Kayani vows to reassert control over tribal belt
Friday, June 26, 2009
RAWALPINDI: Chief of the Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani on Thursday vowed to reassert government control in the lawless tribal belt.
A military statement said Gen Ashfaq Kayani spent the day in South Waziristan, where he met troops and commanders and held prayers for soldiers killed in fighting. On his arrival he was received by the Corps Commander. During the informal discussion with the troops, the COAS appreciated their performance and high morale. He also offered Fateha for the Shauhada of recent operations. He was also briefed in detail by the respective General Officer Commanding. The COAS stated that Pakistan Army is executing a deliberate ‘Campaign Plan’ to achieve the desired end and re-establish writ of the state while ensuring minimum loss to life and damage to property. He thanked the people for their whole-hearted support. He also paid rich tributes to the role of Pakistan Air Force in the ongoing operations. He appreciated the support of local tribes and urged them to use their full influence to rid the area of the terrorists.
Source
Labels: COAS, Kayani, South Waziristan, Tribal Areas, War on Terror
posted @ 9:26 AM,
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65 Taliban killed in Bannu and South Waziristan
Monday, June 15, 2009
RAWALPINDI: Security forces said on Sunday they killed 65 Taliban, including foreigners, and injured 50 in various army operations in South Waziristan and Bannu during the last 24 hours. “Thirty terrorists were killed, including a few foreigners, and 50 were injured at Makeen, South Waziristan due to the airstrike on Saturday,” the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) claimed in a statement.
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Labels: Taliban, Tribal Areas, War on Terror, Waziristan
posted @ 9:24 AM,
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Possible change in Taliban tactics
Monday, June 8, 2009
Monday, June 08, 2009
Events are taking place at a pace faster than they are analysed and interpreted. The Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under Baitullah Mehsud has announced it is going to target the provinces to relieve pressure on the FATA and Malakand regions. That is understood as normal retaliatory policy. But is there something more to what the TTP is planning? The latest death of Maulana Sufi Muhammad’s two close TNSM deputies poses a conundrum that must be carefully probed for new signals. The recent abduction of the Razmak College students and the targeting of Rescue 15 offices have also to be understood in a different light.
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Labels: Baitullah Mehsud, FATA, Malakand Operation, Swat Operation, Taliban, Tribal Areas
posted @ 10:00 AM,
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War in Waziristan
Thursday, June 4, 2009
Thursday, June 04, 2009
The militants have made it quite obvious the war that is being fought in Malakand and elsewhere must be extended to Waziristan. Indeed, the daring kidnapping of dozens of pupils of the Razmak Cadet College may even have been an attempt to force the military to open up a new front, before it had finished off the battle in Swat, thus hoping to stretch it to the maximum, and by doing so trip it up. There is still confusion over how many students and staff members were kidnapped. Numbers range from around 100 to over 500. But it is now clear not all have been recovered. Accounts from law enforcers say 71 out of 122 victims have been retrieved; the ISPR says 80 were recovered and 15 are still missing; some of those who have returned home after their ordeal say the number is higher. But somewhere in the lawless realms of South Waziristan, a number of terrified boys and possibly their teachers are in the hands of the Taliban. Some reports even suggest they may have been taken to Baitullah Mehsud himself. Certainly, that wily veteran of battle seems to be preparing for a new – and we hope final – confrontation.
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Labels: Extremism, Kidnapping, Razmak Cadet College, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas, Waziristan
posted @ 9:54 AM,
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Securing victory
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Tuesday, June 02, 2009
analysis: Rasul Bakhsh Rais
The political consensus and national solidarity that we have succeeded in building against the Taliban can lead us to an enduring victory if we pay greater attention to the non-military components of reconstruction and rehabilitation
Battling warlords and religious militants cannot be a seasonal venture or an on-and-off operation. As indicated by the plight of millions of displaced persons from the conflict zones and the great sacrifices made by our security forces and civilians, it is an extraordinary situation that nobody would like to repeat.
The presence of militant groups, both religious and ethnic, their warlordism — coercive self-imposition — on local populations and holding them hostage under perpetual fear of violence poses a grave national security threat. We cannot leave people at the mercy of private armies and their gendarmes.
If we allow such situations to develop, as has happened in our western borderlands, not only would the sovereignty of the state erode, as it has, the successful warlordism of one group would encourage similar or other types of groups — sectarian or ethnic — to take up arms against the state and challenge its writ.
It is not only the logic of coherence and territorial unity of the state, but also a fundamental constitutional responsibility of the state to guarantee freedom and safety of local populations and free them from brutal warlordism.
The nation state and the warlords trying to run a parallel system of security and governance have a dialectical relationship. The two cannot co-exist; one has to eliminate the other for its own survival. Pakistan faces this challenge because violent groups have established little fiefdoms on the periphery that now threaten the peace and security of our major population centres.
Why have such groups emerged and how can we effectively defeat them?
There is a pile of well-argued explanations for the emergence of militant groups, from the residue of our support to the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet occupation to the rise of militant political Islam. Also there happened to be a confluence of interests between an international coalition led by the United States during the Cold War to defeat communism, against which Pakistan was a frontline state, and the Islamist groups that had purely religious motivations against the Red Army.
The alliance between the two was opportunistic and accidental; neither ideological nor beyond the limits of Afghanistan. There was no clarity on what they would do after the common enemy was defeated, except for a vague expectation that the United States would stay on the ground and lead efforts to rebuild Afghanistan.
But Washington washed its hands of Afghanistan as soon as the Soviets began to withdraw, leaving it at the mercy of warring Mujahideen factions and Afghanistan’s predatory neighbours.
