More information needed
Friday, May 29, 2009
Editorial, Dawn, Pakistan
Friday, 29 May, 2009
EVALUATING the success or otherwise of Operation Rah-i-Raast in Malakand division up to now has been difficult because of the lack of independent reports from the area. Every day the public relations arm of the Pakistan Army has issued statements listing the number of casualties on both sides, the areas where battles have been fought and the neighbourhoods which have been retaken. But owing to the curfew imposed in the areas where the fighting has been the fiercest, the difficulty in establishing contact with the outside world for locals and the lack of reporters on the ground, it has not been possible to develop a reliable, independent picture of the situation in Malakand. On Wednesday, journalists were given a tour of some parts of Mingora in Swat, 70 per cent of which the army claims has been secured, but as is the nature of such supervised visits, a full picture of the situation in the area could not be gleaned.
No doubt that while the fighting continues the safety and security of reporters must be kept in mind. And there is no reason to believe the press statements of the army are exaggerated or untrue. But equally there is a need to verify the government’s and the army’s claims and that will only be possible if reporters are given more access to Malakand. There are two main issues at stake here. One, the actions of the state must be open to scrutiny wherever possible. Fighting a counter-insurgency is by definition a messy business, but the state must necessarily be held to a higher standard than the militants. Every care must be taken to ensure that it is the militants who are bearing the brunt of the military operation and not the local population, and determining whether that is indeed what is happening must not be left to the state to decide for itself. Second, more access for reporters and greater transparency can help defeat the propaganda and misinformation being spread by the militants. For example, there are reports that the militants remove weapons and ammunition from the bodies of militants killed in battle to make it appear that civilians have been killed instead. Without independent verification of such reports, the issue becomes one of the state’s word against the militants’ and in such circumstances disproving such rumours becomes impossible, with damaging consequences for public support for the military operation. The bottom line: more information from independent sources is necessary and beneficial.
Source
Friday, 29 May, 2009
EVALUATING the success or otherwise of Operation Rah-i-Raast in Malakand division up to now has been difficult because of the lack of independent reports from the area. Every day the public relations arm of the Pakistan Army has issued statements listing the number of casualties on both sides, the areas where battles have been fought and the neighbourhoods which have been retaken. But owing to the curfew imposed in the areas where the fighting has been the fiercest, the difficulty in establishing contact with the outside world for locals and the lack of reporters on the ground, it has not been possible to develop a reliable, independent picture of the situation in Malakand. On Wednesday, journalists were given a tour of some parts of Mingora in Swat, 70 per cent of which the army claims has been secured, but as is the nature of such supervised visits, a full picture of the situation in the area could not be gleaned.
No doubt that while the fighting continues the safety and security of reporters must be kept in mind. And there is no reason to believe the press statements of the army are exaggerated or untrue. But equally there is a need to verify the government’s and the army’s claims and that will only be possible if reporters are given more access to Malakand. There are two main issues at stake here. One, the actions of the state must be open to scrutiny wherever possible. Fighting a counter-insurgency is by definition a messy business, but the state must necessarily be held to a higher standard than the militants. Every care must be taken to ensure that it is the militants who are bearing the brunt of the military operation and not the local population, and determining whether that is indeed what is happening must not be left to the state to decide for itself. Second, more access for reporters and greater transparency can help defeat the propaganda and misinformation being spread by the militants. For example, there are reports that the militants remove weapons and ammunition from the bodies of militants killed in battle to make it appear that civilians have been killed instead. Without independent verification of such reports, the issue becomes one of the state’s word against the militants’ and in such circumstances disproving such rumours becomes impossible, with damaging consequences for public support for the military operation. The bottom line: more information from independent sources is necessary and beneficial.
Source
Labels: Army Operation, Extremism, Information War, Militancy, Swat Operation, Taliban
posted @ 6:47 PM,
,
Military might
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Editorial, The News International, Pakistan
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
The strategically important mountain resort of Malam Jabba has been seized from the militants. The ISPR says Mingora could be cleared of the Taliban within a week or so. Collaboration of this has come in the comments made by Maulana Fazalullah that his men have been asked to stop fighting in the principal city of Swat to avoid inflicting suffering on civilians. This indeed is ironic; in different circumstances the comments would even have been amusing given that the militants have throughout their campaign used non-combatants as human shields and deliberately taken up posts within heavily populated areas, so that maximum casualties are inflicted when these locations are bombed. They have then blamed the security apparatus for killing innocent men, women and children.
The news of the liberation of Malam Jabba is psychologically significant. The resort, with its once pristine alpine forests and ski slopes, is one of the best known in the area. The destruction of the militant training camp located here also means there have been important gains made in taking it. Unfortunately, there have also been civilian injuries, possible deaths and the destruction of homes. We all hope that not long in the future, we can celebrate a final triumph over the militants and mark what would be a historic day, somewhat on the pattern of the events seen recently in Sri Lanka. But even as we inch a little closer by the day to this goal, preparing now to take on the Taliban in Waziristan, there is a need to consider other matters. As yet there has been no announcement of plans to rebuild houses destroyed in bombing or to compensate families for damage to lands, livestock and crops. This is a huge source of tension for people in the IDP camps. Many wonder how they are to manage in the months following the fighting, given their dependence on what they grow. News of shattered houses is also drifting back to many who have fled from relatives still based in Swat.
To keep up morale and ensure we can build a united front against militants, preventing any attempt at a future resurgence, a long-term recovery plan for Swat and other areas needs to be announced now. The militant move to pull back from Mingora suggests they may be thinking of further action at some point later, after troop numbers have been reduced in the area. This after all is a game they are experienced in. Our best hope against such tactics is to ensure local people are ready to fight them off. This they will be able to accomplish most readily if the sense of security and peace of mind that they currently lack is restored to them by easing fears about food security and survival. As one part of the strategy of war, the bid to offer them some reassurance and indeed some role in the future should begun now so that the victory achieved by our soldiers can be safeguarded and a return to combat in the months ahead avoided.
Source
The strategically important mountain resort of Malam Jabba has been seized from the militants. The ISPR says Mingora could be cleared of the Taliban within a week or so. Collaboration of this has come in the comments made by Maulana Fazalullah that his men have been asked to stop fighting in the principal city of Swat to avoid inflicting suffering on civilians. This indeed is ironic; in different circumstances the comments would even have been amusing given that the militants have throughout their campaign used non-combatants as human shields and deliberately taken up posts within heavily populated areas, so that maximum casualties are inflicted when these locations are bombed. They have then blamed the security apparatus for killing innocent men, women and children.
The news of the liberation of Malam Jabba is psychologically significant. The resort, with its once pristine alpine forests and ski slopes, is one of the best known in the area. The destruction of the militant training camp located here also means there have been important gains made in taking it. Unfortunately, there have also been civilian injuries, possible deaths and the destruction of homes. We all hope that not long in the future, we can celebrate a final triumph over the militants and mark what would be a historic day, somewhat on the pattern of the events seen recently in Sri Lanka. But even as we inch a little closer by the day to this goal, preparing now to take on the Taliban in Waziristan, there is a need to consider other matters. As yet there has been no announcement of plans to rebuild houses destroyed in bombing or to compensate families for damage to lands, livestock and crops. This is a huge source of tension for people in the IDP camps. Many wonder how they are to manage in the months following the fighting, given their dependence on what they grow. News of shattered houses is also drifting back to many who have fled from relatives still based in Swat.
To keep up morale and ensure we can build a united front against militants, preventing any attempt at a future resurgence, a long-term recovery plan for Swat and other areas needs to be announced now. The militant move to pull back from Mingora suggests they may be thinking of further action at some point later, after troop numbers have been reduced in the area. This after all is a game they are experienced in. Our best hope against such tactics is to ensure local people are ready to fight them off. This they will be able to accomplish most readily if the sense of security and peace of mind that they currently lack is restored to them by easing fears about food security and survival. As one part of the strategy of war, the bid to offer them some reassurance and indeed some role in the future should begun now so that the victory achieved by our soldiers can be safeguarded and a return to combat in the months ahead avoided.
Source
Labels: Army Operation, Militants, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 9:11 AM,
,
A war on two fronts
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Editorial, Dawn, Pakistan
By S.M. Naseem
Wednesday, 20 May, 2009
THE Pakistan Army’s sudden escalation of hostilities against the Taliban in the last two weeks, without prior preparation to prevent or minimise collateral damage, has landed the country, even if unintentionally, in its worst humanitarian crisis since its inception.
Back then, people were willing to pay any price to secure their freedom and new home. No one then had any doubts that the war for which they were laying down their lives and for which millions were abandoning their hearths and homes, even as old inhabitants ecstatically welcomed the refugees, was their own and that they were fully prepared to face and share its consequences.
A similar, if contextually different, response was witnessed during the 2005 earthquake when hundreds of thousands of refugees were forced to seek shelter, albeit temporarily, in various urban centres in the country until their homes and communities were rebuilt with government help — a task that is yet to be completed. Successive governments seem to accumulate unfinished agendas as new ones are thrust on them either by the vagaries of nature or their own follies.
The early 1980s brought us another humanitarian disaster in the form of the influx of Afghan refugees. This influx — thought to be temporary — was welcomed as a Pashtunwali gesture. It came with the safe haven we provided to Afghan warlords, militant religious extremism and the drug and Kalashnikov culture.
