The battle for Pakistan
Monday, June 1, 2009
Dawn, Pakistan
By Javed Hussain
Monday, 01 Jun, 2009
COUNTER-INSURGENCY operations are a tough undertaking. They become tougher when the geography of the area favours the insurgents, and even more when the soldiers are not trained for them.
They are trained for conventional warfare which is the anti-thesis of guerilla warfare. As a consequence, switching from the conventional to the unconventional is not easy for the soldiers.
When they are unable to adapt to the clandestine nature of guerilla warfare, they tend to collapse under minimal stress, as happened to the French and American soldiers in Vietnam, to the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, to the Indian soldiers in Kashmir and is happening to the Americans once again, this time in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The only elements of the regular army who feel completely at home in guerilla warfare are the Special Forces. They can switch from commando to guerilla to anti-guerilla with ease. Like the skillful guerillas, they are also masters of surprise and innovation. Outfits like the American Green Berets, the British SAS, the Russian Spetsnaz and the Pakistani SSG conducted some spectacular operations in Vietnam, Malaya, Afghanistan and former East Pakistan respectively that earned them the respect of the guerillas — the latest being the SSG assault on the Peochar heights. But on their own, the Special Forces cannot win a war; they can contribute a great deal when used imaginatively and on sound intelligence.
If the experience of the SSG in unconventional warfare is utilised for preparing the regular infantry for the counter-insurgency role, it will pay dividends. Although our infantrymen have done far better than the French, American, Soviet and Indian infantry under similar conditions, it is only fair that they are prepared mentally, physically and tactically for a war that will not end any time soon.
The ultimate objective of both sides in guerilla war is control of the people. If the guerillas succeed in winning them over, the army would have to contend with a hostile population also. Conversely if the army wins them over, the guerillas stand exposed and begin to gasp for breath like fish out of water since they derive their staying power from the people. In a remarkable turn of events, the outrages perpetrated by Taliban insurgents have alienated the people, while their large-scale exodus from the areas of operation has removed the cover behind which they could hide — hence their recent appeals to the people to return.
While displacement is a harrowing experience for the people, it has created an opportunity for the government to win them over completely. If it fails, the people’s antipathy to the Taliban will get dissipated, and in time, turn into sympathy. This would make the army’s task that much more difficult. The exodus has created an opportunity for the army also for conducting operations in a relatively free environment.
Another act of the insurgents that has favoured the army immensely is their propensity for holding ground and fighting pitched battles. But this is not likely to last long as they cannot sustain the attrition thus caused, and sooner than later, they would have to revert to guerilla warfare and its classic hit-and-run tactics.
The army operation would then be reduced to small-scale actions by infantry platoons and companies.
The reason why counter-insurgency operations drag on is that when the insurgents come under pressure, they slip out to hit-and-run another day, as they did when the army went into Kalam and Bahrain. But when they hit and cannot run, demoralisation starts setting in. This can only be ensured when the theatre of operations, and within the theatre the area of operations, are sealed from all sides before an operation is undertaken to make escape from it or ingress into it difficult (Swat is a theatre, Mingora an area of operation).
It is this compulsion that consumes maximum troops, more so, when the terrain is harsh. Therefore, it is important for the army to make sure it doesn’t get overstretched by operating in multiple theatres at the same time. Thus the need to establish the right soldier-to-guerilla ratio on the basis of intelligence about the number of guerillas present in the theatre of operations, and within the theatre in each area of operation, as well as the number outside the theatre who could influence the operation. But since intelligence-gathering is far more difficult in a guerilla-warfare setting, it is better to err on the side of excess.
If the Soviets had secured the Pak-Afghan border, they could have severed the logistics line to the Mujahideen and thus created a major problem not only for the Mujahideen but also for their handlers in Pakistan. But they were unable to muster the troops required for this and paid heavily for it.
In the early days of the war in Vietnam, Generals Maxwell Taylor and Westmoreland suggested that a superiority of 10:1 would be necessary to defeat the Viet Cong, but as early as 1965, it was revised to 25:1, while after the defeat a ratio of 50:1 was bandied about.
The Taliban insurgents essentially are mountain fighters. When they come under pressure they withdraw into the mountains, their safe haven. But when these are denied to them they become vulnerable. Mountains therefore, constitute a key terrain for them as well as for the army. If the heights are secured by landing helicopter-borne troops on them, the insurgents in all probability would be forced down into the valleys, thus exposing themselves to pre-positioned units of the army. But if this doesn’t force them down, a downhill attack would.
Unless the insurgency is defeated in the tribal areas of Pakistan, the insurgency in Afghanistan will not be defeated. Therefore, it would be in America’s interest to provide the requisite number of troop-carrying helicopters and infantry’s night-vision devices to the
Pakistan Army and to redeploy their forces to make it difficult for the Afghan insurgents to cross into the tribal areas.