The international coalition that supported the Afghan Mujahideen gave no serious thought to normalising the devastated Afghan state and society. No one really bothered to consider the impact religious forces gloating over a historic victory against the Soviet Union and Afghan communists would have on regional security.
Being fixated just on humiliating and defeating the Soviet Union and not devoting political attention and resources to rebuilding Afghanistan and reintegrating Islamic militants peacefully back into society was a mistake of titanic proportions.
We now know the consequences of that neglect: civil war among Afghanistan’s social groups and the eventual emergence of the Taliban movement. Every neighbour of Afghanistan got sucked into the conflict, fuelling the fire of a war that demolished what was left of Afghan state and society.
The Taliban movement, backed by Pakistan and the Pashtun ethnic groups inside Afghanistan, routed other groups and warlords that were supported by Iran, Russia, India and some Central Asian states. That victory further contributed to two dangerous developments: rule by military conquest and transnational linkages among Islamist groups from an extended Central Asia to Pakistan.
It is a moot question whether it was the triumphalism of the transnational Islamists and their regional networking or the weakened position of countervailing forces like local opposition groups or the collapse of the state that facilitated the Taliban victory.
While making references to all other reasons related to the Cold War and Pakistan’s policy, let us not forget that militant religious groups and warlords have risen from the ruins of the states and their weak governing structures. In Afghanistan, there was no state left; only rival ethnic groups were left to fight the Taliban, and they couldn’t stand against the ferocious and determined Taliban force until the American-led international coalition with the cooperation of the Taliban’s ethnic rivals displaced them from power in 2001.
The governing capacity of the Pakistani state has gradually weakened in all areas, but notably more in the border regions because of the social, religious and political impact of the wars next door in Afghanistan.
Pakistan today faces the adverse consequences of the failure of the United States and other coalition partners in Afghanistan. After eight years of brutal and costly war, Afghanistan remains a fragile state, fragmented and in a state of perpetual war. The Taliban are now once again a rising force in Afghanistan as they have so far resisted the American efforts to pacify and rebuild the Pashtun areas.
There has indeed historically been a nexus between what happened in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s western borderlands. In this part of the world, conflicts and groups involved in conflicts have often spilled over across borders on grounds of religion or nationalism or both. Now there is yet another malignant factor: the presence of our adversary across the border that acts with malicious intent to destabilise the country and make our war against the Taliban costlier.
The mission and determination of the armed forces, political leaders and the nation at large today is to defeat the Taliban and their affiliated militant groups permanently. The political consensus and national solidarity that we have succeeded in building against the Taliban can lead us to an enduring victory if we pay greater attention to the non-military components of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the millions of displaced persons.
More importantly, the very causes that have contributed to the rise of the Taliban militancy need to be addressed. We have to rebuild credible state capacity with a focus on strengthening the police, the paramilitary forces and intelligence, accompanied by transparent development and good governance.
As Afghanistan is largely an American baby and its responsibility in terms of security and reconstruction, we can only hope the US will do better than it has done so far. We have a direct stake in the peace and political integrity of Afghanistan because its failures are going affect our security very adversely.
One way we can isolate our borderland from the conflicts in Afghanistan is to integrate these regions into mainstream Pakistan with similar institutions, legal system and social services delivery.
It is time to rethink tribal exceptionalism and its outdated institutions. The Afghan wars and the rise of militancy have damaged Pakistan, and no amount of social repairing is likely to succeed. The solution lies in slow political integration, economic development and effective and participatory statehood. Only that will win us the current war and future peace.
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
Source
Labels: FATA, Military Operation, Swat Operation, Tribal Areas, Waziristan
posted @ 10:53 AM,
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What we’re up against in Waziristan
Tuesday, June 02, 2009
The Taliban of Baitullah Mehsud suffered 25 dead after their attacks on army checkposts in South Waziristan and the Jandola frontier region were repulsed on Sunday. The attacks happened in the wake of the demand made by Baitullah that the army should leave “his area”. A similar demand had emanated from North Waziristan from his branch outfit there and other warlords with whom he is acting in cooperation. Sensing the coming storm, the local population is fleeing South Waziristan to swell the tide of refugees caused by Taliban atrocities in the semi-tribal areas under the NWFP government. The Army Public College Hangu was attacked on Sunday and its administrator cruelly done to death.
Baitullah Mehsud has suffered a defeat in Swat and his telephone call saying the Taliban should leave the area was intercepted by the army. The government has already announced that the army will go for Baitullah in his fastness of South Waziristan and this time everyone knows it means business, untied to any parliamentary resolution to evacuate the affected areas and allow “talks” with the killers. It is clear that skirmishes with the men of Baitullah Mehsud have already started and that the Taliban are forewarned about what they might face in the days to come. The truth is that they also knew what was coming in Swat but were shocked by the impact of the military attack.
As Swat is pacified in the days to come and the refugees start returning to their homes amid reinforced local administration, it will be time to think about the phenomenon of Baitullah Mehsud, the biggest warlord on both sides of the Durand Line, who has the backing of Al Qaeda and its international brigade of terrorists. It will be in order here to outline the organisational strength and firepower of this warlord with the help of the just-published book written by a Pashtun scholar Aqeel Yusufzai, titled Talibanisation (Urdu).