Things are different today as we face the second largest internal migration in our history since 1947. Although many, especially among the elite, call it the result of Pakistan’s “existentialist war”, others, even among those directly affected by the war, refuse to accept its ownership, attributing its illegitimate paternity to the US and Pakistani military establishments. The reality is, of course, much more complex than either of the two oversimplified versions, although both have some truth to them.
The fact is that large swathes of our country are today beyond the writ of the state and various insurgencies, representing legitimate and contrived grievances, dominate certain parts. Of these, the Taliban and the Baloch nationalists’ issues have acquired urgency. Although the latter has much greater political significance as an “existentialist threat” for Pakistan, as well as being a secular struggle which could transform into an Intifada of sorts, the focus currently is on the former because of US involvement and the inducement of billions of aid being promised to fight that menace. To that extent, it is, at least partly, an American war, or at best an American-army war.
Regardless of the differences regarding their genesis and motivation, there is considerable unanimity now — although differences on a common strategy still remain — that the Taliban have become a formidable threat to the integrity, progress and prosperity of the Pakistani nation and that they can’t be allowed to impose their despicable version of religion by force, as they have attempted to in Swat.
Whether it was wise on the part of the political class to allow them political space by accepting an indigenous legal system and whether the Taliban succeeded in hoodwinking the people that they wanted to dismantle an unjust socioeconomic order is now moot. Their reneging on the agreement to lay down arms and accept the writ of the constitution, which Sufi Mohammad, the Taliban intermediary, rejected as un-Islamic, and their armed intrusion into Dir and Buner, have gone against them.
True much of the blame for the fiasco lies at the door of those who negotiated and canvassed for the Nizam-i-Adl. But the army and intelligence agencies can’t be absolved of not nipping the insurgency in the bud and, more importantly, not being prepared with a plan for well-thought-through army action that would include the evacuation of civilians from the targeted area in advance. The pace and timing of the army’s action seems to have been dictated more by the need of getting financial support from Washington than by meeting the challenges in Pakistan.
If military sources are to be believed, the delayed fast-track action in Buner, Dir and Swat has already killed about a quarter of the 4,000 Taliban insurgents facing about 10,000 Pakistani troops during the last two weeks. Whether or not the tide of Taliban insurgency has been stemmed significantly, will become evident only when at least some of the trapped insurgents begin to surrender and people in the affected areas begin to trek back to their homes in sufficient numbers. However, the ISPR has been reticent about collateral damage, which independent reports indicate are high, since the techniques adopted are similar to those used by American forces in Iraq.
Currently, the second front of the battle against the Taliban — that for hearts and minds, rather than hearths and homes — is being fought in a score of refugee camps set up in the adjacent Pakhtunkhwa areas and in the countless temporary shelters all over the country and in the homes of friends and relatives. Up to two million people have been displaced and the arrangements in the refugee camps are inadequate and their management far from satisfactory — far below the standards, by no means spectacular, achieved during the 2005 earthquake. The private relief effort is stated to have exceeded the official effort by a margin of three to one.
If military action continues for much longer, citizens will get weary and the refugees will get restless and may even succumb to the lure of the Taliban’s agenda. There is, therefore, the need to upscale and remove imperfections in the public relief effort, along with increasing the intensity of military action while keeping collateral damage to a minimum. Otherwise, the Taliban will gain ground as modern-day Robin Hoods.
The management of the relief effort is far more haphazard and half-hearted than in the case of the 2005 earthquake, which unravelled without prior warning, unlike the present disaster. It is regrettable that the disaster relief lessons learnt and institutions created after the 2005 earthquake have not been invoked in the present situation.
The Pakistani Army today faces its biggest challenge in redeeming itself in the eyes of the nation since 1971 when it lost half the country and later when it got itself involved in two prolonged periods of ruling the nation, destroying democracy in the process. It has a chance to prove that it is on the same page as the civilian government to save the integrity of the nation and restore peace.
By S.M. Naseem
Wednesday, 20 May, 2009
THE Pakistan Army’s sudden escalation of hostilities against the Taliban in the last two weeks, without prior preparation to prevent or minimise collateral damage, has landed the country, even if unintentionally, in its worst humanitarian crisis since its inception.
Back then, people were willing to pay any price to secure their freedom and new home. No one then had any doubts that the war for which they were laying down their lives and for which millions were abandoning their hearths and homes, even as old inhabitants ecstatically welcomed the refugees, was their own and that they were fully prepared to face and share its consequences.
A similar, if contextually different, response was witnessed during the 2005 earthquake when hundreds of thousands of refugees were forced to seek shelter, albeit temporarily, in various urban centres in the country until their homes and communities were rebuilt with government help — a task that is yet to be completed. Successive governments seem to accumulate unfinished agendas as new ones are thrust on them either by the vagaries of nature or their own follies.
The early 1980s brought us another humanitarian disaster in the form of the influx of Afghan refugees. This influx — thought to be temporary — was welcomed as a Pashtunwali gesture. It came with the safe haven we provided to Afghan warlords, militant religious extremism and the drug and Kalashnikov culture.
Things are different today as we face the second largest internal migration in our history since 1947. Although many, especially among the elite, call it the result of Pakistan’s “existentialist war”, others, even among those directly affected by the war, refuse to accept its ownership, attributing its illegitimate paternity to the US and Pakistani military establishments. The reality is, of course, much more complex than either of the two oversimplified versions, although both have some truth to them.
The fact is that large swathes of our country are today beyond the writ of the state and various insurgencies, representing legitimate and contrived grievances, dominate certain parts. Of these, the Taliban and the Baloch nationalists’ issues have acquired urgency. Although the latter has much greater political significance as an “existentialist threat” for Pakistan, as well as being a secular struggle which could transform into an Intifada of sorts, the focus currently is on the former because of US involvement and the inducement of billions of aid being promised to fight that menace. To that extent, it is, at least partly, an American war, or at best an American-army war.
Regardless of the differences regarding their genesis and motivation, there is considerable unanimity now — although differences on a common strategy still remain — that the Taliban have become a formidable threat to the integrity, progress and prosperity of the Pakistani nation and that they can’t be allowed to impose their despicable version of religion by force, as they have attempted to in Swat.
Whether it was wise on the part of the political class to allow them political space by accepting an indigenous legal system and whether the Taliban succeeded in hoodwinking the people that they wanted to dismantle an unjust socioeconomic order is now moot. Their reneging on the agreement to lay down arms and accept the writ of the constitution, which Sufi Mohammad, the Taliban intermediary, rejected as un-Islamic, and their armed intrusion into Dir and Buner, have gone against them.
True much of the blame for the fiasco lies at the door of those who negotiated and canvassed for the Nizam-i-Adl. But the army and intelligence agencies can’t be absolved of not nipping the insurgency in the bud and, more importantly, not being prepared with a plan for well-thought-through army action that would include the evacuation of civilians from the targeted area in advance. The pace and timing of the army’s action seems to have been dictated more by the need of getting financial support from Washington than by meeting the challenges in Pakistan.
If military sources are to be believed, the delayed fast-track action in Buner, Dir and Swat has already killed about a quarter of the 4,000 Taliban insurgents facing about 10,000 Pakistani troops during the last two weeks. Whether or not the tide of Taliban insurgency has been stemmed significantly, will become evident only when at least some of the trapped insurgents begin to surrender and people in the affected areas begin to trek back to their homes in sufficient numbers. However, the ISPR has been reticent about collateral damage, which independent reports indicate are high, since the techniques adopted are similar to those used by American forces in Iraq.
Currently, the second front of the battle against the Taliban — that for hearts and minds, rather than hearths and homes — is being fought in a score of refugee camps set up in the adjacent Pakhtunkhwa areas and in the countless temporary shelters all over the country and in the homes of friends and relatives. Up to two million people have been displaced and the arrangements in the refugee camps are inadequate and their management far from satisfactory — far below the standards, by no means spectacular, achieved during the 2005 earthquake. The private relief effort is stated to have exceeded the official effort by a margin of three to one.
If military action continues for much longer, citizens will get weary and the refugees will get restless and may even succumb to the lure of the Taliban’s agenda. There is, therefore, the need to upscale and remove imperfections in the public relief effort, along with increasing the intensity of military action while keeping collateral damage to a minimum. Otherwise, the Taliban will gain ground as modern-day Robin Hoods.
The management of the relief effort is far more haphazard and half-hearted than in the case of the 2005 earthquake, which unravelled without prior warning, unlike the present disaster. It is regrettable that the disaster relief lessons learnt and institutions created after the 2005 earthquake have not been invoked in the present situation.
The Pakistani Army today faces its biggest challenge in redeeming itself in the eyes of the nation since 1971 when it lost half the country and later when it got itself involved in two prolonged periods of ruling the nation, destroying democracy in the process. It has a chance to prove that it is on the same page as the civilian government to save the integrity of the nation and restore peace.
