Pakistan in Media

The News International, Pakistan, Monday, July 13, 2009
PESHAWAR: Spending more than two months in camps after the commencement of the military operation in Malakand Division, over two million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are set to return home from today (Monday).

The convoys of the IDPs would be streaming in the beautiful valley amid tight security arrangements, backed by military gunship helicopters. The security is aimed at avoiding any untoward incident during the IDPs’.
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The News International, Pakistan, Saturday, June 20, 2009
Daily updates from military spokesmen tell us of casualties on both sides and the location of some operations in the preceding twenty-four hours. They are never accompanied by contemporary footage, a map or any supporting documentation – NIC of some of the dead Taliban for instance. We are now 54 days into the Swat battle, with Dir and Buner still active combat zones and Waziristan moving into the foreground as the site of a major engagement. We are told that at least 1,400 militants have been killed alongside 120 of our own soldiers. There is never mention of civilian casualties – the 'collateral damage' – despite ample anecdotal evidence from IDPs that civilians have died as a result of the actions of our army. No independent verification of the figures delivered daily has been made, and the media – apart from some carefully choreographed reports from Mingora – are excluded from the battle. The numbers of Taliban dead seem improbably high given that they fight in less-than-platoon sized units and are highly mobile. 'Hideouts' are reportedly 'cleared out' everyday – but have we ever seen a picture of one of these 'hideouts' immediately after it was 'cleared'? Does nobody in the military have access to a camera?
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The News International, Pakistan, Saturday, June 20, 2009
PESHAWAR: Eleven Taliban combatants were killed in Doog Darra area of Dir Upper by armed villagers and artillery shelling by security forces as the militants started fleeing the area after giving up resistance.

Also, the Chitral police arrested 10 fleeing militants, including an Afghan national, who was in an injured condition, when they sneaked into the district to escape the villagersí onslaught. The armed villagers have ringed the Taliban militants, led by Afghan commander Amir Khitab, since June 6 in the mountains in Doog Darra area.
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The News International, Pakistan, Saturday, June 20, 2009
KHAR/PESHAWAR/GHALLANAI: Security forces on Friday killed 15 more militants and injured seven others in a shootout in the Charmang area of Bajaur Agency, while 47 wanted persons surrendered to the authorities in neighbouring Mohmand Agency.

Also, security forces killed four militants in Buner district as troops consolidated their positions in the Swat Valley, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said. Sources said that the militants attacked security forces’ patrolling party near the Pak-Afghan border in the Charmang area of Nawagai Tehsil in Bajaur Agency, killing two soldiers and injuring three others.
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Dawn, Pakistan
By Shahid Javed Burki
Tuesday, 09 Jun, 2009

THE decision by the government to send the military to chase out the Islamic militants from Malakand may have ushered in a process that can bring the country back to the path of religious moderation and political modernisation. The move represents a major change for the army.

According to one analysis, “the coming weeks are a reckoning for Pakistan’s army. …The … force — long primed for another war against the regional rival India — is now fighting an internal conflict”.

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The News International, Pakistan

Tuesday, June 09, 2009

Indicators outside of the major state and international actors are the people of Swat, who are themselves looking to a time in the not-far future when they will return to their land and homes. And businesses. And farms. Already there are reports of residents discussing how to revive the tourism industry in Kalam, and an understanding that foreign tourists may be a couple of years hence, but domestic tourism should be up and running again next season. Tourism may be the easier nut to crack – putting farms back on their feet and replacing lost livestock will be much harder. Local strains of cattle, sheep and goats cannot be replaced easily; land which has been fought over and perhaps mined – and is anyway bound to contain unexploded munitions that present a danger to agricultural activity – will take more than a season to get back into profit. Difficult it may be but not impossible, and the deep well of social capital within of Swati communities will help to sustain the process of post-war regeneration. But social capital is not measured in hard cash – and hard cash they need. Swat presented an overarching threat – it could again – but it may also be an unparalleled opportunity for the government and the people to remake the social contract.

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Dawn, Pakistan
Monday, 08 Jun, 2009

SOME voices of dissent aside, the consensus in political circles is near absolute. The two most popular parties are solidly behind the army operation in Malakand and seem to have convinced their supporters that this is Pakistan’s battle. The president said on Friday that the fight against militancy will be taken to its “logical conclusion”. Parliament has thrown its weight behind the crackdown and the majority of Senate members subscribe to the same view. As befits a democracy, the stance taken by our elected representatives reflects popular opinion which has swung sharply against the Taliban in recent weeks. In the theatre of war, the military offensive seems to be proceeding in a calculated manner and the militants are on the run. So far so good, even if victory is still nowhere near in sight.