Baitullah Mehsud, born in Bannu, is from the Badwi Khel tribe, and his Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), while headquartered in Makin in South Waziristan, has branchline groups complete with their own commanders in North Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur and Khyber. Thanks to the jihadi groups once supported by the Pakistani state and because of their affiliations with Al Qaeda, TTP has its supporting manpower in all the four provinces, particularly in South Punjab where first contacts were made between Sipah Sahaba and its Arab patrons. The Pakistani press has already taken note of. Commanders Qari Hussain, Rais Khan, Salim Sakin, Azmatullah are his front-leaders in South Waziristan while Qari Hussain specialises in training suicide-bombers.
After tasting the toughness of his subordinate Taliban group in the Malakand division, one can estimate the kind of power he will use when challenged. In North Waziristan, considered a territory of the Jalaluddin Haqqani group, he has Nur Syed Amir, Faqir Dawar and Haji Aftab Khan; the last-named also charged with looking after Baitullah’s foreign guests from the Arab world, Central Asia, Chechnya in Russia and Xinjiang in China. Commanders who lead bands of Taliban marauders in other agencies are: Hakimullah (Orakzai and Kurram with 8,000 men), Rehmanullah and Hazrat Ali (Khyber, 1,200), Umar Khalid (Mohmand, 5,000), and Faqir Muhammad (Bajaur, 5,000). Baitullah himself is estimated to dispose of 30,000 warriors, supplemented with Tahir Yuldashev’s 4,000 Uzbeks and other “foreigners”. The TTP could have nearly 50,000 men at its disposal. If you also count the non-Baitullah Taliban, the total estimate comes to over 100,000.
According to some estimates, Baitullah could have in his kitty around Rs 4 billion to spend annually. This money comes from drugs facilitated by Al Qaeda contacts, Arab money from the Gulf, money made from kidnapping for ransom, looting of banks, smuggling and “protection money” in general. He has weapons produced in Russia, the US and India, and has been looting explosives produced at the Wah munitions factory. His strength has been built up during a period of benign neglect in Islamabad, which has been focusing on India as the country’s premier threat. But Swat has proved that the Taliban can be taken on and defeated. The national consensus is there and crucial international support in these lean times is forthcoming too. *
Source
Labels: Counter Insurgency, Extremism, Insurgency, Militancy, Military Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas, Waziristan
posted @ 10:49 AM,
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Taliban kidnap 500 students, teachers in FR Bannu
Tuesday, June 02, 2009
MIRANSHAH/PESHAWAR: Taliban gunmen were accused Monday of brazen abduction of a convoy of 30 buses carrying more than 500 students and staff of Razmak Cadet College (of North Waziristan) in Frontier Region (FR) Bannu.
They were on their way to Bannu after the college closed for its summer vacation, town police chief Iqbal Marwat said.
“Only two buses carrying some 25 students reached Bannu,” Marwat said, adding that about 28 buses carrying around 400 students were missing.
“They have been kidnapped by Taliban militants,” Marwat told AFP.
The college is an army-run educational institution for civilians. Those kidnapped include students and civilian staff, he said.
Officials told Daily Times the convoy reached Kajori checkpost on the border of North Waziristan and FR Bannu safe, but were abducted from Marwat Kanal area in Baqakhel police precincts.
“Militants started firing in the air to stop the vehicles and then they forcibly drove them to unknown place,” Javed Alam, vice principal of the college, told a private television channel. APP quoted Alam as saying that only 15 students and five teachers had been abducted.
“We were in a convoy of around 30 vehicles, escorted by tribal police, when masked men stopped our vehicles and started asking questions,” said Mohammad Shafiq, a ninth grade student among those who fled.
“They asked us whether we are army recruits, first they were questioning us in Urdu and then in Pashto,” he said. “They stopped us for some time but allowed most of those students who were from the tribal areas to go,” Shah Hussain, another student in the same class said. haji mujtaba/agencies
Source
Labels: Bannu, Extremism, Kidnapping, Militancy, Military Operation, Miranshah, Razmak Cadet College, Students, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas
posted @ 10:40 AM,
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New determination?
Friday, May 29, 2009
Friday, May 29, 2009
There is a change in the attitude of the government, most of the political parties and the various law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. The change is that finally the scales seem to have fallen from their eyes and, to double the metaphor, the gloves have come off. Hitherto there has been an obvious reticence to take on some of the terrorist and extremists that threaten all of us. The reasons for this are – were – many and complex; ranging from those who saw the terrorists as somehow 'on our side' to those who understood them only in the context of them being a tool in the hand of external forces.
There are several indicators that allow us to make the deduction that something really has changed. One of them is the arrest in Islamabad of a man said to be a senior Taliban commander, who was picked up whilst being taken from the house of a cleric prominent in the Lal Masjid movement to another safe house. The car he was travelling in was being driven by a former FATA parliamentarian – a man who might have expected a degree of immunity in all but the most recent past. Such men are not strangers come amongst us to fight some proxy battle on behalf of foreign powers. They are our own people who, for whatever reason, have gone down a path that leads them away from the principles that our state was founded upon. Now is the time for us all, every man woman and child who has an investment in the stability and prosperity of Pakistan, to stand four-square against them, for they are the evil that darkens all our lives.
Source
Labels: FATA, Militancy, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas
posted @ 6:16 PM,
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Quote – unquote
Sunday, May 24, 2009
Sunday, May 24, 2009
President Zardari has said that he did not say 'Waziristan is next' in an interview published by the London Sunday Times on May 17. The interview was subsequently widely referred to by our electronic and print media. Speaking on Friday last he said…"I had said the government would eliminate militancy wherever it felt the need to do so" - which is not the same as saying 'Waziristan is next.' There is no shortage of politicians who are quoted and 'on the record' one day and deny that they said anything of the sort the next – and not just politicians; everybody from soap-opera stars to scientists pontificating on swine-fever deny their words despite having been filmed and recorded as having said them. Much of the time the dispute about who said what and when is nothing more than a storm in a teacup and dies down as quickly as it flared up. But the president's alleged words which were published in a reputable newspaper carry weight - and in these troubled times, consequence. At least some of those leaving Waziristan now are moving as a direct result of the 'Waziristan is next' quote.