Labels: Army Operation, FATA, IDPs, Militants, Refugees, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas
posted @ 2:00 PM,
,
The Swat SWOT
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Editorial, The News International, Pakistan
Sunday, May 17, 2009
It has been said that Pakistan is impossible to govern, it can only be managed. The situation in Swat, multi-layered and complex, can be seen in management terms and the application of that old but tried and true tool – the SWOT analysis – be brought to bear. SWOT – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats is an analytic tool usually used in a business context, but its use has broadened into the social-sector, the military and aspects of governance over the last thirty years. The model is flawed by its inherent subjectivity but it can be a useful indicator of 'the Big Picture.' The Swat valley used to be a successful business. It was run by a family of relatively benevolent feudals who presided over various arms of the business – tourism, politics, religious and cultural affairs – and turned a healthy profit. Today the enterprise lies in ruins, its workers driven out by a group of Luddites who have smashed the machinery of development and prosperity and peaceful coexistence. Turning the business around, back into stability and profitability, will require a finesse rarely seen in either business or governance in Pakistan – difficult but not impossible.
The greatest strength of Swat are its people. They are the human capital, the repository of institutional memory and skill-sets who are currently dispersed, disempowered and demoralized. They represent the largest opportunity that the government has to its hand – and at the same time the greatest threat. The opportunity that the government has is to win the 'hearts and minds' battle, and moreover to win it from a position of weakness. It will not have escaped the notice of the displaced populace that the reason for their displacement is a failure, in large part, of governance. Large populations tend to remember, for generations, who it was that did wrong unto them – think 'colonialism' for instance. But the government hand is strengthened in the short-term by the anger that the populace feels towards the Luddites who smashed the engines that powered their success. This will be a window of opportunity that is only open for as long as the people believe that the government really is committed to righting their many wrongs; and if they close it because the government fails to credibly address at least some of those wrongs then the likelihood of it opening again for a generation is remote. Short-term, the people represent a threat. It will be mitigated if the same calibre of response is made to their needs as was made to the victims of the '05 'quake. Failure is not an option, because to fail hands victory to the Luddites who will then have at their disposal a populace so enfeebled as to be unable to resist them.
And what of the Luddites themselves? The government has in the last two days offered a deal to them – but is it a deal they would want or, indeed, need? For the Luddites the option of laying down their arms may not be attractive, but dying for a cause – is. Despite having overwhelming firepower and numerical superiority the army is being stretched to defeat these wreckers of lives and futures, and even if they physically drive them out the threat represented by their ideas remains strong. Iconoclasts in the system are like a virus, and this is a virus that has learned to make the human-to-human jump.
What of the army itself, for the first time engaged in hard and protracted war-fighting with the Luddites? It has threats and opportunities aplenty to manage, with the biggest threat being not losing but failing to win decisively, and the biggest opportunity being the restoration of morale and dignity to a much-battered institution. The test is probably going to come at Mingora, and it will be a test of political will as well as military competence. The great weakness of the politicians is that they tend to be poor managers, forever bogged down with petty internal disputes and the turf-wars that go with their calling. The management trick that they have to pull off – and they do not have long to do it in, a fortnight, perhaps – is to convert threats to opportunities and find the strength that can only come from the unity that has mostly eluded them down the decades. The Swat SWOT says 'get this wrong and you lose…game set and match'. Get it right and you can win games that are yet to be played.
Sunday, May 17, 2009
It has been said that Pakistan is impossible to govern, it can only be managed. The situation in Swat, multi-layered and complex, can be seen in management terms and the application of that old but tried and true tool – the SWOT analysis – be brought to bear. SWOT – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats is an analytic tool usually used in a business context, but its use has broadened into the social-sector, the military and aspects of governance over the last thirty years. The model is flawed by its inherent subjectivity but it can be a useful indicator of 'the Big Picture.' The Swat valley used to be a successful business. It was run by a family of relatively benevolent feudals who presided over various arms of the business – tourism, politics, religious and cultural affairs – and turned a healthy profit. Today the enterprise lies in ruins, its workers driven out by a group of Luddites who have smashed the machinery of development and prosperity and peaceful coexistence. Turning the business around, back into stability and profitability, will require a finesse rarely seen in either business or governance in Pakistan – difficult but not impossible.
The greatest strength of Swat are its people. They are the human capital, the repository of institutional memory and skill-sets who are currently dispersed, disempowered and demoralized. They represent the largest opportunity that the government has to its hand – and at the same time the greatest threat. The opportunity that the government has is to win the 'hearts and minds' battle, and moreover to win it from a position of weakness. It will not have escaped the notice of the displaced populace that the reason for their displacement is a failure, in large part, of governance. Large populations tend to remember, for generations, who it was that did wrong unto them – think 'colonialism' for instance. But the government hand is strengthened in the short-term by the anger that the populace feels towards the Luddites who smashed the engines that powered their success. This will be a window of opportunity that is only open for as long as the people believe that the government really is committed to righting their many wrongs; and if they close it because the government fails to credibly address at least some of those wrongs then the likelihood of it opening again for a generation is remote. Short-term, the people represent a threat. It will be mitigated if the same calibre of response is made to their needs as was made to the victims of the '05 'quake. Failure is not an option, because to fail hands victory to the Luddites who will then have at their disposal a populace so enfeebled as to be unable to resist them.
And what of the Luddites themselves? The government has in the last two days offered a deal to them – but is it a deal they would want or, indeed, need? For the Luddites the option of laying down their arms may not be attractive, but dying for a cause – is. Despite having overwhelming firepower and numerical superiority the army is being stretched to defeat these wreckers of lives and futures, and even if they physically drive them out the threat represented by their ideas remains strong. Iconoclasts in the system are like a virus, and this is a virus that has learned to make the human-to-human jump.
What of the army itself, for the first time engaged in hard and protracted war-fighting with the Luddites? It has threats and opportunities aplenty to manage, with the biggest threat being not losing but failing to win decisively, and the biggest opportunity being the restoration of morale and dignity to a much-battered institution. The test is probably going to come at Mingora, and it will be a test of political will as well as military competence. The great weakness of the politicians is that they tend to be poor managers, forever bogged down with petty internal disputes and the turf-wars that go with their calling. The management trick that they have to pull off – and they do not have long to do it in, a fortnight, perhaps – is to convert threats to opportunities and find the strength that can only come from the unity that has mostly eluded them down the decades. The Swat SWOT says 'get this wrong and you lose…game set and match'. Get it right and you can win games that are yet to be played.
Labels: Army Operation, Militants, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 10:41 AM,
,
Total war (Against Terrorism)
Saturday, May 16, 2009
Editorial, The News International, Pakistan
Saturday, May 16, 2009
The prime minister has told the National Assembly that both hearts and land will be won in Swat. The military is clearly aware of a similar need, with its offer to share its rations with local people obviously aimed to try and achieve this. The resolve to wage war till victory has been reiterated by the COAS while visiting frontline positions in Swat and we are now also hearing of plans to extend the operation to Waziristan, possibly coinciding with a similar operation launched by Afghanistan along the border. These are all important statements. But they are unfortunately not related to facts. So far the hearts of people are being lost – and this could have disastrous implications for the future given that eventually they hold the key to what happens in their home areas. There is after all a limit to how long troops can remain there and how long they can fight a battle that does not have the full support of people.Why is this happening? Why are hearts not being won? There is no big mystery involved. In Swat and other areas people are dying when bombs fall. We have no figures at all on the number of civilian casualties, but the anecdotal evidence coming in from those who have fled suggests it may be quite high. There is talk of hasty burials and the constant fear of death. Proposals for mass evacuations have been made. Perhaps, despite the obvious difficulties that would be involved, they need to be considered more earnestly. And as for those who have managed to make their way down, often after paying exorbitant sums of money to exploitative transporters, many who have turned to the state for help are paying the price. In Mardan and Swabi, where several camps have been set up, conditions are reported to be appalling. Inside tents the heat is oppressive and parents talk of children falling sick in huge numbers as diarrhoea and other sicknesses take rapid hold. Some who have been displaced speak of a refusal to register them because they have no NICs – a document that many in remote areas, especially women, have never possessed. A few angrily speak of being treated like criminals by officials. This is no way to win hearts.The government needs to do much more to ensure its words can be turned into action. Resources need to be found to help in a massive way the over 800,000 now said by the UN to be displaced. Maulana Abdul Sattar Edhi, collecting funds by the roadside in Lahore, has received tiny sums even from schoolchildren giving up lunch money. Those far more able to give have so far not come forward in a big way. A lack of trust for the government contributes to this. Reports of misuse of funds collected in this manner in the past still echo and leave behind their impact. There must also be more motivation. As the operation proceeds, there is a need to remember that taking people along is vital, as crucial as the actual strategy of fighting. We have still not heard of future plans. People must be given a picture of what lies beyond the bombs and the misery they have now been plunged into. Some light needs to be switched on so it can be glimpsed at the end of the tunnel. A failure to do so would be a disaster and may even mean a failure of the war we are now fighting. As the PM has said, this is a total war. It can be won only if we succeed on all fronts at the same time
Saturday, May 16, 2009