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Dawn, Pakistan
By Moazzam Husain
Monday, 08 Jun, 2009

THE view was panoramic from atop Peochar from where the operational commander of the Special Forces contingent informed a private TV channel that “the militants’ leadership had fled by the time we got here”.

He moved on to speculate on the sources of arms and funds for the Swat Taliban alluding to a “foreign hand”. Within hours, rightwing blogs and discussion groups on the Internet were ablaze with activity. “See we told you, it was the Indians”. We finally have “proof”. Stop the operation … stop fighting America’s war, the noises came.

I tread with caution here before jumping to any conclusions. The guns are of Russian, American and Indian origin we are told. This is one data point. The source of funds is a question mark and thereby potentially another data point. Now let’s consider a few more and then see if we can join the dots.

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Dawn, Pakistan
By Asad Hashim
Monday, 08 Jun, 2009

ASIF Ali Zardari may just be a genius. It is, however, unlikely. What is more likely is that Pakistan just got very, very lucky (appearances to the contrary notwithstanding).

With the army claiming successes in the ongoing military operation in Swat, it is worth looking back at how a military operation became an option: it was due to the breakdown of the agreement between the Pakistani government and the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM).

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Daily Times, Pakistan
Monday, June 08, 2009

Events are taking place at a pace faster than they are analysed and interpreted. The Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under Baitullah Mehsud has announced it is going to target the provinces to relieve pressure on the FATA and Malakand regions. That is understood as normal retaliatory policy. But is there something more to what the TTP is planning? The latest death of Maulana Sufi Muhammad’s two close TNSM deputies poses a conundrum that must be carefully probed for new signals. The recent abduction of the Razmak College students and the targeting of Rescue 15 offices have also to be understood in a different light.

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The News International, Pakistan
Monday, June 08, 2009

The meeting between top leaders of the NWFP government and the military to discuss a roadmap for the return of the IDPs to their homes once the military operation is over is significant. Cooperation between the civil and military setup is vital in the post-conflict phase. The mutual mistrust between the two has often hampered matters in the past and this is one of the fundamental factors behind the many administrative and even political failures that we have had to suffer. The military, for its part, has frequently been too quick to dismiss politicians as inept or unwilling. Frequently the politicians too have failed to work in coordination with the military. The situation in Swat and other zones of fighting is now such that they must do so.

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Dawn, Pakistan
By Muhammad Shehryar Khakwani
Monday, 01 Jun, 2009

OUR nation, at war with armed miscreants among its population and determined to root out terrorism, faces an unprecedented, dangerous situation. Prime Minister Gilani fittingly described the fight in Swat as a struggle for survival as he rallied support in parliament for the operation.

The strain is multifaceted; not only is a humanitarian crisis at hand with the IDPs, but a security situation looms as a result of the operation. The blast in Lahore confirms it. The aftermath saw a flurry of activity condemning the attack followed by reviewing security procedures. This should have happened before the attack in Lahore.

As the president embarked on a number of foreign trips recently, the interior minister was by his side. The business conducted may have been important, and the entourage needed, but one questions the timing and tasks at home delayed because of these dealings.

The challenge in Swat is not just one of putting down an insurgency but of dealing effectively with the aftermath. It was not a natural disaster which caught us unawares. It was a planned operation, and proper planning should have included military operations, political support, the social aspect of dealing with the internally displaced and the consequent security situation. It was apparent that millions would leave their homes in a hurry, carrying few belongings and looking for any mode of transportation towards safety as they waited for the army to break the Taliban’s back. That this is an extraordinary situation calling for extraordinary measures should have been catered for. Yet, our governments fail to be proactive.

At a critical hour, we see the people fleeing a war zone. All basic provisions, such as a roof over their heads, security, sanitation, electricity, medical care, food and water, become dependent on someone’s charity. We witness the media running advertisements raising awareness, average citizens showing courage and generosity, provincial governments organising relief efforts, stretching their strained resources to spare what they can. We also witness the interior minister responsible for security by the president’s side in front of the Elysée Palace and in Tehran for the declarations of nuclear power pacts and gas pipelines.

