Pakistan in Media

Daily Times, Pakistan
Wednesday, June 03, 2009
WASHINGTON DIARY: Dr Manzur Ejaz

Sri Lanka took more than two decades to suppress Tamil separatists and prevailed. The Pakistani state, with its powerful institutions and military, can get the job done in the northwest in a much shorter period.

For some time now, several elements in the US intelligentsia, military strategists, Indian analysts and even some Pakistani intellectuals have been declaring Pakistan a failed state that will disintegrate in the near future.

Pakistan is facing the most serious crisis in its sixty-year history. Large chunks of the tribal areas and NWFP are under the control of the Taliban, where the Pakistani state has no writ. Anti-state elements have been able to penetrate areas close to the federal capital; while the Indians may be playing games through Afghanistan.

But while there is mammoth disarray in Pakistan, is the country really going to disintegrate?

No. Despite the disastrous situation, the possibility of Pakistan’s disintegration is very minimal. Neither the anti-state elements within Pakistan nor external forces stand to gain anything from such an outcome.

The worst conditions are found in the northwestern Pashtun areas where the Taliban and other extremist groups are engaged in conflict with the Pakistani state. However, the people of these areas have a greater stake in Pakistan, than in separating or becoming part of Afghanistan. Both in good times and bad, Pashtuns have preferred to migrate to other parts of Pakistan than to any neighbouring state. In this context, Pashtuns have economic interests in Punjab and Sindh; and this economic fact has also played out in the political arena.

From the day Nasim Wali Khan joined the anti-Bhutto Pakistan National Alliance, Pashtun nationalism as a separatist movement has not been on the agenda of the Awami National Party or other influential political formations in the region. National parties like the PPP, the JUI and the Muslim League have also been victorious at the polls. Also, during the 2008 elections, the ANP fought on a national rather than a nationalist agenda, and thus readily joined the federal coalition.

Therefore from the ground realities of this region, it can be easily inferred that there is no threat of disintegration here. The conditions under which separatist movements succeed are not present.

One also keeps hearing separatist rhetoric from time to time from some sections of Sindh, the second most populous province of Pakistan. However, the separatist elements in Sindh have never done won anything at the polls. Other than the PPP, the smaller provincial parties have always sought to work within the federation rather than seek a separate “Sindhu-desh”. Furthermore, the cultural, linguistic and historical affinity between Sindh and Punjab is very strong and even the political trends in both provinces are similar.

There are also some elements that wanted to turn Karachi into a separate coastal city-state like Hong Kong or Singapore. But such plans cannot be realised because of the demographic realities of Pakistan’s largest city. The ethnic diversity of Karachi’s population and the state’s high stakes in the city will hardly give a chance to any separatist movement. Further, the strongest party in the city, the MQM, has always been successful in elections and has been involved in the federal government as well. Therefore, there is no threat of Sindh ever abandoning the federation of Pakistan.

However, the serious problem is in Balochistan, where the major tribes don’t seem to have much of a stake in the federation. The Pashtuns of Balochistan may be overwhelmingly supportive of a united Pakistan, but the Baloch problem is very serious and there is a need for strenuous efforts to integrate the people of that province on an economic basis with the rest of the country. This is an achievable goal if the ruling parties redress the grievances of the Baloch people. Pakistan still has time to avoid a separatist war in Balochistan.

Another positive for Pakistan is that neither its neighbours nor the big powers have any interest in breaking up the country. India knows fully well that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is better suited to its interests than a fragmented and unstable Pakistan. Further, the Indian economy also sees potential benefit from a prosperous Pakistani market.

Similarly, Iran will do its best to stop trouble in Balochistan because that could trigger a similar separatist movement in the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan.

The major world powers also have nothing to gain from the disintegration of Pakistan. Furthermore, the balance of world power is being reconfigured as the power of the US declines and China rises. The Chinese have already made a long-term investment in the construction of Gwadar Port to reach the Arabian Sea. Therefore, even if someone tries to threaten the unity of Pakistan, China will fully support its long-term ally to safeguard its own interests.

Therefore an examination of internal and external factors indicates that Pakistan’s disintegration is an extremely unlikely possibility. Pakistan may take ten to fifteen years to fully overcome religious insurgency, but eventually, the state of Pakistan will prevail. Sri Lanka took more than two decades to suppress Tamil separatists and prevailed. The Pakistani state, with its powerful institutions and military, can get the job done in the northwest in a much shorter period.