The prime minister has told the National Assembly that both hearts and land will be won in Swat. The military is clearly aware of a similar need, with its offer to share its rations with local people obviously aimed to try and achieve this. The resolve to wage war till victory has been reiterated by the COAS while visiting frontline positions in Swat and we are now also hearing of plans to extend the operation to Waziristan, possibly coinciding with a similar operation launched by Afghanistan along the border. These are all important statements. But they are unfortunately not related to facts. So far the hearts of people are being lost – and this could have disastrous implications for the future given that eventually they hold the key to what happens in their home areas. There is after all a limit to how long troops can remain there and how long they can fight a battle that does not have the full support of people.Why is this happening? Why are hearts not being won? There is no big mystery involved. In Swat and other areas people are dying when bombs fall. We have no figures at all on the number of civilian casualties, but the anecdotal evidence coming in from those who have fled suggests it may be quite high. There is talk of hasty burials and the constant fear of death. Proposals for mass evacuations have been made. Perhaps, despite the obvious difficulties that would be involved, they need to be considered more earnestly. And as for those who have managed to make their way down, often after paying exorbitant sums of money to exploitative transporters, many who have turned to the state for help are paying the price. In Mardan and Swabi, where several camps have been set up, conditions are reported to be appalling. Inside tents the heat is oppressive and parents talk of children falling sick in huge numbers as diarrhoea and other sicknesses take rapid hold. Some who have been displaced speak of a refusal to register them because they have no NICs – a document that many in remote areas, especially women, have never possessed. A few angrily speak of being treated like criminals by officials. This is no way to win hearts.The government needs to do much more to ensure its words can be turned into action. Resources need to be found to help in a massive way the over 800,000 now said by the UN to be displaced. Maulana Abdul Sattar Edhi, collecting funds by the roadside in Lahore, has received tiny sums even from schoolchildren giving up lunch money. Those far more able to give have so far not come forward in a big way. A lack of trust for the government contributes to this. Reports of misuse of funds collected in this manner in the past still echo and leave behind their impact. There must also be more motivation. As the operation proceeds, there is a need to remember that taking people along is vital, as crucial as the actual strategy of fighting. We have still not heard of future plans. People must be given a picture of what lies beyond the bombs and the misery they have now been plunged into. Some light needs to be switched on so it can be glimpsed at the end of the tunnel. A failure to do so would be a disaster and may even mean a failure of the war we are now fighting. As the PM has said, this is a total war. It can be won only if we succeed on all fronts at the same time
Labels: Army Operation, Militants, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 11:43 AM,
,
Host family dilemma (SWAT IDPs)
Friday, May 15, 2009
Editorial, The News International, Pakistan
Thursday, May 14, 2009
According to latest figures from the UN, some 650,000 people have now been displaced in Pakistan. Most of these – according to some estimates up to 80 per cent – are living outside camps, most often with host families. Some families in Peshawar, Lahore and Rawalpindi have accommodated up to 20 relatives in their own home. The strong spirit of kinship that is a part of the culture of the north means doors are being opened willingly, but this does not negate the fact that the strain on host families is immense. Most are themselves impoverished wage earners – forced to cater to people who have no jobs, no homes and no means of survival. This situation needs to be addressed as part of a wide ranging plan for IDPs. Many people moving down from the northern areas have stated they prefer, for cultural reasons, to be based with relatives rather than in tent villages. The UN's World Food Programme (WFP) has initiated an effort to provide the IDPs, including those based with host families, with food – but there are still many loopholes that need to be fixed. The current situation, with 20 or 30 people living in two or three room apartments is simply unsustainable. This is all the more true given that we have no way of knowing how long the displacement will last.
Families who have taken in IDP families need financial support. The issue is not one just of food, but also of rents, utility bills and so on. Some scheme for this is urgently needed. And in the longer run we need also to consider the housing needs of IDPs and to improve camp conditions so that more feel able to move there. It is imperative that the situation be handled tactfully and sensibly, in a manner aimed to limit suffering for all the victims.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
According to latest figures from the UN, some 650,000 people have now been displaced in Pakistan. Most of these – according to some estimates up to 80 per cent – are living outside camps, most often with host families. Some families in Peshawar, Lahore and Rawalpindi have accommodated up to 20 relatives in their own home. The strong spirit of kinship that is a part of the culture of the north means doors are being opened willingly, but this does not negate the fact that the strain on host families is immense. Most are themselves impoverished wage earners – forced to cater to people who have no jobs, no homes and no means of survival. This situation needs to be addressed as part of a wide ranging plan for IDPs. Many people moving down from the northern areas have stated they prefer, for cultural reasons, to be based with relatives rather than in tent villages. The UN's World Food Programme (WFP) has initiated an effort to provide the IDPs, including those based with host families, with food – but there are still many loopholes that need to be fixed. The current situation, with 20 or 30 people living in two or three room apartments is simply unsustainable. This is all the more true given that we have no way of knowing how long the displacement will last.
Families who have taken in IDP families need financial support. The issue is not one just of food, but also of rents, utility bills and so on. Some scheme for this is urgently needed. And in the longer run we need also to consider the housing needs of IDPs and to improve camp conditions so that more feel able to move there. It is imperative that the situation be handled tactfully and sensibly, in a manner aimed to limit suffering for all the victims.
Labels: Army Operation, IDPs, Pakistan, Swat
posted @ 12:42 PM,
,
Pakistan army plans to open second front against Taliban
May 14, 2009
Pakistan plans to escalate its military operations against the Taliban massively by opening a second front in the country's lawless border areas.
The army, which is fighting in Swat Valley and two neighbouring districts in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), is planning to begin a new offensive in the badlands of the Waziristan tribal areas as early as next month, sources told The Daily Telegraph.
"The army is planning to go into Waziristan, possibly in June, which will involve huge numbers of troops in an attempt to establish some sort of state control over the area," said a source close to the Pakistani military.
Washington has intensified pressure on Pakistan to launch an offensive in Waziristan since President Barack Obama came to power.
Read more
The army, which is fighting in Swat Valley and two neighbouring districts in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), is planning to begin a new offensive in the badlands of the Waziristan tribal areas as early as next month, sources told The Daily Telegraph.
"The army is planning to go into Waziristan, possibly in June, which will involve huge numbers of troops in an attempt to establish some sort of state control over the area," said a source close to the Pakistani military.
Washington has intensified pressure on Pakistan to launch an offensive in Waziristan since President Barack Obama came to power.
Read more
Labels: Army Operation, FATA, Pakistan, Taliban, Terrorism, Tribal Areas, Waziristan
posted @ 11:59 AM,
,
Pakistan: Now or Never?
Reuters
May 13th, 2009
Making decisions in Pakistan
With Pakistan facing a refugee crisis, and its army engaged in intense fighting in the Swat valley, the question of who makes decisions in the country and how these are taken may not seem like the top priority.
But Shuja Nawaz at the Atlantic Council makes a strong argument in favour of deepening institutional mechanisms for decision-making. While President Asif Ali Zardari, who has retained the sweeping presidential powers of his predecessor Pervez Musharraf, made many decisions himself and also personally represented Pakistan diplomatically on trips overseas, the institutional process of decision-making that would allow coordination between the different branches of the country’s government is lacking, he writes. As a result the government seemed unprepared to deal with the million refugees created by Pakistan’s military offensive against the Taliban.
“If there had been an institutional mechanism for national security analysis and decision-making with a clear central command authority … the exodus would have been anticipated and arrangements put in place to look after the displaced people,” he writes. ”The National Security Council has been abolished. The Defence Committee of the cabinet does not appear to have met to discuss the crisis. And in the absence of a National Security Adviser, sacked by the prime minister in a moment of pique following the Mumbai attack, there is no formal mechanism for studying such issues nor a central point in government to ensure that all parts of the administration work together to anticipate problems and resolve issues.”
Read more
May 13th, 2009
Making decisions in Pakistan
With Pakistan facing a refugee crisis, and its army engaged in intense fighting in the Swat valley, the question of who makes decisions in the country and how these are taken may not seem like the top priority.
But Shuja Nawaz at the Atlantic Council makes a strong argument in favour of deepening institutional mechanisms for decision-making. While President Asif Ali Zardari, who has retained the sweeping presidential powers of his predecessor Pervez Musharraf, made many decisions himself and also personally represented Pakistan diplomatically on trips overseas, the institutional process of decision-making that would allow coordination between the different branches of the country’s government is lacking, he writes. As a result the government seemed unprepared to deal with the million refugees created by Pakistan’s military offensive against the Taliban.
“If there had been an institutional mechanism for national security analysis and decision-making with a clear central command authority … the exodus would have been anticipated and arrangements put in place to look after the displaced people,” he writes. ”The National Security Council has been abolished. The Defence Committee of the cabinet does not appear to have met to discuss the crisis. And in the absence of a National Security Adviser, sacked by the prime minister in a moment of pique following the Mumbai attack, there is no formal mechanism for studying such issues nor a central point in government to ensure that all parts of the administration work together to anticipate problems and resolve issues.”
Read more
Labels: Army Operation, Refugees, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism, Zardari
posted @ 11:10 AM,
,
Pakistan's displacement camps: A study in contrasts
Los Angeles Times
By Mark Magnier May 14, 2009
Reporting from Takht Bhai, Pakistan -- At the entrance to the Hazrat Usman camp just south of the Swat Valley, a welcoming committee greets those fleeing violence between the government and militants with a cool glass of water, a meal and a place to sleep with fans and a pharmacy.Though camp organizers don't voice any overt sympathy for the Taliban, their view is clear: The entire crisis is a creation of the government and the army.