The puzzle with the president's most recent quote about his interview with the Sunday Times (conducted by Christina Lamb, who knows more than many western journalists about the ins and outs of Pakistani politics) is that nowhere in the interview is he quoted as saying 'the government would eliminate militancy wherever it felt the need to do so'. Nor does the word 'Waziristan' appear anywhere either – at least in the online version of the interview. The problem of the 'missing' quotes may lie in the difference between the printed and the electronic versions of the same interview. There are often significant differences in terms of content between the newspaper as sold to the customer on the street and the newspaper accessed online. Online content is sometimes edited differently to the print version of the paper, usually by a different team of people and not infrequently in a different building. As things stand we are unable to make a comparison between the two versions and thus cannot know definitively.
No matter, the president has said in an interview with a private TV channel that 'the government will hunt down the Taliban everywhere in the country' – and 'the country' clearly includes Swat but – arguably - not Waziristan. The status of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is hedged with ambiguity, and whilst they are considered a part of Pakistan by the federal government the inhabitants frequently feel very differently. Reports of an 'operation' – which is not an 'operation' according to the army spokesman – in South Waziristan Agency may be the first indicators that the army is going to take the fight into the Tribal Agencies, boots on the ground. Not since 2002 has the army ventured across the line and into the Agencies, but needs must when the devil drives. The president may or may not have said something like 'Waziristan is next' – and it is in a sense immaterial either way. Waziristan is next; and we support the army and the government in their fight against those who would drag us back to the Dark Ages; and if in the process a little enlightenment is brought to the obscurantists of FATA, then so be it.
Source
Labels: FATA, Militants, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas, Waziristan, Zardari
posted @ 10:14 AM,
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What is false within
Saturday, May 23, 2009
May 23, 2009
ANALYSIS:Salman Tarik Kureshi
A holistic process of integration will be needed. Such a process is only possible after (and if) the cleansing process, commenced so far in Swat and Buner, is fully and successfully extended to FATA
Three weeks into action, the Malakand campaign is mercifully uninterrupted by faint-hearted politicos, milquetoast Assembly resolutions or disastrous ‘deals’. Unlike in the past, it certainly seems that this action will continue until substantive results are achieved. A little introspection would not be out of place.
In a time that now seems many ages away, the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto mused upon “the stirrings of a revolution” in the Third World and felt that this could “never be suppressed”. He said, “We all [are] children of revolution, a revolution whose onward march may sometimes be arrested by our own weaknesses and contradictions but cannot be stopped... We in the Third World should not be swayed by conspiratorial theories and forget the fact that the fault lies on the ground and within ourselves. To quote Meredith, we are betrayed by what is false within.”
In the three-and-a-half decades since these musings, the revolution perceived by Mr Bhutto seems to have evaporated and conspiratorial theories spawn unendingly as the Pakistani state shakes itself to pieces. The fatal flaw truly lies, it seems, within our selves, in what is false within.
Even at the time Mr Bhutto recorded these observations, at least one such fatal falsity was exemplified in the fawning figure by the prime minister’s own side of a military general, whose obsequious manner disguised immense and ruthless personal ambition. Where we are today, in Swat, Waziristan and elsewhere, is owed in substantial measure to the dark regime visited on the country by this satanic general.
But it is altogether too easy to pin the blame for all that has gone wrong on the shoulders of a single fanatical evildoer. There was much that was ‘false within’ during the regime of Mr Bhutto, his predecessors and his successors — the prime minister’s own blind hubris being not the only fatal flaw.
A ‘fatal flaw’ is a fundamental defect — a blind spot, a false intent, a dishonourable policy — that ineluctably leads to tragic disaster. These are distinct from the societal ‘fault lines’ (of ethnicity, class, sect, tribe, whatever), so beloved of political commentators, which cause conflicts within a political entity. Properly handled, such angularities are capable of yielding powerful syntheses.
But the kinds of fatal flaws that lie deep within the psyche of our ruling groups, have led only to violence, bloodshed and social breakdown. They are the false institutional threads woven through the warp and woof of this country’s social and political fabric.
One such fatal flaw has been the contempt for constitutional principles and the rule of law that has permitted continued existence of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas: these are all said to be under the direct charge of the President of the Islamic Republic.
But, let it be quite clear, the laws of the state of Pakistan do not prevail here. This is both a legal fact and a reality on the ground. Now, if the normal laws of a state do not apply in a particular region, meaning that the legislature of the state cannot legislate regarding that region, ordinary logic inescapably suggests that the state cannot be considered as sovereign in that region.
From the beginning, Pakistan has done nothing to integrate these regions with the rest of the country. Worse, where the administrators of the British Raj, through a combination of guile and clever management, had generally succeeded in exercising substantial indirect control over these areas, even their kind of hikmat-e amli has since disappeared altogether.
A flourishing trade in smuggled goods sprang up in the FATA belt. Customs check posts were established well inside the borders of Pakistan in a futile attempt at preventing these goods from entering our cities without paying customs levies.
In the course of time, other extra-legal trades developed: illicit weaponry and illicit drugs. Kalashnikovs, Uzis, TTs and Mausers were streaming southwards to meet the demand of the criminal bands, ethnic gangs and sectarian killers of Karachi.