The writer can be reached at manzurejaz@yahoo.com

Daily Times, Pakistan
Tuesday, June 02, 2009

The Taliban of Baitullah Mehsud suffered 25 dead after their attacks on army checkposts in South Waziristan and the Jandola frontier region were repulsed on Sunday. The attacks happened in the wake of the demand made by Baitullah that the army should leave “his area”. A similar demand had emanated from North Waziristan from his branch outfit there and other warlords with whom he is acting in cooperation. Sensing the coming storm, the local population is fleeing South Waziristan to swell the tide of refugees caused by Taliban atrocities in the semi-tribal areas under the NWFP government. The Army Public College Hangu was attacked on Sunday and its administrator cruelly done to death.

Baitullah Mehsud has suffered a defeat in Swat and his telephone call saying the Taliban should leave the area was intercepted by the army. The government has already announced that the army will go for Baitullah in his fastness of South Waziristan and this time everyone knows it means business, untied to any parliamentary resolution to evacuate the affected areas and allow “talks” with the killers. It is clear that skirmishes with the men of Baitullah Mehsud have already started and that the Taliban are forewarned about what they might face in the days to come. The truth is that they also knew what was coming in Swat but were shocked by the impact of the military attack.

As Swat is pacified in the days to come and the refugees start returning to their homes amid reinforced local administration, it will be time to think about the phenomenon of Baitullah Mehsud, the biggest warlord on both sides of the Durand Line, who has the backing of Al Qaeda and its international brigade of terrorists. It will be in order here to outline the organisational strength and firepower of this warlord with the help of the just-published book written by a Pashtun scholar Aqeel Yusufzai, titled Talibanisation (Urdu).

Baitullah Mehsud, born in Bannu, is from the Badwi Khel tribe, and his Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), while headquartered in Makin in South Waziristan, has branchline groups complete with their own commanders in North Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur and Khyber. Thanks to the jihadi groups once supported by the Pakistani state and because of their affiliations with Al Qaeda, TTP has its supporting manpower in all the four provinces, particularly in South Punjab where first contacts were made between Sipah Sahaba and its Arab patrons. The Pakistani press has already taken note of. Commanders Qari Hussain, Rais Khan, Salim Sakin, Azmatullah are his front-leaders in South Waziristan while Qari Hussain specialises in training suicide-bombers.

After tasting the toughness of his subordinate Taliban group in the Malakand division, one can estimate the kind of power he will use when challenged. In North Waziristan, considered a territory of the Jalaluddin Haqqani group, he has Nur Syed Amir, Faqir Dawar and Haji Aftab Khan; the last-named also charged with looking after Baitullah’s foreign guests from the Arab world, Central Asia, Chechnya in Russia and Xinjiang in China. Commanders who lead bands of Taliban marauders in other agencies are: Hakimullah (Orakzai and Kurram with 8,000 men), Rehmanullah and Hazrat Ali (Khyber, 1,200), Umar Khalid (Mohmand, 5,000), and Faqir Muhammad (Bajaur, 5,000). Baitullah himself is estimated to dispose of 30,000 warriors, supplemented with Tahir Yuldashev’s 4,000 Uzbeks and other “foreigners”. The TTP could have nearly 50,000 men at its disposal. If you also count the non-Baitullah Taliban, the total estimate comes to over 100,000.

According to some estimates, Baitullah could have in his kitty around Rs 4 billion to spend annually. This money comes from drugs facilitated by Al Qaeda contacts, Arab money from the Gulf, money made from kidnapping for ransom, looting of banks, smuggling and “protection money” in general. He has weapons produced in Russia, the US and India, and has been looting explosives produced at the Wah munitions factory. His strength has been built up during a period of benign neglect in Islamabad, which has been focusing on India as the country’s premier threat. But Swat has proved that the Taliban can be taken on and defeated. The national consensus is there and crucial international support in these lean times is forthcoming too. *

Source

Dawn, Pakistan
By Muhammad Shehryar Khakwani
Monday, 01 Jun, 2009

OUR nation, at war with armed miscreants among its population and determined to root out terrorism, faces an unprecedented, dangerous situation. Prime Minister Gilani fittingly described the fight in Swat as a struggle for survival as he rallied support in parliament for the operation.

The strain is multifaceted; not only is a humanitarian crisis at hand with the IDPs, but a security situation looms as a result of the operation. The blast in Lahore confirms it. The aftermath saw a flurry of activity condemning the attack followed by reviewing security procedures. This should have happened before the attack in Lahore.