Two miles up the road sits the much larger government-run Jalala camp. It is hot, mosquito-ridden and busy turning newcomers away. Water, food and medicine are in short supply, tempers flare and many people are forced to sleep in the open -- a particular indignity for women in this Islamic society.
If counterinsurgency is about hearts and minds, the rapid, efficient way some Islamic groups have aided the needy amid the recent army offensive against the Taliban -- and the lumbering state response -- suggests the hard-liners could win the battle that counts.
The various private efforts like Hazrat Usman often benefit from the goodwill generated when helping just a few thousand people. By contrast, the government, already under suspicion for unleashing its firepower in the region, faces criticism if it falls short in any respect when addressing the needs of millions.
The two camps offer refuge to some of the 1.3 million people the United Nations estimates have fled the fighting between the Pakistani army and the Taliban since the fall. Though many of those displaced by the latest conflict have shunned such camps, preferring to squeeze in with relatives whenever possible, the camps remain vital to a large number of families with no alternatives.
Read more
Reporting from Takht Bhai, Pakistan -- At the entrance to the Hazrat Usman camp just south of the Swat Valley, a welcoming committee greets those fleeing violence between the government and militants with a cool glass of water, a meal and a place to sleep with fans and a pharmacy.Though camp organizers don't voice any overt sympathy for the Taliban, their view is clear: The entire crisis is a creation of the government and the army.
Two miles up the road sits the much larger government-run Jalala camp. It is hot, mosquito-ridden and busy turning newcomers away. Water, food and medicine are in short supply, tempers flare and many people are forced to sleep in the open -- a particular indignity for women in this Islamic society.
If counterinsurgency is about hearts and minds, the rapid, efficient way some Islamic groups have aided the needy amid the recent army offensive against the Taliban -- and the lumbering state response -- suggests the hard-liners could win the battle that counts.
The various private efforts like Hazrat Usman often benefit from the goodwill generated when helping just a few thousand people. By contrast, the government, already under suspicion for unleashing its firepower in the region, faces criticism if it falls short in any respect when addressing the needs of millions.
The two camps offer refuge to some of the 1.3 million people the United Nations estimates have fled the fighting between the Pakistani army and the Taliban since the fall. Though many of those displaced by the latest conflict have shunned such camps, preferring to squeeze in with relatives whenever possible, the camps remain vital to a large number of families with no alternatives.
Read more
Labels: Army Operation, IDPs, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 10:48 AM,
,
The long and the short of it (Exodus from Swat Region)
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Comment, Daily Times, Pakistan
May 13, 2009
It should be repeated constantly that refugees are coming out of Swat by the many thousands not because the army has gone back to the attack, but because the Taliban have reneged on every aspect of the peace deal and have brought bloodshed and misery
Suddenly, like a Kansas tornado, the Pakistan Army and government have reversed direction and are pushing back — and if the excited media coverage is to be believed — pushing back hard against Pakistan’s existential enemies. The Taliban are on the run, it is said, in Buner, on the defensive in Swat, and nervous, it is hoped, about their ability to hold on to their other gains.
However, I wonder if they, or their extremist allies, those jihadi groups which also provide foot soldiers for attacking the Pakistani state, as well as their ideological mentor, Al Qaeda, are breathing fearfully these days. Are they feeling endangered by this sudden shift in Pakistan’s policy and strategy? Do they think it possible that their encroachment on the writ of the Pakistani state has reached its apex and is about to become much more costly to sustain?
Or, do they take the view that this is just another spike in the army’s sporadic campaign against them, brought on by public anger over Taliban overreach and overconfidence that will peter out as all the previous army campaigns against them have.
Read more
May 13, 2009
It should be repeated constantly that refugees are coming out of Swat by the many thousands not because the army has gone back to the attack, but because the Taliban have reneged on every aspect of the peace deal and have brought bloodshed and misery
Suddenly, like a Kansas tornado, the Pakistan Army and government have reversed direction and are pushing back — and if the excited media coverage is to be believed — pushing back hard against Pakistan’s existential enemies. The Taliban are on the run, it is said, in Buner, on the defensive in Swat, and nervous, it is hoped, about their ability to hold on to their other gains.
However, I wonder if they, or their extremist allies, those jihadi groups which also provide foot soldiers for attacking the Pakistani state, as well as their ideological mentor, Al Qaeda, are breathing fearfully these days. Are they feeling endangered by this sudden shift in Pakistan’s policy and strategy? Do they think it possible that their encroachment on the writ of the Pakistani state has reached its apex and is about to become much more costly to sustain?
Or, do they take the view that this is just another spike in the army’s sporadic campaign against them, brought on by public anger over Taliban overreach and overconfidence that will peter out as all the previous army campaigns against them have.
Read more
Labels: Army Operation, IDPs, Pakistan, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 12:58 PM,
,
(Zardari's) Role definition
Editorial, The News International, Pakistan
Thursday, May 14, 2009
President Zardari is coming in for quite a bit of stick ñ again. It is all too easy for the media to have a go at our ëaccidentalí president, whose style of governance has variously been described as ëdictatorialí, ëineptí and ëfeudalí to name but three. Complaint is being made currently about his absence from the country at a crucial phase of the military operation in Swat and other parts of NWFP; as well as not ëbeing hereí for the IDPs. Both the national and the international press and sections of our electronic media have castigated Mr Zardari for being AWOL at a time when the country needs him and that this is yet another example of his somewhat cavalier approach to governance. It is easy to criticize the president, but there is another side to this coin, and that side tells us that the president is doing exactly what he should be doing, and lets leave aside how well or ill he is doing it.
Presidents visit other presidents and prime ministers. They are always preceded by a bevy of aides and civil servants who will have met with a bevy of aides and civil servants representing whoever they are meeting, and it is their job to work out the details of the agreements that the presidents then sign. Presidents have no part of this detail work; they are just there for the photo-call and the ceremonial signature with perhaps a little gentle discourse to make sure that both sides actually have an understanding of what it is that their civil servants have written and that they have just signed. Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the government and the country gets on with whatever it was doing before the president went a-junketing ñ and in todayís case it is getting on with a large military operation against a determined enemy and the management of the biggest movement of IDPs since partition. The show at home is managed by the prime minster, Mr Gilani ñ a man who has grown perceptibly in recent months. He will of course be consulting the president, but events are moving so fast and are so complex that arms-length micro-management is not a presidential option. It is Gilani who needs to be here, not Mr Zardari. The president is apprised of the state of play at least daily and probably hourly, will conclude his business overseas and eventually return. The IDP-Swat crisis will have done little for our image elsewhere, but it may have ñ perversely ñ strengthened the roles and clarified the role-definition of, our president and prime minister
Thursday, May 14, 2009
President Zardari is coming in for quite a bit of stick ñ again. It is all too easy for the media to have a go at our ëaccidentalí president, whose style of governance has variously been described as ëdictatorialí, ëineptí and ëfeudalí to name but three. Complaint is being made currently about his absence from the country at a crucial phase of the military operation in Swat and other parts of NWFP; as well as not ëbeing hereí for the IDPs. Both the national and the international press and sections of our electronic media have castigated Mr Zardari for being AWOL at a time when the country needs him and that this is yet another example of his somewhat cavalier approach to governance. It is easy to criticize the president, but there is another side to this coin, and that side tells us that the president is doing exactly what he should be doing, and lets leave aside how well or ill he is doing it.
Presidents visit other presidents and prime ministers. They are always preceded by a bevy of aides and civil servants who will have met with a bevy of aides and civil servants representing whoever they are meeting, and it is their job to work out the details of the agreements that the presidents then sign. Presidents have no part of this detail work; they are just there for the photo-call and the ceremonial signature with perhaps a little gentle discourse to make sure that both sides actually have an understanding of what it is that their civil servants have written and that they have just signed. Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the government and the country gets on with whatever it was doing before the president went a-junketing ñ and in todayís case it is getting on with a large military operation against a determined enemy and the management of the biggest movement of IDPs since partition. The show at home is managed by the prime minster, Mr Gilani ñ a man who has grown perceptibly in recent months. He will of course be consulting the president, but events are moving so fast and are so complex that arms-length micro-management is not a presidential option. It is Gilani who needs to be here, not Mr Zardari. The president is apprised of the state of play at least daily and probably hourly, will conclude his business overseas and eventually return. The IDP-Swat crisis will have done little for our image elsewhere, but it may have ñ perversely ñ strengthened the roles and clarified the role-definition of, our president and prime minister
Labels: Army Operation, IDPs, Pakistan, Swat, Zardari
posted @ 12:38 PM,
,
A discordant note (Army Operation in Swat Region)
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Editorial, The News International, Pakistan
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Maulana Fazlur Rehman has shaken the spirit of unity over the operation in the northern areas by staging a walk out from the National Assembly. He has denied his party backs the action and claims they were never consulted. This damages the claims of the government of support from all major parties, though a new attempt to forge cohesive thinking is to come through the All Parties Conference on security which the PM has said will be held. Creating unity is good. But of course it is not always possible, in a democracy, to keep all dissent at bay. Indeed some dissent is important because it can help trigger debate and thus play a part in rationalizing opinion. This is what should happen now. The JUI should be asked to explain how it would deal with a situation such as that in the northern areas. The time has come to abandon the air of apology we see too often in discussions regarding the Taliban and to speak out openly and without ambiguity. Attempts to defend men who have seized state and private property, burnt down schools, whipped people, posted heads atop stakes and paraded them in cities and dug bodies out of graves are simply ludicrous. Such behaviour cannot be condoned. Those who attempt to do so should be made to justify their stance so that the Taliban can be more fully exposed for what they are.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Maulana Fazlur Rehman has shaken the spirit of unity over the operation in the northern areas by staging a walk out from the National Assembly. He has denied his party backs the action and claims they were never consulted. This damages the claims of the government of support from all major parties, though a new attempt to forge cohesive thinking is to come through the All Parties Conference on security which the PM has said will be held. Creating unity is good. But of course it is not always possible, in a democracy, to keep all dissent at bay. Indeed some dissent is important because it can help trigger debate and thus play a part in rationalizing opinion. This is what should happen now. The JUI should be asked to explain how it would deal with a situation such as that in the northern areas. The time has come to abandon the air of apology we see too often in discussions regarding the Taliban and to speak out openly and without ambiguity. Attempts to defend men who have seized state and private property, burnt down schools, whipped people, posted heads atop stakes and paraded them in cities and dug bodies out of graves are simply ludicrous. Such behaviour cannot be condoned. Those who attempt to do so should be made to justify their stance so that the Taliban can be more fully exposed for what they are.