As regards drugs, the heroin factories in FATA, which appeared in the subcontinent for the first time, churned out their lethal powders for marketing into Karachi (which came to boast of the largest population of hard drug addicts anywhere) and export to the rest of the world.
By the 1990s, motor vehicles stolen in Lahore and other cities were being spirited away into the tribal areas, there to be repainted and sold back into those very cities. Kidnap victims were lodged in this wild region-beyond-the-law while their fingers and toes were cut off one at a time and dispatched to their relatives to stimulate rapid compliance with ransom demands.
The point is that, thanks to the negligence of every Pakistani government over the decades, these regions had been allowed to become a Criminal’s Paradise — an extended band of lawlessness along our northwest that sheltered and offered a staging ground for every kind of organised crime and hospitable refuge to fugitives from justice. These latter have included the leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
At first, they used these regions principally as staging grounds for incursions into Afghanistan, actions that both NATO and President Karzai are continually protesting. But, after 2003, the regime of General Pervez Musharraf permitted the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan of Baitullah Mehsud and others to gain control of a huge swathe of territory, within which it now actively governs — collecting taxes and operating a crude police force and primitive justice system.
Whatever negligible writ of the threatened state of Pakistan may have existed, it has completely disappeared now and this region has become an entirely separate ‘Islamic Emirate’. The violent primitives spawned here have erupted outward to the districts of Pishin, Peshawar, Bannu, Kohat and, most dramatically, the Swat valley. They have carried their war against the state of Pakistan into our major cities, from Peshawar to Karachi, and abroad to Mumbai. Their terror bombings have caused the mass murder of citizens everywhere and they are clearly implicated in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.
Victory in Swat will be utterly incomplete if the tribal regions are not also cleansed of these murderous insurgents. More, the state of Pakistan will remain in mortal peril. The point is that the FATA Band of Anarchy will continue to fling out destructive tendrils in every direction, until such time as this belt ceases to exist as a separate political and administrative entity.
As I have suggested in these pages before, a holistic process of integration — comprising a raft of constitutional, economic, ideological and administrative measures — will be needed. Such a process is only possible after (and if) the cleansing process, commenced so far in Swat and Buner, is fully and successfully extended to FATA.
To enlarge on the lines from George Meredith that Mr Bhutto quoted above:
It’s morning: but no morning can restore
What we have forfeited...In tragic life,
No villain need be! Passions spin the plot:
We are betrayed by what is false within.
The long-standing neglect of the tribal areas is only one of the many fatal flaws that is destroying us. There are others, on some of which I will touch in later articles, but this one has had a special significance. Worse (and this is the tragic part), it had been capable of less painful remedy for most of our history.
Source
Labels: FATA, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas, Waziristan
posted @ 9:59 AM,
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A war on two fronts
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
By S.M. Naseem
Wednesday, 20 May, 2009
THE Pakistan Army’s sudden escalation of hostilities against the Taliban in the last two weeks, without prior preparation to prevent or minimise collateral damage, has landed the country, even if unintentionally, in its worst humanitarian crisis since its inception.
Back then, people were willing to pay any price to secure their freedom and new home. No one then had any doubts that the war for which they were laying down their lives and for which millions were abandoning their hearths and homes, even as old inhabitants ecstatically welcomed the refugees, was their own and that they were fully prepared to face and share its consequences.
A similar, if contextually different, response was witnessed during the 2005 earthquake when hundreds of thousands of refugees were forced to seek shelter, albeit temporarily, in various urban centres in the country until their homes and communities were rebuilt with government help — a task that is yet to be completed. Successive governments seem to accumulate unfinished agendas as new ones are thrust on them either by the vagaries of nature or their own follies.
The early 1980s brought us another humanitarian disaster in the form of the influx of Afghan refugees. This influx — thought to be temporary — was welcomed as a Pashtunwali gesture. It came with the safe haven we provided to Afghan warlords, militant religious extremism and the drug and Kalashnikov culture.
Things are different today as we face the second largest internal migration in our history since 1947. Although many, especially among the elite, call it the result of Pakistan’s “existentialist war”, others, even among those directly affected by the war, refuse to accept its ownership, attributing its illegitimate paternity to the US and Pakistani military establishments. The reality is, of course, much more complex than either of the two oversimplified versions, although both have some truth to them.
The fact is that large swathes of our country are today beyond the writ of the state and various insurgencies, representing legitimate and contrived grievances, dominate certain parts. Of these, the Taliban and the Baloch nationalists’ issues have acquired urgency. Although the latter has much greater political significance as an “existentialist threat” for Pakistan, as well as being a secular struggle which could transform into an Intifada of sorts, the focus currently is on the former because of US involvement and the inducement of billions of aid being promised to fight that menace. To that extent, it is, at least partly, an American war, or at best an American-army war.
Regardless of the differences regarding their genesis and motivation, there is considerable unanimity now — although differences on a common strategy still remain — that the Taliban have become a formidable threat to the integrity, progress and prosperity of the Pakistani nation and that they can’t be allowed to impose their despicable version of religion by force, as they have attempted to in Swat.
Whether it was wise on the part of the political class to allow them political space by accepting an indigenous legal system and whether the Taliban succeeded in hoodwinking the people that they wanted to dismantle an unjust socioeconomic order is now moot. Their reneging on the agreement to lay down arms and accept the writ of the constitution, which Sufi Mohammad, the Taliban intermediary, rejected as un-Islamic, and their armed intrusion into Dir and Buner, have gone against them.