As the president embarked on a number of foreign trips recently, the interior minister was by his side. The business conducted may have been important, and the entourage needed, but one questions the timing and tasks at home delayed because of these dealings.

The challenge in Swat is not just one of putting down an insurgency but of dealing effectively with the aftermath. It was not a natural disaster which caught us unawares. It was a planned operation, and proper planning should have included military operations, political support, the social aspect of dealing with the internally displaced and the consequent security situation. It was apparent that millions would leave their homes in a hurry, carrying few belongings and looking for any mode of transportation towards safety as they waited for the army to break the Taliban’s back. That this is an extraordinary situation calling for extraordinary measures should have been catered for. Yet, our governments fail to be proactive.

At a critical hour, we see the people fleeing a war zone. All basic provisions, such as a roof over their heads, security, sanitation, electricity, medical care, food and water, become dependent on someone’s charity. We witness the media running advertisements raising awareness, average citizens showing courage and generosity, provincial governments organising relief efforts, stretching their strained resources to spare what they can. We also witness the interior minister responsible for security by the president’s side in front of the Elysée Palace and in Tehran for the declarations of nuclear power pacts and gas pipelines.

There can only be a couple of reasons for leaving at a critical hour. One is that the office held cannot make a difference in combating the crisis. The other is that all measures are in place, and nothing can be gained by staying behind. It is hard to believe that the highest office in charge of security would not be able to make a difference. The security services are facing a determined, elusive enemy, who will apparently declare victory by striking the innocent wherever they may be. Loss of innocent lives, wounding and maiming indiscriminately are the goals of twisted vengeance. This is not ordinary and it seems our security services are not adequately prepared to thwart the attempts.The federal government must make every effort, however minuscule, for easing suffering and coordinating efforts among government agencies. All offices must come together to ensure efficient means are employed as aid reaches the hungry and stricken, and follow up with the armed forces ensuring they have all the support necessary to reach the endgame faster. This is imperative to organising the return of the internally displaced smoothly, and most importantly to making security arrangements for those exposed.

Discussing a civil nuclear deal with France to improve the power situation, or raising awareness about Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, securing energy supplies are important issues, but not at the cost of security issues at home. This is akin to leaving for business meetings when one’s house is on fire. Perhaps it would be more prudent to put the fire out before leaving home. The operation in Swat is not a minor undertaking. The government must have all hands on deck until the country is declared secure.

Nearly all leaders face unexpected situations, usually grim, and needing urgent attention. In order to be effective, it is imperative to spend more time planning for things that go wrong than things that are headed in the right direction.

Source

Dawn, Pakistan
By Javed Hussain
Monday, 01 Jun, 2009

COUNTER-INSURGENCY operations are a tough undertaking. They become tougher when the geography of the area favours the insurgents, and even more when the soldiers are not trained for them.

They are trained for conventional warfare which is the anti-thesis of guerilla warfare. As a consequence, switching from the conventional to the unconventional is not easy for the soldiers.

When they are unable to adapt to the clandestine nature of guerilla warfare, they tend to collapse under minimal stress, as happened to the French and American soldiers in Vietnam, to the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, to the Indian soldiers in Kashmir and is happening to the Americans once again, this time in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The only elements of the regular army who feel completely at home in guerilla warfare are the Special Forces. They can switch from commando to guerilla to anti-guerilla with ease. Like the skillful guerillas, they are also masters of surprise and innovation. Outfits like the American Green Berets, the British SAS, the Russian Spetsnaz and the Pakistani SSG conducted some spectacular operations in Vietnam, Malaya, Afghanistan and former East Pakistan respectively that earned them the respect of the guerillas — the latest being the SSG assault on the Peochar heights. But on their own, the Special Forces cannot win a war; they can contribute a great deal when used imaginatively and on sound intelligence.

If the experience of the SSG in unconventional warfare is utilised for preparing the regular infantry for the counter-insurgency role, it will pay dividends. Although our infantrymen have done far better than the French, American, Soviet and Indian infantry under similar conditions, it is only fair that they are prepared mentally, physically and tactically for a war that will not end any time soon.

The ultimate objective of both sides in guerilla war is control of the people. If the guerillas succeed in winning them over, the army would have to contend with a hostile population also. Conversely if the army wins them over, the guerillas stand exposed and begin to gasp for breath like fish out of water since they derive their staying power from the people. In a remarkable turn of events, the outrages perpetrated by Taliban insurgents have alienated the people, while their large-scale exodus from the areas of operation has removed the cover behind which they could hide — hence their recent appeals to the people to return.