Labels: Army Operation, JUI, Pakistan, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 12:52 PM,
,
Pakistan's refugees tell of fear under Taliban (Swat Region)
By NAHAL TOOSI – 9 hours ago
JALALA, Pakistan (AP) — The Pakistani teenager remembered recognizing her distant relative almost instantly, even though his head had been severed and placed on his back, punishment the Taliban claimed was for spying.
The brutal discovery was just one example used Tuesday by Kulsoom, a 16-year-old refugee, to describe life in the Swat Valley under Taliban control. As tens of thousands flood refugee camps to escape fighting between the army and militants, some are cautiously sharing their stories, detailing how extremists ran roughshod over cities and hamlets.
The Taliban's brand of Islamic law proved too harsh for many residents in the relatively conservative region of Pakistan, and it appears to be a major reason large numbers of the displaced support the military's latest offensive in the area.
Read more
JALALA, Pakistan (AP) — The Pakistani teenager remembered recognizing her distant relative almost instantly, even though his head had been severed and placed on his back, punishment the Taliban claimed was for spying.
The brutal discovery was just one example used Tuesday by Kulsoom, a 16-year-old refugee, to describe life in the Swat Valley under Taliban control. As tens of thousands flood refugee camps to escape fighting between the army and militants, some are cautiously sharing their stories, detailing how extremists ran roughshod over cities and hamlets.
The Taliban's brand of Islamic law proved too harsh for many residents in the relatively conservative region of Pakistan, and it appears to be a major reason large numbers of the displaced support the military's latest offensive in the area.
Read more
Labels: Army Operation, Pakistan, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 12:25 PM,
,
FACTBOX: Facts about conflict in Pakistan's Swat
Tue May 12, 2009
(Reuters) - Pakistani soldiers closed in on Tuesday on a Taliban headquarters in Swat, the military said, as the United Nations called for help for hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the fighting.
The offensive in Swat, 130 km (80 miles) northwest of Islamabad, is seen as a test of the government's commitment to face up to a growing Taliban insurgency and comes after the United States accused it of "abdicating" to the militants.
Here are some facts about Swat and the insurgency there.
* Swat is not on the Afghan border but Western countries with troops in Afghanistan fear the area could turn into a bastion for Taliban militants fighting in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and for al Qaeda.
* Islamist militancy emerged in Swat, an alpine beauty spot and former tourism favorite, in the 1990s when cleric Sufi Mohammad took up arms to impose sharia law there and in neighboring areas of the Malakand region.
* Mohammad was arrested after he returned to Pakistan having led thousands of fighters to Afghanistan in 2001 in a vain attempt to help the Taliban resist U.S.-backed forces.
* Pakistani authorities released him in 2008 in a bid to defuse another uprising, led by his son-in-law, Fazlullah, who has ties with other Pakistani Taliban factions and al Qaeda.
* Fazlullah called his men to arms after a military assault on the Red Mosque in Islamabad in mid-2007 to put down an armed movement seeking to impose Islamic law. Fazlullah used illegal FM radio to propagate his message and became known as Mullah Radio.
* The army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement.
* A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that hundreds, including soldiers, militants and civilians, died in battles.
* Militants gained control of almost the entire valley and unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools.
* Pakistan offered in February to introduce Islamic law in Swat and nearby areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced a ceasefire after the army said it was halting operations. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing Islamic law in the area last month.
* But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner, only 100 km (60 miles) northwest of Islamabad, and another district adjacent to Swat.
* Amid mounting concern at home and abroad, security forces launched an offensive to expel militants from Buner and another district near Swat on April 26.
* Taliban seized government buildings in Mingora, the main town in Swat, and the military began attacking them.
* Last Thursday, the prime minister directed the military "to eliminate the militants and terrorists" and the army stepped up its attacks the next day.
* Interior Ministry chief Rehman Malik said on Monday 700 Taliban and 20 soldiers had been killed. Most reporters have left Swat and there was no independent confirmation of that estimate of militant casualties, which was higher than figures provided by the military.
(Editing by Robert Birsel)
(Reuters) - Pakistani soldiers closed in on Tuesday on a Taliban headquarters in Swat, the military said, as the United Nations called for help for hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the fighting.
The offensive in Swat, 130 km (80 miles) northwest of Islamabad, is seen as a test of the government's commitment to face up to a growing Taliban insurgency and comes after the United States accused it of "abdicating" to the militants.
Here are some facts about Swat and the insurgency there.
* Swat is not on the Afghan border but Western countries with troops in Afghanistan fear the area could turn into a bastion for Taliban militants fighting in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and for al Qaeda.
* Islamist militancy emerged in Swat, an alpine beauty spot and former tourism favorite, in the 1990s when cleric Sufi Mohammad took up arms to impose sharia law there and in neighboring areas of the Malakand region.
* Mohammad was arrested after he returned to Pakistan having led thousands of fighters to Afghanistan in 2001 in a vain attempt to help the Taliban resist U.S.-backed forces.
* Pakistani authorities released him in 2008 in a bid to defuse another uprising, led by his son-in-law, Fazlullah, who has ties with other Pakistani Taliban factions and al Qaeda.
* Fazlullah called his men to arms after a military assault on the Red Mosque in Islamabad in mid-2007 to put down an armed movement seeking to impose Islamic law. Fazlullah used illegal FM radio to propagate his message and became known as Mullah Radio.
* The army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement.
* A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that hundreds, including soldiers, militants and civilians, died in battles.
* Militants gained control of almost the entire valley and unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools.
* Pakistan offered in February to introduce Islamic law in Swat and nearby areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced a ceasefire after the army said it was halting operations. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing Islamic law in the area last month.
* But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner, only 100 km (60 miles) northwest of Islamabad, and another district adjacent to Swat.
* Amid mounting concern at home and abroad, security forces launched an offensive to expel militants from Buner and another district near Swat on April 26.
* Taliban seized government buildings in Mingora, the main town in Swat, and the military began attacking them.
* Last Thursday, the prime minister directed the military "to eliminate the militants and terrorists" and the army stepped up its attacks the next day.
* Interior Ministry chief Rehman Malik said on Monday 700 Taliban and 20 soldiers had been killed. Most reporters have left Swat and there was no independent confirmation of that estimate of militant casualties, which was higher than figures provided by the military.
(Editing by Robert Birsel)
Labels: Army Operation, Pakistan, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 12:15 PM,
,
Pakistan military faces up to humanitarian crisis (Swat Region)
May 12, 2009
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (CNN) -- Pakistan's military is dealing with more than a million Pakistanis who have been displaced by fighting since last year, a military spokesman said Tuesday.
The military has set up headquarters to manage the 1.3 million internally displaced people, spokesman Gen. Athar Abbas said.
That number includes 500,000 Pakistanis who were uprooted from their homes since August, before the latest military push against Taliban militants in the country's northeastern region, he said.
The army has set up hospitals in many of the refugee camps and plans to build camps near the conflict zone, he said.
Pakistan's military is continuing an offensive against the Taliban along its western border with Afghanistan, particularly in the Swat Valley.
The military has been releasing regular reports saying it has killed Taliban militants in the region, but it has produced little evidence of the successes it claims. Journalists have not been permitted to observe the offensive and the army has not shown bodies of the militants it says it has killed.
Curfews have been imposed in the conflict zone, but are relaxed periodically to allow civilians to travel. It is not unusual now to see rickshaws and cargo trucks filled with fleeing civilians, rolling down Pakistan's main east-west highway.
Vehicles are not allowed back into the region, which has led to a shortage for those trying to leave.
On Sunday, at least 25 boys stranded at the Khpal Kor Foundation orphanage in Swat Valley had to flee the district capital, Mingora, on foot, according to director Mohammed Ali.
He said local government officials told him there were no vehicles to evacuate the children.
The 175-kilometer (110-mile) journey from Mingora to the western city of Peshawar normally takes about three hours by car. The boys walked for several hours, but had to spend the night in a madrassa -- a religious school -- outside of Mingora, because authorities had re-established the curfew.