True much of the blame for the fiasco lies at the door of those who negotiated and canvassed for the Nizam-i-Adl. But the army and intelligence agencies can’t be absolved of not nipping the insurgency in the bud and, more importantly, not being prepared with a plan for well-thought-through army action that would include the evacuation of civilians from the targeted area in advance. The pace and timing of the army’s action seems to have been dictated more by the need of getting financial support from Washington than by meeting the challenges in Pakistan.
If military sources are to be believed, the delayed fast-track action in Buner, Dir and Swat has already killed about a quarter of the 4,000 Taliban insurgents facing about 10,000 Pakistani troops during the last two weeks. Whether or not the tide of Taliban insurgency has been stemmed significantly, will become evident only when at least some of the trapped insurgents begin to surrender and people in the affected areas begin to trek back to their homes in sufficient numbers. However, the ISPR has been reticent about collateral damage, which independent reports indicate are high, since the techniques adopted are similar to those used by American forces in Iraq.
Currently, the second front of the battle against the Taliban — that for hearts and minds, rather than hearths and homes — is being fought in a score of refugee camps set up in the adjacent Pakhtunkhwa areas and in the countless temporary shelters all over the country and in the homes of friends and relatives. Up to two million people have been displaced and the arrangements in the refugee camps are inadequate and their management far from satisfactory — far below the standards, by no means spectacular, achieved during the 2005 earthquake. The private relief effort is stated to have exceeded the official effort by a margin of three to one.
If military action continues for much longer, citizens will get weary and the refugees will get restless and may even succumb to the lure of the Taliban’s agenda. There is, therefore, the need to upscale and remove imperfections in the public relief effort, along with increasing the intensity of military action while keeping collateral damage to a minimum. Otherwise, the Taliban will gain ground as modern-day Robin Hoods.
The management of the relief effort is far more haphazard and half-hearted than in the case of the 2005 earthquake, which unravelled without prior warning, unlike the present disaster. It is regrettable that the disaster relief lessons learnt and institutions created after the 2005 earthquake have not been invoked in the present situation.
The Pakistani Army today faces its biggest challenge in redeeming itself in the eyes of the nation since 1971 when it lost half the country and later when it got itself involved in two prolonged periods of ruling the nation, destroying democracy in the process. It has a chance to prove that it is on the same page as the civilian government to save the integrity of the nation and restore peace.
Labels: Army Operation, FATA, IDPs, Militants, Refugees, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas
posted @ 2:00 PM,
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A united front
Wednesday, 20 May, 2009
THE all-parties conference was meant to sound out the political spectrum on the necessity of the battle underway in Malakand division, but, in truth, all eyes were on one man and his party: Nawaz Sharif and the PML-N. With the PPP, MQM and ANP fully behind the military operation and even the PML-Q appearing supportive in public, the only real question was whether the PML-N would join in accepting the necessity of the operation. And to Mr Sharif’s credit he has done just that, accepting that the state was left with no choice but to fight after the militants in Malakand division had effectively closed the door on the policy of dialogue. So, with the overwhelming majority of parliament now behind the government’s policy, the Pakistan Army now has a clear mandate to fight and defeat the militants. Pakistan, it seems, may have finally turned the page on the militancy issue and at long last may have begun to present a unified national front against the militants. If that is indeed the case, then it has been achieved not a moment too soon given the alarming rise of militancy in recent years.
The PML-N’s support for a national policy against militancy is important for two reasons. First, militancy will not be defeated today, tomorrow or even a year from now. A tough, drawn-out fight should be expected, and it will involve many different areas of Pakistan. Second, the PML-N is the only real political rival to the PPP, with all other parties ranking a distant third among the electorate. Given Pakistan’s unstable political culture and unpredictability of events here, a situation in which both the two major parties in the country accept and understand the need for the military option in certain circumstances bodes well for Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, extremism and militancy.
The emphatic verdict of the APC — the resolution issued afterwards was airy and soft, but in Pakistan the wording of such resolutions is rarely of major importance — may also have a positive effect on the thinking of the Pakistan Army. Until now, the army has appeared reluctant to take on the militants on multiple fronts simultaneously, perhaps because it has been worried about the lack of popular support for such large-scale operations on Pakistani territory. But now the army may be encouraged to go beyond firefighting and think bigger — there is little doubt that at some point the focus must turn to the Waziristan agencies in Fata, where the threat that lurks may be larger than that in Swat by an order of magnitude. Be that as it may, the military option must always be weighed carefully. Fighting is serious business with serious consequences for the population, the army and the government — it should only be resorted to with a clearly defined objective and well-thought-out strategy in place.
Labels: FATA, Militants, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas
posted @ 1:54 PM,
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APC unanimity
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
In an unusual demonstration of harmony, all the major political parties in the country backed the operation in Swat. The loud chorus in favour of the move against militants meant that the feeble voice of dissent raised by several religious parties and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf was more or less completely drowned out. For the government this marks a big success. The strong backing of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz proved finally to be the key factor in swinging the balance and ensuring that no notable voice of opposition was heard. From the APC, it seems clear that all major parties in the country have recognized there is no choice but to battle militants with all the might we can muster. This is an important development for several reasons; The end to the dichotomy of opinion, as far as mainstream forces go, on how to handle the Taliban should help build support for our soldiers entrenched in battle in the north. The confusion over the need for them to do so should indeed end. The APC verdict will help achieve this with major political leaders making it clear there is no doubt in their minds as to what is needed and why.