While displacement is a harrowing experience for the people, it has created an opportunity for the government to win them over completely. If it fails, the people’s antipathy to the Taliban will get dissipated, and in time, turn into sympathy. This would make the army’s task that much more difficult. The exodus has created an opportunity for the army also for conducting operations in a relatively free environment.

Another act of the insurgents that has favoured the army immensely is their propensity for holding ground and fighting pitched battles. But this is not likely to last long as they cannot sustain the attrition thus caused, and sooner than later, they would have to revert to guerilla warfare and its classic hit-and-run tactics.

The army operation would then be reduced to small-scale actions by infantry platoons and companies.

The reason why counter-insurgency operations drag on is that when the insurgents come under pressure, they slip out to hit-and-run another day, as they did when the army went into Kalam and Bahrain. But when they hit and cannot run, demoralisation starts setting in. This can only be ensured when the theatre of operations, and within the theatre the area of operations, are sealed from all sides before an operation is undertaken to make escape from it or ingress into it difficult (Swat is a theatre, Mingora an area of operation).

It is this compulsion that consumes maximum troops, more so, when the terrain is harsh. Therefore, it is important for the army to make sure it doesn’t get overstretched by operating in multiple theatres at the same time. Thus the need to establish the right soldier-to-guerilla ratio on the basis of intelligence about the number of guerillas present in the theatre of operations, and within the theatre in each area of operation, as well as the number outside the theatre who could influence the operation. But since intelligence-gathering is far more difficult in a guerilla-warfare setting, it is better to err on the side of excess.

If the Soviets had secured the Pak-Afghan border, they could have severed the logistics line to the Mujahideen and thus created a major problem not only for the Mujahideen but also for their handlers in Pakistan. But they were unable to muster the troops required for this and paid heavily for it.

In the early days of the war in Vietnam, Generals Maxwell Taylor and Westmoreland suggested that a superiority of 10:1 would be necessary to defeat the Viet Cong, but as early as 1965, it was revised to 25:1, while after the defeat a ratio of 50:1 was bandied about.

The Taliban insurgents essentially are mountain fighters. When they come under pressure they withdraw into the mountains, their safe haven. But when these are denied to them they become vulnerable. Mountains therefore, constitute a key terrain for them as well as for the army. If the heights are secured by landing helicopter-borne troops on them, the insurgents in all probability would be forced down into the valleys, thus exposing themselves to pre-positioned units of the army. But if this doesn’t force them down, a downhill attack would.

Unless the insurgency is defeated in the tribal areas of Pakistan, the insurgency in Afghanistan will not be defeated. Therefore, it would be in America’s interest to provide the requisite number of troop-carrying helicopters and infantry’s night-vision devices to the

Pakistan Army and to redeploy their forces to make it difficult for the Afghan insurgents to cross into the tribal areas.

If they decline they would only reinforce the perception that in their ‘new strategy’, they see their battle for Afghanistan being fought by the Pakistan Army in Pakistan.

Fate has placed the destiny of Pakistan in the hands of the army. It is fighting a brutal enemy programmed by religious pseudso and supported by external elements inimical to Pakistan. The soldiers are fighting with great élan.

They are fighting a battle that has to be won — the battle for Pakistan. Every time a soldier is buried, we should remind ourselves of Pericles’ oration at the funeral of Athenians who died in 431 BC in the Peloponnesian War: “Take these men for your example. Like them remember that prosperity can only be for the free, that freedom is the sure possession of those who have the courage to defend it.”

Editorial, Dawn, Pakistan
By Tariq Fatemi
Thursday, 21 May, 2009

AS always, the US capital is in the throes of raging controversies. President Obama remains popular, while the Republican Party appears not to have found its bearings after its rout in the last election.

This has not stopped former vice president Dick Cheney from becoming Obama’s harshest critic and the previous administration’s most forceful defender.

The Republicans claim that Obama’s sudden reversal on the issue of the release of photographs depicting the abuse of detainees held by the US authorities abroad is the result of the pressure mounted by Cheney. While Obama claimed that the release of photos would endanger US troops abroad, a rights organisation charged that it “essentially renders meaningless Obama’s pledge of transparency and accountability” because the president “has become complicit with the torture that was rampant during the Bush years by being complicit in its cover-up”.

The Republicans have also seized on the opportunity provided by the gaffes of the powerful house speaker Nancy Pelosi, who is caught in a controversy regarding what she was told by the CIA about its interrogation methods way back in 2002. With Pelosi and the Obama-appointed CIA chief Leon Panetta engaged in a major public spat, the Republicans see in it the fortuitous weakening of the speaker with a negative impact on Obama’s legislative programmes.