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (CNN) -- Pakistan's military is dealing with more than a million Pakistanis who have been displaced by fighting since last year, a military spokesman said Tuesday.
The military has set up headquarters to manage the 1.3 million internally displaced people, spokesman Gen. Athar Abbas said.
That number includes 500,000 Pakistanis who were uprooted from their homes since August, before the latest military push against Taliban militants in the country's northeastern region, he said.
The army has set up hospitals in many of the refugee camps and plans to build camps near the conflict zone, he said.
Pakistan's military is continuing an offensive against the Taliban along its western border with Afghanistan, particularly in the Swat Valley.
The military has been releasing regular reports saying it has killed Taliban militants in the region, but it has produced little evidence of the successes it claims. Journalists have not been permitted to observe the offensive and the army has not shown bodies of the militants it says it has killed.
Curfews have been imposed in the conflict zone, but are relaxed periodically to allow civilians to travel. It is not unusual now to see rickshaws and cargo trucks filled with fleeing civilians, rolling down Pakistan's main east-west highway.
Vehicles are not allowed back into the region, which has led to a shortage for those trying to leave.
On Sunday, at least 25 boys stranded at the Khpal Kor Foundation orphanage in Swat Valley had to flee the district capital, Mingora, on foot, according to director Mohammed Ali.
He said local government officials told him there were no vehicles to evacuate the children.
The 175-kilometer (110-mile) journey from Mingora to the western city of Peshawar normally takes about three hours by car. The boys walked for several hours, but had to spend the night in a madrassa -- a religious school -- outside of Mingora, because authorities had re-established the curfew.
Labels: Army Operation, Internally Displaced Persons, Pakistan, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 11:03 AM,
,
Pakistan's Swat offensive risks wider backlash
By Luke Baker - Analysis
Tue May 12, 2009 1:46pm BST
LONDON (Reuters) - Pakistan's heavy-handed offensive against the Taliban in northwest Pakistan is misguided and risks further destabilizing the country, western military and intelligence experts argue.
By throwing up to 15,000 troops and heavy weaponry against an estimated 5,000 Taliban in Swat, a valley northwest of Islamabad, the Pakistan army may make short-term gains, but it increases the likelihood of terror-style attacks on targets in more stable areas of eastern Pakistan in the longer-term.
While the army essentially had no choice but to go on the offensive after the Taliban broke a peace accord and the U.S. administration piled on pressure for action, the broader strategy needs overhauling, the analysts say.
.....
Longer-term stability depends not just on bolstering Pakistan's military and police, and pumping money for jobs and development into poor or remote areas to undercut insurgency, but on U.S. forces getting out of Afghanistan, he said.
"The U.S. presence in Afghanistan is what's really feeding the insurgency in Pakistan. That can't be overlooked and it's the big issue for militants in Pakistan.
"The fundamental thing to do is get out of Afghanistan as quickly as we reasonably can. I'm not talking tomorrow, but there's got to be a strategy to do it and soon."
Read more
Tue May 12, 2009 1:46pm BST
LONDON (Reuters) - Pakistan's heavy-handed offensive against the Taliban in northwest Pakistan is misguided and risks further destabilizing the country, western military and intelligence experts argue.
By throwing up to 15,000 troops and heavy weaponry against an estimated 5,000 Taliban in Swat, a valley northwest of Islamabad, the Pakistan army may make short-term gains, but it increases the likelihood of terror-style attacks on targets in more stable areas of eastern Pakistan in the longer-term.
While the army essentially had no choice but to go on the offensive after the Taliban broke a peace accord and the U.S. administration piled on pressure for action, the broader strategy needs overhauling, the analysts say.
.....
Longer-term stability depends not just on bolstering Pakistan's military and police, and pumping money for jobs and development into poor or remote areas to undercut insurgency, but on U.S. forces getting out of Afghanistan, he said.
"The U.S. presence in Afghanistan is what's really feeding the insurgency in Pakistan. That can't be overlooked and it's the big issue for militants in Pakistan.
"The fundamental thing to do is get out of Afghanistan as quickly as we reasonably can. I'm not talking tomorrow, but there's got to be a strategy to do it and soon."
Read more
Labels: Army Operation, Pakistan, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 10:45 AM,
,
The invisible war (Swat Region)
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Editorial
The News International
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Every TV news-channel in the country has it as the lead story. Every newspaper has it as the headline. It is discussed ad-nauseum on TV, the radio and in countless blogs on the internet. Yet we know surprisingly little – in fact beyond official daily briefings almost nothing - about the war with the Taliban. The TV channels show stock footage of Cobra helicopters and armour being moved on flatbed trucks and the very-capable army spokesperson gives a daily update in measured tones that tell us next to nothing of substance - and is not backed up by any battlefield reports or even still-pictures of our army in action. Whilst there is not an overt news blackout regarding the fighting in Swat and elsewhere, there is clearly tightly-managed access to and information-flow outwards about, the situation on the ground. There are good reasons why this might be – the Taliban are a sophisticated enemy, well-armed and equipped, capable of using electronic intelligence and skilled at news-management themselves. We do not want to offer them information on a plate in the name of 'press freedom' and at the same time give them an opportunity to make strategic and tactical decisions on the basis of what is in the public domain. It would be foolhardy in the extreme to reveal precisely where our troops are moving from and to and tantamount to issuing some of them with a death sentence – as the Taliban are now deploying sophisticated IED's and mines to complement their already-advanced ambush techniques.
Operational considerations notwithstanding; it may be in the interests of both the military and the politicians who issue their orders to be a little more forthcoming than they currently are. A key factor in winning this war is winning the hearts and minds of the general public. Of convincing the common man that the war now being fought is a just war, is our war and we are fighting it for the greater good. Today, there is guarded support from the common man, but questions are beginning to be asked – where are all these dead Taliban for one? Why is artillery being used to attack the Taliban rather than infantry who can then hold the position they have just taken? What is the physical state of the centre of towns like Mingora and why can't we have a couple of 'embedded' correspondents who can write a pooled dispatch for the English and Urdu press every day? We do not need to compromise our forces nor our military planners, but we do need to persuade an ever-sceptical public a little better than is currently the case.
The News International
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Every TV news-channel in the country has it as the lead story. Every newspaper has it as the headline. It is discussed ad-nauseum on TV, the radio and in countless blogs on the internet. Yet we know surprisingly little – in fact beyond official daily briefings almost nothing - about the war with the Taliban. The TV channels show stock footage of Cobra helicopters and armour being moved on flatbed trucks and the very-capable army spokesperson gives a daily update in measured tones that tell us next to nothing of substance - and is not backed up by any battlefield reports or even still-pictures of our army in action. Whilst there is not an overt news blackout regarding the fighting in Swat and elsewhere, there is clearly tightly-managed access to and information-flow outwards about, the situation on the ground. There are good reasons why this might be – the Taliban are a sophisticated enemy, well-armed and equipped, capable of using electronic intelligence and skilled at news-management themselves. We do not want to offer them information on a plate in the name of 'press freedom' and at the same time give them an opportunity to make strategic and tactical decisions on the basis of what is in the public domain. It would be foolhardy in the extreme to reveal precisely where our troops are moving from and to and tantamount to issuing some of them with a death sentence – as the Taliban are now deploying sophisticated IED's and mines to complement their already-advanced ambush techniques.
Operational considerations notwithstanding; it may be in the interests of both the military and the politicians who issue their orders to be a little more forthcoming than they currently are. A key factor in winning this war is winning the hearts and minds of the general public. Of convincing the common man that the war now being fought is a just war, is our war and we are fighting it for the greater good. Today, there is guarded support from the common man, but questions are beginning to be asked – where are all these dead Taliban for one? Why is artillery being used to attack the Taliban rather than infantry who can then hold the position they have just taken? What is the physical state of the centre of towns like Mingora and why can't we have a couple of 'embedded' correspondents who can write a pooled dispatch for the English and Urdu press every day? We do not need to compromise our forces nor our military planners, but we do need to persuade an ever-sceptical public a little better than is currently the case.
Labels: Army Operation, Pakistan, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 11:35 AM,
,
A national tragedy (Swat Region)
Editorial
The News International, Pakistan
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
As the fierce military operation continues in Swat and other areas, tens of thousands of people continue to flee the fighting. The brief lifting of a curfew imposed in Swat saw hundreds of desperate families pile belongings into trucks, vans, cars or hand-pushed trolleys and try to make it down to safer locations, even if they had to do so on foot. The plight of Pakistan's displaced people is terrible to witness. Already, the immense humanitarian crisis unfolding in our midst has been taken note of by international organizations in many places. Yet there is still a kind of disconnect between the people forced to take shelter where they can and the mainstream of society in our country. This is a continuation of the isolation of different parts of the Federation that began some three decades ago and was deliberately created in order to maximize the power of an autocrat. It is this mental distance, which extends far further than the actual number of kilometres, which has allowed militants to take hold of certain areas in the first place, while the rest of us waited and watched, often with indifference. Now we seem content to be mere onlookers once again while small children driven from homes by no fault of their own scramble for a few crumbs of food or women who till now have lived lives of dignity scrounge through garbage heaps in the hope of finding something to feed famished families who struggle to survive.