The meeting also represented a forum where, perhaps for the first time, leaders also spoke out against those opposing the military operation. Their silence suggests they had few answers to give. Indeed some seem to have been persuaded as to the right of what was happening, with Imran Khan finally signing the joint declaration after ANP leaders answered questions that he put to them, claiming confusion over issues linked to the operation. In a state of civil war, it is always useful for either side to have public opinion behind it. The considerable force of this opinion seems now to be moving against the Taliban. Whether they have come about by accident or design, the events of the past few months have played a part in making this possible. The militants have been discredited, they have been increasingly exposed as mindless savages and this has played a part in the building of the consent we now see. The fact that it coincides with news of major military successes is also welcome and should help secure the victory that does not seem too far away.
But all the political parties, and the rest of us too, need to keep in mind that this may not be the final triumph. A great deal will still need to be done to ensure the victory is a lasting one. As we move into this phase, we will need the parties to come forward with their thoughts and ideas and to act as a kind of pressure group on government. We must then hope all the political players are looking too towards this future, and are ready to play their part in building one that would ensure peace and security for the people of the northern areas and also those in other parts of the country.
Labels: APC, Militants, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas
posted @ 1:13 PM,
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Losing Pakistan
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
US drones have just killed 29 tribesmen in Mirali, North Waziristan. The military invasion of Swat continues meanwhile. The story has already dropped out of headlines, in some cases vanishing altogether, meanwhile nearly a 1000 people have been killed, more than a million displaced, with most of their property and livelihoods destroyed. The following analysis from Brig (ret) F. B. Ali is astute when it comes to describing the error and futility of this operation, but it overstates the likelihood of Islamist take over in Pakistan, the chances of which are close to zero. (via Col. Pat Lang’s indispensable Sic Semper Tyrannis).
The tragedy now unfolding in Pakistan is occurring due the pursuit of shortsighted policies by the United States as well as the Pakistan government and military. The US has pressured Pakistan into engaging in brutal military operations in Bajaur and Swat, with no regard for how this would affect its own vital interests in the region. The Pakistani rulers (bedazzled by the glitter of all those promised billions) have meekly complied in waging war on parts of their own people, again with no thought to the likely outcome for them and their country. The main impact of this has been to the civilian population, some million and a half of whom have been displaced (with many killed and maimed, although no figures for these are yet available).
Incidentally, what Pakistan is doing is little different from what Sudan did in Darfur and what the Sri Lankan government is now doing – fighting an insurgency with minimal or no regard for civilians in the area. This got Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir indicted as a war criminal, while the Sri Lankan government is the object of widespread condemnation in the West. Even Israel got a few taps on its knuckles for its indiscriminate brutality in Gaza. Pakistan, however, is being widely lauded for its resolute “war on terror”. Apparently, causing avoidable human suffering while waging this particular war is more palatable than in other cases.
In a previous article (Marching to the Edge – Eyes Wide Shut) I analysed the real threat that the United States faces in this theatre, and recommended what might be a rational policy for it to pursue. This was to first shore up Pakistan instead of waging a war in Afghanistan (with Pakistan forced to act in a supporting role). I warned that a failure to do this risked losing Pakistan to the Islamists, which would render pointless whatever the US could achieve in Afghanistan. The likelihood of such a policy being adopted is nil, unfortunately, since the present administration has continued the Bush practice of letting generals set national policy in this theatre. The generals are fixated on their war in Afghanistan, and Pakistan figures only as an often-reluctant subordinate player in their operations.
What remains to be described is how this tragedy will likely unfold as Pakistan slides ever closer to an Islamist takeover. The current military operation in Swat (like the earlier one in Bajaur) consists mainly of subjecting successive areas to heavy bombardment from the air and the ground, behind which ground troops advance, shooting at anyone they encounter (including unfortunate civilians trying to flee). The area thus occupied is then subjected to an indefinite curfew, and again anyone seen outside is shot (often civilians trying to flee or seek food and water). The hardened Taliban militants, who had moved into Swat from the adjoining tribal area (FATA), have mostly slipped back to their own areas, leaving behind local diehards to attain the honour of martyrdom (those not so inclined merely bury their weapons and mingle with the escaping refugees).
So, even though a famous victory will undoubtedly be won, this military operation is unlikely to do much lasting damage to the Taliban. The army will, in due course, occupy much of the inhabited portions of the Swat valley (but not the hilly regions). The million plus displaced refugees will rush back to find their homes demolished or looted, and most civic infrastructure destroyed, and with it their means of livelihood. As would already have happened in the camps they came from, the flood of US and international aid dollars would dwindle to a trickle by the time it reached them after passing through so many sticky fingers. The main relief effort will be mounted by the Islamist aid organizations, just as they did after the 2005 earthquake in Northern Pakistan. They will thereby win many friends and much goodwill, unlike the Pakistan government and the US, which is even now seen as the instigator of this operation and the resulting calamity. Ultimately, the army will have to depart, and the same ineffective, corrupt and complicit civil administration will return. And so will the Taliban, digging up their black turbans and AK-47s.
Meanwhile, the US war in Afghanistan will continue, and the need to stop the Taliban from using the FATA as a base and launching pad for attacks will intensify. Washington will twist some arms and thump some tables, and the hapless Pakistan military will have to go in and clean up FATA as it did Bajaur and Swat. Another miserable wave of destitute Pashtun refugees will flood back into the adjoining settled areas, to meet the same indifferent care that the refugees from Bajaur and Swat received. The Taliban will not only fade away into the hills and caves of FATA and Afghanistan, but also infiltrate into the interior of Pakistan. FATA will become a depopulated free-fire zone, but scattered garrisons and air attacks will not be able to stop guerrillas from using it as a base to attack both Afghanistan and Pakistan (nor will magical drones manipulated from balmy Florida).
