on them. Alternative power supplies have been arranged via generators but there is little news of water supplies or telecommunications. There can be little doubt that the entire infrastructure of Buner – as well as everywhere else that has been and continues to be fought over – has been degraded to a greater or lesser extent. There are reports that the entire centre of Mingora has been razed to the ground for instance, and it is reasonable to assume the civil servants who are being pressed to return are unlikely to find their desks and filing systems in apple-pie order. It is likely that for some at least their offices no longer exist. Chains of command and management will be broken by absent members, and issuing a directive with an implication of penalty for those who fail to comply displays a fundamental lack of understanding of the plight faced by the IDPs. Yes, the civil administration needs to be up and running again as quickly as possible. But issuing veiled threats to people already traumatized by the experience of uprooting themselves and their families is no way to win any hearts and minds – indeed we might imagine that alienation and anger would be an appropriate response to this latest display of ineptitude.
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Labels: Extremism, IDPs, Militancy, Military Operation, Officials, Refugees, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 10:04 AM,
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