There can only be a couple of reasons for leaving at a critical hour. One is that the office held cannot make a difference in combating the crisis. The other is that all measures are in place, and nothing can be gained by staying behind. It is hard to believe that the highest office in charge of security would not be able to make a difference. The security services are facing a determined, elusive enemy, who will apparently declare victory by striking the innocent wherever they may be. Loss of innocent lives, wounding and maiming indiscriminately are the goals of twisted vengeance. This is not ordinary and it seems our security services are not adequately prepared to thwart the attempts.The federal government must make every effort, however minuscule, for easing suffering and coordinating efforts among government agencies. All offices must come together to ensure efficient means are employed as aid reaches the hungry and stricken, and follow up with the armed forces ensuring they have all the support necessary to reach the endgame faster. This is imperative to organising the return of the internally displaced smoothly, and most importantly to making security arrangements for those exposed.

Discussing a civil nuclear deal with France to improve the power situation, or raising awareness about Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, securing energy supplies are important issues, but not at the cost of security issues at home. This is akin to leaving for business meetings when one’s house is on fire. Perhaps it would be more prudent to put the fire out before leaving home. The operation in Swat is not a minor undertaking. The government must have all hands on deck until the country is declared secure.

Nearly all leaders face unexpected situations, usually grim, and needing urgent attention. In order to be effective, it is imperative to spend more time planning for things that go wrong than things that are headed in the right direction.

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Dawn, Pakistan
By Javed Hussain
Monday, 01 Jun, 2009

COUNTER-INSURGENCY operations are a tough undertaking. They become tougher when the geography of the area favours the insurgents, and even more when the soldiers are not trained for them.

They are trained for conventional warfare which is the anti-thesis of guerilla warfare. As a consequence, switching from the conventional to the unconventional is not easy for the soldiers.

When they are unable to adapt to the clandestine nature of guerilla warfare, they tend to collapse under minimal stress, as happened to the French and American soldiers in Vietnam, to the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, to the Indian soldiers in Kashmir and is happening to the Americans once again, this time in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The only elements of the regular army who feel completely at home in guerilla warfare are the Special Forces. They can switch from commando to guerilla to anti-guerilla with ease. Like the skillful guerillas, they are also masters of surprise and innovation. Outfits like the American Green Berets, the British SAS, the Russian Spetsnaz and the Pakistani SSG conducted some spectacular operations in Vietnam, Malaya, Afghanistan and former East Pakistan respectively that earned them the respect of the guerillas — the latest being the SSG assault on the Peochar heights. But on their own, the Special Forces cannot win a war; they can contribute a great deal when used imaginatively and on sound intelligence.

If the experience of the SSG in unconventional warfare is utilised for preparing the regular infantry for the counter-insurgency role, it will pay dividends. Although our infantrymen have done far better than the French, American, Soviet and Indian infantry under similar conditions, it is only fair that they are prepared mentally, physically and tactically for a war that will not end any time soon.

The ultimate objective of both sides in guerilla war is control of the people. If the guerillas succeed in winning them over, the army would have to contend with a hostile population also. Conversely if the army wins them over, the guerillas stand exposed and begin to gasp for breath like fish out of water since they derive their staying power from the people. In a remarkable turn of events, the outrages perpetrated by Taliban insurgents have alienated the people, while their large-scale exodus from the areas of operation has removed the cover behind which they could hide — hence their recent appeals to the people to return.

While displacement is a harrowing experience for the people, it has created an opportunity for the government to win them over completely. If it fails, the people’s antipathy to the Taliban will get dissipated, and in time, turn into sympathy. This would make the army’s task that much more difficult. The exodus has created an opportunity for the army also for conducting operations in a relatively free environment.

Another act of the insurgents that has favoured the army immensely is their propensity for holding ground and fighting pitched battles. But this is not likely to last long as they cannot sustain the attrition thus caused, and sooner than later, they would have to revert to guerilla warfare and its classic hit-and-run tactics.

The army operation would then be reduced to small-scale actions by infantry platoons and companies.

The reason why counter-insurgency operations drag on is that when the insurgents come under pressure, they slip out to hit-and-run another day, as they did when the army went into Kalam and Bahrain. But when they hit and cannot run, demoralisation starts setting in. This can only be ensured when the theatre of operations, and within the theatre the area of operations, are sealed from all sides before an operation is undertaken to make escape from it or ingress into it difficult (Swat is a theatre, Mingora an area of operation).