The catastrophe is one that in magnitude is as vast as the earthquake of 2005. So far no figures are being given for civilian casualties, but we all know, in our hearts of hearts, that some non-combatants at least will die. The kind of war being fought means this is in fact almost impossible to avoid – though of course the government must attempt to minimize what we have learned to call 'collateral damage'. It is the danger of such a death that has brought desperate people pouring out of homes. We need mobilization of the kind seen three and a half years ago, in the days that followed the quake. We need everyone in a position to give or to help in other ways to be involved in the effort to prevent still more misery for displaced persons. The need to avert human suffering is of course irrefutable, but the fact also is that we need to create a 'connect' between people from the northern areas and the mainstream of our country. Building bridges that can close the existing chasms between different parts of our country may eventually prove just as crucial to winning the war against militants as the actual military operation. Success on both fronts is indeed interlinked and this reality should not be ignored. We need action to help displaced people, so that the process of winning over hearts coincides with that of regaining control over tracts of territory and may be the factor that enables the state to retain a grasp of these lands over a longer frame of time.
The News International, Pakistan
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
As the fierce military operation continues in Swat and other areas, tens of thousands of people continue to flee the fighting. The brief lifting of a curfew imposed in Swat saw hundreds of desperate families pile belongings into trucks, vans, cars or hand-pushed trolleys and try to make it down to safer locations, even if they had to do so on foot. The plight of Pakistan's displaced people is terrible to witness. Already, the immense humanitarian crisis unfolding in our midst has been taken note of by international organizations in many places. Yet there is still a kind of disconnect between the people forced to take shelter where they can and the mainstream of society in our country. This is a continuation of the isolation of different parts of the Federation that began some three decades ago and was deliberately created in order to maximize the power of an autocrat. It is this mental distance, which extends far further than the actual number of kilometres, which has allowed militants to take hold of certain areas in the first place, while the rest of us waited and watched, often with indifference. Now we seem content to be mere onlookers once again while small children driven from homes by no fault of their own scramble for a few crumbs of food or women who till now have lived lives of dignity scrounge through garbage heaps in the hope of finding something to feed famished families who struggle to survive.
The catastrophe is one that in magnitude is as vast as the earthquake of 2005. So far no figures are being given for civilian casualties, but we all know, in our hearts of hearts, that some non-combatants at least will die. The kind of war being fought means this is in fact almost impossible to avoid – though of course the government must attempt to minimize what we have learned to call 'collateral damage'. It is the danger of such a death that has brought desperate people pouring out of homes. We need mobilization of the kind seen three and a half years ago, in the days that followed the quake. We need everyone in a position to give or to help in other ways to be involved in the effort to prevent still more misery for displaced persons. The need to avert human suffering is of course irrefutable, but the fact also is that we need to create a 'connect' between people from the northern areas and the mainstream of our country. Building bridges that can close the existing chasms between different parts of our country may eventually prove just as crucial to winning the war against militants as the actual military operation. Success on both fronts is indeed interlinked and this reality should not be ignored. We need action to help displaced people, so that the process of winning over hearts coincides with that of regaining control over tracts of territory and may be the factor that enables the state to retain a grasp of these lands over a longer frame of time.
Labels: Army Operation, Internally Displaced Persons, Pakistan, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 11:24 AM,
,
Shaky Pakistan Is Seen as a Target of Plots by Al Qaeda
Monday, May 11, 2009
The New York Times
By MARK MAZZETTI and ERIC SCHMITT
Published: May 10, 2009
WASHINGTON — As Taliban militants push deeper into Pakistan’s settled areas, foreign operatives of Al Qaeda who had focused on plotting attacks against the West are seizing on the turmoil to sow chaos in Pakistan and strengthen the hand of the militant Islamist groups there, according to American and Pakistani intelligence officials.
One indication came April 19, when a truck parked inside a Qaeda compound in South Waziristan, in Pakistan’s tribal areas, erupted in a fireball when it was struck by a C.I.A. missile. American intelligence officials say that the truck had been loaded with high explosives, apparently to be used as a bomb, and that while its ultimate target remains unclear, the bomb would have been more devastating than the suicide bombing that killed more than 50 people at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September.
Al Qaeda’s leaders — a predominantly Arab group of Egyptians, Saudis and Yemenis, as well as other nationalities like Uzbeks — for years have nurtured ties to Pakistani militant groups like the Taliban operating in the mountains of Pakistan. The foreign operatives have historically set their sights on targets loftier than those selected by the local militant groups, aiming for spectacular attacks against the West, but they may see new opportunity in the recent violence.
Intelligence officials say the Taliban advances in Swat and Buner, which are closer to Islamabad than to the tribal areas, have already helped Al Qaeda in its recruiting efforts. The officials say the group’s recruiting campaign is currently aimed at young fighters across the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia who are less inclined to plan and carry out far-reaching global attacks and who have focused their energies on more immediate targets.
“They smell blood, and they are intoxicated by the idea of a jihadist takeover in Pakistan,” said Bruce O. Riedel, a former analyst for the C.I.A. who recently led the Obama administration’s policy review of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
It remains unlikely that Islamic militants could seize power in Pakistan, given the strength of Pakistan’s military, according to American intelligence analysts. But a senior American intelligence official expressed concern that recent successes by the Taliban in extending territorial gains could foreshadow the creation of “mini-Afghanistans” around Pakistan that would allow militants even more freedom to plot attacks.
Read more
Labels: Al Qaeda, Army Operation, Pakistan, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 6:12 PM,
,
We may be defeated by refugee camps
Daily Times, Pakistan
Monday, May 11, 2009
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani says the Swat operation is a fight for the “survival of Pakistan”. True. But we could be defeated in this fight by the developing crisis of the refugee camps in Mardan and elsewhere in the NWFP unless we do some emergency reorganisation. When the provincial government asked the people of the Malakand region to leave their homes to give the Pakistan Army a chance to take on the Taliban without too much collateral damage, the local population readily agreed. But their reception at the camps is turning out to be a trauma they did not anticipate.
The camps have been hurriedly put together in Mardan, Swabi and other places in the NWFP, and first reports are not very heartening. Around 200,000 have moved out of the target areas; an additional 300,000 are on the move and are expected to reach the camps by the beginning of the week. They will have joined the earlier 500,000 that fled the conflict zone and have been absorbed in various parts of the province, including the old deserted refugee camps used by the Afghan refugees in the past. That makes a total of one million refugees. The NWFP government projects a figure of 1.5 million as the war in Swat goes into attrition.
The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) disagrees with the numbers on the basis of registration because registration is the only way you can officially compute the size of displacement. It is true that many Swatis and people from other areas have moved in with their relatives outside the region but the coming flood of refugees is mostly going to be looked after by the state of Pakistan. The prime minister has already given Rs 1 billion to the NWFP government but it is organisation and expert handling that is missing. The first images appearing on the TV channels tell us that both are in short supply.
If this is the case, we may be defeated by the Taliban because of the refugee camps. We had a much better record of handling the displaced persons after the 2005 earthquake in Azad Kashmir and parts of the NWFP. Have we forgotten the lessons? The 2005 earthquake was a sudden natural calamity and we could not have organised rescue and settlement beforehand. Adverse publicity of government performance went on for weeks before organisation caught up with the homeless. Beyond 2005, we had decades of experience of handling the Afghan refugees most of whom were lodged in the NWFP. Where has that expertise gone?
Read more
Monday, May 11, 2009
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani says the Swat operation is a fight for the “survival of Pakistan”. True. But we could be defeated in this fight by the developing crisis of the refugee camps in Mardan and elsewhere in the NWFP unless we do some emergency reorganisation. When the provincial government asked the people of the Malakand region to leave their homes to give the Pakistan Army a chance to take on the Taliban without too much collateral damage, the local population readily agreed. But their reception at the camps is turning out to be a trauma they did not anticipate.
The camps have been hurriedly put together in Mardan, Swabi and other places in the NWFP, and first reports are not very heartening. Around 200,000 have moved out of the target areas; an additional 300,000 are on the move and are expected to reach the camps by the beginning of the week. They will have joined the earlier 500,000 that fled the conflict zone and have been absorbed in various parts of the province, including the old deserted refugee camps used by the Afghan refugees in the past. That makes a total of one million refugees. The NWFP government projects a figure of 1.5 million as the war in Swat goes into attrition.
The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) disagrees with the numbers on the basis of registration because registration is the only way you can officially compute the size of displacement. It is true that many Swatis and people from other areas have moved in with their relatives outside the region but the coming flood of refugees is mostly going to be looked after by the state of Pakistan. The prime minister has already given Rs 1 billion to the NWFP government but it is organisation and expert handling that is missing. The first images appearing on the TV channels tell us that both are in short supply.
If this is the case, we may be defeated by the Taliban because of the refugee camps. We had a much better record of handling the displaced persons after the 2005 earthquake in Azad Kashmir and parts of the NWFP. Have we forgotten the lessons? The 2005 earthquake was a sudden natural calamity and we could not have organised rescue and settlement beforehand. Adverse publicity of government performance went on for weeks before organisation caught up with the homeless. Beyond 2005, we had decades of experience of handling the Afghan refugees most of whom were lodged in the NWFP. Where has that expertise gone?
Read more
Labels: Army Operation, Internally Displaced Persons, Pakistan, Refugees, Swat, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 5:37 PM,
,