In the field of foreign policy, Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to occupy centre-stage, with Obama hosting presidents Zardari and Karzai in an unusual trilateral summit. Prior to Zardari’s arrival, Holbrooke was tasked to limit the damage caused by Obama’s remarks and reiterate that the US was “not abandoning it (Pakistan), nor are we distancing ourselves from Zardari”. Administration officials also affirmed Obama’s support for “the democratically elected governments” of the two countries, although there was no personal endorsement of the leaders. Zardari’s spin masters, however, have claimed that the visit was highly successful, pointing to Holbrooke’s characterising of the talks as “extraordinary” and “unprecedented”. But the reality appeared at a lunch meeting where one senator made a most inappropriate remark about Zardari’s past reputation and another accused Karzai of taking more of “the illegal [drug] money than the Taliban”.

But the administration is pleased that Islamabad has undertaken a major military operation with greater resolve to eliminate the militants than before. Nevertheless, there is now concern that the exodus of residents from the affected areas to the cities could create a backlash and weaken support for the military operations. Some have expressed the fear that it could also trigger deep-seated tensions in Punjab and Karachi. This has led Admiral Mullen to remark that “my biggest concern is whether (Pakistan) will sustain it”.

In the meanwhile, the word currently in vogue in Washington is “counterinsurgency”. Gen David Petraeus, Centcom chief, is credited with being the inspiration for this latest military mantra. Its detractors however, fear that this doctrine could soon become unquestioned orthodoxy, distracting the US from other strategic options. In the meanwhile, it has already claimed its first casualty, with Gen McKiernan the top US commander in Afghanistan becoming the first military commander to be removed since President Truman fired Gen McArthur from his Korea command. Not surprisingly, his replacement Gen McChrystal and his new deputy, Gen Rodrigues, are both strong advocates of counterinsurgency.

Nevertheless, there is a growing realisation in Washington that it has only limited options to deal with the current situation in Pakistan. For the first time, there are some voices that the administration needs to come up with a more clear and convincing strategy for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In a recent piece in the Washington Post, Richard Haass, a former senior official in the Bush administration and who is currently president of the Council on Foreign Relations, had words of caution for the current set-up in Washington. Though convinced that Obama has opted for “a modest but not minimalist strategy [in Afghanistan] of targeting Al Qaeda, weakening the Taliban and strengthening the central government”, he points out that the US is “stretched economically and militarily”. He therefore recommends lowering its sights because it is better to have “partial success we can afford than expensive failures we cannot”.

Another evidence of ‘revisionism’ was evident in the debate in the house on the administration’s request for fresh appropriations for Afghanistan. While it was approved by an overwhelming majority, 51 members of the president’s party opposed the bill, with congresswoman Donna Edwards explaining that she could not support funding because the president lacked “a strategy for leaving Afghanistan”; while David Obey, the powerful chairman of the appropriations committee told the media that he would give Obama’s strategy a year to work before moving to the opposition. The paper described the move as a “modest but gathering opposition”.

In this context, US leaders (as well as ours), would do well to read the just published Power Rules by Leslie Gelb. A highly respected Washington veteran in government, journalism and think tanks, Gelb argues that the US may be the world’s indispensable power but cannot solve major problems on its own. In his incisive and compelling antidote to the fervour of ideologues, Gelb warns that “unilateral action even in military extremis is not likely to work”. He explains that other key nations — that too are unable to solve problems on their own — are equally indispensable as partners in solving problems and this leads him to the conclusion that the only way out is to promote multi-polarity. He therefore emphasises that “this clear mutual dependence makes mutual indispensability the central operating principle for power in the 21st century”. Finally, Gelb warns the politicians to “avoid the three demons of foreign policy: ideology, domestic politics and the arrogance of power”.

These are developments that need to be analysed by our leaders. For one, it is clear that during the next 12 to 18 months, the advocates of counterinsurgency are likely to be given a freer hand to make a concerted effort to eliminate the Al Qaeda leadership, even if this means more frequent drone attacks and cross-border incursions into Pakistan. But if that option fails, we can expect growing demands that the US review its overall strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, or as Haass counsels: “if it [US] fails to meet its objectives, it should resist increasing its effort much beyond current levels”. What will this strategic review mean for Pakistan, for we know that Obama is far too intelligent to allow the US to get stuck in a quagmire?