Taliban infiltration and Pashtun alienation (due to these operations by a largely Punjabi military) will likely lead to the collapse of government in the NW Frontier province, allowing an insurgency to grow in this area (low-level, but considerably worse than the one now occurring in Baluchistan). The ethnic conflict now simmering in Karachi will escalate. The Taliban militants who have infiltrated into the cities and towns will stage bombings and attacks in them. All this will intensify the many internal strains and problems already plaguing Pakistan (which I spelt out in my earlier article). Throwing US money at this mess will not make much difference, except to hugely inflate some bank accounts in obscure tax havens. Pakistan is not a very strong and stable structure as it is; under all these additional pressures and complications, something has to give.
Casual or uninformed outside observers are quick to predict the break-up of Pakistan under pressure. That is unlikely, though it remains a possibility at the end of a long chain of adverse events. What is most likely is a change in the present governance structure. Pakistan is currently ruled by one man, Asif Zardari (the facade of democracy notwithstanding). Mr. Zardari, and his policy of unlimited support for US policies in the region, is extremely unpopular (in an opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in March 2009 he was the most disliked politician in Pakistan (72%) with only 17% liking him). When conditions in the country worsen due to the “war on terror”, he and his subservience to the US will be blamed, and he is unlikely to be able to remain in power for long. (The delegation from Dubai is ever ready to depart, uttering in farewell those immortal words that Douglas Adams put into the mouths of his departing celestial dolphins: So long, and thanks for all the fish).
Mr. Zardari’s most likely replacement will either be his political rival, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, or an Islamist military junta. Mr. Sharif is currently displaying a somewhat tentative friendship for the US. But, if he comes into power on a wave of anti-US sentiment (whether through an early election, a popular movement, or military intervention), his policies will be radically different from those of the present government. This will probably cause US (and international) aid to dry up, and as this exacerbates the country’s problems, he will have to lean increasingly on Islamists (political Islamists, not the Taliban), and they will gradually take over the government.
Another possible scenario is an Islamist military coup. Though possible at any time (it is unclear how deeply they have penetrated the military, but nationalist fervour easily shades into the Islamist variety), it becomes much more likely if governance in the country seriously breaks down, or the military buckles under the combined pressures of trying to support the US war in Afghanistan, combatting insurgencies and militant attacks at home, while all the time looking apprehensively over its shoulder at the “threat” posed by an India it does not trust. A takeover of the military and the government by a group of Islamist officers could well occur in such circumstances.
Whatever the actual chain of events that transpires, the great (and avoidable) tragedy is that the policies the US is pursuing in the region greatly increase the likelihood of the loss of Pakistan to the Islamists. The frightening consequences of this, for both Pakistan and the US, are easy to imagine. Any successes the generals can achieve in their war in Afghanistan would be meaningless; military campaigns divorced from the real needs of national policy usually end up as expensive failures. The pages of history are littered with them.
© F B Ali (May 2009)
Labels: Militants, Pakistan Army Operation, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas
posted @ 11:25 AM,
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Zardari seeks drone technology: Pakistan to take Taliban war into Tribal Areas
Monday, May 18, 2009
Monday, May 18, 2009
LAHORE: Pakistan will soon extend its war on the Taliban to the Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan, President Asif Zardari said on Sunday.
“We’re going to go into Waziristan, all these regions, with army operations,” he told The Sunday Times in an interview. “Swat is just the start. [There’s] a larger war to fight.”
He said Pakistan would need billions of pounds in military assistance and aid for up to 1.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), on account of the operation.
“We need much, much more than the $1 billion [military aid] we’ve been getting, which is nothing,” Zardari said. “We’ve got 150,000 troops in [the Tribal Areas] – just the movement of that number would cost $1 billion,” he added.
Zardari may get the cash but the US administration is less likely to accede to his wish of being given US drones, claimed a Times report.
“I want drones,” Zardari had said. “I want transfer of technology so I can manufacture them at home and use them myself.”
Last week, for the first time, the US shared surveillance data collected by drones with Pakistan.
Referring to his recent visit to Libya, the US, Britain and France, Zardari shrugged off all suggestions that he has abandoned his country in its darkest hour. “This is not just Pakistan’s problem,” he said, “It’s the world’s problem”.
Sufi’s exposure: Zardari still insists the peace deal under which the Taliban were to administer Swat and six other districts, in return for laying down their arms, was the right move. “It was a good thing, because it exposed Sufi Muhammad for what he was,” he said.
To take on the Taliban, Pakistan Army is for the first time accepting counter-insurgency training on its own soil from British and US troops.
Senior US officials told The Wall Street Journal that 25 to 50 special forces personnel are to be based at two new training camps in Balochistan. The army is planning to open new fronts in Waziristan and Darra Adam Khel.
Labels: Pakistan Army Operation, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas, Zardari
posted @ 12:38 PM,
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Pakistan army plans to open second front against Taliban
Friday, May 15, 2009
The army, which is fighting in Swat Valley and two neighbouring districts in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), is planning to begin a new offensive in the badlands of the Waziristan tribal areas as early as next month, sources told The Daily Telegraph.
"The army is planning to go into Waziristan, possibly in June, which will involve huge numbers of troops in an attempt to establish some sort of state control over the area," said a source close to the Pakistani military.
Washington has intensified pressure on Pakistan to launch an offensive in Waziristan since President Barack Obama came to power.
Read more
Labels: Army Operation, FATA, Pakistan, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas, Waziristan
posted @ 11:59 AM,
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