It is this compulsion that consumes maximum troops, more so, when the terrain is harsh. Therefore, it is important for the army to make sure it doesn’t get overstretched by operating in multiple theatres at the same time. Thus the need to establish the right soldier-to-guerilla ratio on the basis of intelligence about the number of guerillas present in the theatre of operations, and within the theatre in each area of operation, as well as the number outside the theatre who could influence the operation. But since intelligence-gathering is far more difficult in a guerilla-warfare setting, it is better to err on the side of excess.

If the Soviets had secured the Pak-Afghan border, they could have severed the logistics line to the Mujahideen and thus created a major problem not only for the Mujahideen but also for their handlers in Pakistan. But they were unable to muster the troops required for this and paid heavily for it.

In the early days of the war in Vietnam, Generals Maxwell Taylor and Westmoreland suggested that a superiority of 10:1 would be necessary to defeat the Viet Cong, but as early as 1965, it was revised to 25:1, while after the defeat a ratio of 50:1 was bandied about.

The Taliban insurgents essentially are mountain fighters. When they come under pressure they withdraw into the mountains, their safe haven. But when these are denied to them they become vulnerable. Mountains therefore, constitute a key terrain for them as well as for the army. If the heights are secured by landing helicopter-borne troops on them, the insurgents in all probability would be forced down into the valleys, thus exposing themselves to pre-positioned units of the army. But if this doesn’t force them down, a downhill attack would.

Unless the insurgency is defeated in the tribal areas of Pakistan, the insurgency in Afghanistan will not be defeated. Therefore, it would be in America’s interest to provide the requisite number of troop-carrying helicopters and infantry’s night-vision devices to the

Pakistan Army and to redeploy their forces to make it difficult for the Afghan insurgents to cross into the tribal areas.

If they decline they would only reinforce the perception that in their ‘new strategy’, they see their battle for Afghanistan being fought by the Pakistan Army in Pakistan.

Fate has placed the destiny of Pakistan in the hands of the army. It is fighting a brutal enemy programmed by religious pseudso and supported by external elements inimical to Pakistan. The soldiers are fighting with great élan.

They are fighting a battle that has to be won — the battle for Pakistan. Every time a soldier is buried, we should remind ourselves of Pericles’ oration at the funeral of Athenians who died in 431 BC in the Peloponnesian War: “Take these men for your example. Like them remember that prosperity can only be for the free, that freedom is the sure possession of those who have the courage to defend it.”

Dawn, Pakistan
Sunday, 31 May, 2009

FOUR weeks into the military operation in Malakand division, the flow of mixed news continues. Militarily, successes are being achieved; the latest good news is that Mingora has nearly been secured by the army. But on the humanitarian front troubling news continues to pour in: on Friday, the NWFP information minister claimed that the number of IDPs in the northwest has touched 3.4 million, and this at a time when international aid agencies are running short of money and supplies. Overall, the picture that is emerging is one of a reasonably successful military operation set against a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions. Clearly, the best-case scenario from here is one in which the security forces clear and hold the various battlefields in Malakand quickly to allow as many IDPs as possible to return to their homes at the earliest. Anything short of that and a large number of IDPs may be looking at a bleak foreseeable future.

Yet, simply attaining military success and allowing some IDPs to return to their homes without concerted action to make their resettlement as smooth as possible may prove very damaging to the counter-insurgency. Thankfully, the federal government appears to be awake to the need for such aid — it has spelled out a 3R approach in which, in addition to relief operations, emphasis has been laid on rehabilitation and reconstruction. Now that phase A of the counter-insurgency — use of the security forces to clear and hold areas controlled by the militants while the local populations have evacuated — appears to be nearing an end in some areas, the government must quickly turn its attention to phase B: filling the administrative void in areas that have been retaken and helping smooth the return of IDPs to their homes. Take the case of Mingora. It is a shattered city. The electricity grid has been destroyed, the telephone network has been damaged, government offices have been looted and damaged in fighting, the local police force has absconded and stocks of food have been removed by the militants. The city may have been secured by the army, but it has been a war zone until very recently and by any standard it is a city that isn’t ready to be administered by anyone at the moment. Therefore, the provincial and federal governments must ensure that the nuts and bolts of local administration are in place as quickly as possible and that the local administration is up and running by the time the people start streaming back into the city.

Finally, a word about the leadership of the TTP. While the militants may be on the back foot generally, a handful of the top commanders have still eluded the security forces. Those commanders need to be captured or killed soon, or else they may make the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases very difficult.

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