If they decline they would only reinforce the perception that in their ‘new strategy’, they see their battle for Afghanistan being fought by the Pakistan Army in Pakistan.
Fate has placed the destiny of Pakistan in the hands of the army. It is fighting a brutal enemy programmed by religious pseudso and supported by external elements inimical to Pakistan. The soldiers are fighting with great élan.
They are fighting a battle that has to be won — the battle for Pakistan. Every time a soldier is buried, we should remind ourselves of Pericles’ oration at the funeral of Athenians who died in 431 BC in the Peloponnesian War: “Take these men for your example. Like them remember that prosperity can only be for the free, that freedom is the sure possession of those who have the courage to defend it.”
By Javed Hussain
Monday, 01 Jun, 2009
COUNTER-INSURGENCY operations are a tough undertaking. They become tougher when the geography of the area favours the insurgents, and even more when the soldiers are not trained for them.
They are trained for conventional warfare which is the anti-thesis of guerilla warfare. As a consequence, switching from the conventional to the unconventional is not easy for the soldiers.
When they are unable to adapt to the clandestine nature of guerilla warfare, they tend to collapse under minimal stress, as happened to the French and American soldiers in Vietnam, to the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, to the Indian soldiers in Kashmir and is happening to the Americans once again, this time in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The only elements of the regular army who feel completely at home in guerilla warfare are the Special Forces. They can switch from commando to guerilla to anti-guerilla with ease. Like the skillful guerillas, they are also masters of surprise and innovation. Outfits like the American Green Berets, the British SAS, the Russian Spetsnaz and the Pakistani SSG conducted some spectacular operations in Vietnam, Malaya, Afghanistan and former East Pakistan respectively that earned them the respect of the guerillas — the latest being the SSG assault on the Peochar heights. But on their own, the Special Forces cannot win a war; they can contribute a great deal when used imaginatively and on sound intelligence.
If the experience of the SSG in unconventional warfare is utilised for preparing the regular infantry for the counter-insurgency role, it will pay dividends. Although our infantrymen have done far better than the French, American, Soviet and Indian infantry under similar conditions, it is only fair that they are prepared mentally, physically and tactically for a war that will not end any time soon.
The ultimate objective of both sides in guerilla war is control of the people. If the guerillas succeed in winning them over, the army would have to contend with a hostile population also. Conversely if the army wins them over, the guerillas stand exposed and begin to gasp for breath like fish out of water since they derive their staying power from the people. In a remarkable turn of events, the outrages perpetrated by Taliban insurgents have alienated the people, while their large-scale exodus from the areas of operation has removed the cover behind which they could hide — hence their recent appeals to the people to return.
While displacement is a harrowing experience for the people, it has created an opportunity for the government to win them over completely. If it fails, the people’s antipathy to the Taliban will get dissipated, and in time, turn into sympathy. This would make the army’s task that much more difficult. The exodus has created an opportunity for the army also for conducting operations in a relatively free environment.
Another act of the insurgents that has favoured the army immensely is their propensity for holding ground and fighting pitched battles. But this is not likely to last long as they cannot sustain the attrition thus caused, and sooner than later, they would have to revert to guerilla warfare and its classic hit-and-run tactics.
The army operation would then be reduced to small-scale actions by infantry platoons and companies.
The reason why counter-insurgency operations drag on is that when the insurgents come under pressure, they slip out to hit-and-run another day, as they did when the army went into Kalam and Bahrain. But when they hit and cannot run, demoralisation starts setting in. This can only be ensured when the theatre of operations, and within the theatre the area of operations, are sealed from all sides before an operation is undertaken to make escape from it or ingress into it difficult (Swat is a theatre, Mingora an area of operation).
It is this compulsion that consumes maximum troops, more so, when the terrain is harsh. Therefore, it is important for the army to make sure it doesn’t get overstretched by operating in multiple theatres at the same time. Thus the need to establish the right soldier-to-guerilla ratio on the basis of intelligence about the number of guerillas present in the theatre of operations, and within the theatre in each area of operation, as well as the number outside the theatre who could influence the operation. But since intelligence-gathering is far more difficult in a guerilla-warfare setting, it is better to err on the side of excess.
If the Soviets had secured the Pak-Afghan border, they could have severed the logistics line to the Mujahideen and thus created a major problem not only for the Mujahideen but also for their handlers in Pakistan. But they were unable to muster the troops required for this and paid heavily for it.
In the early days of the war in Vietnam, Generals Maxwell Taylor and Westmoreland suggested that a superiority of 10:1 would be necessary to defeat the Viet Cong, but as early as 1965, it was revised to 25:1, while after the defeat a ratio of 50:1 was bandied about.
The Taliban insurgents essentially are mountain fighters. When they come under pressure they withdraw into the mountains, their safe haven. But when these are denied to them they become vulnerable. Mountains therefore, constitute a key terrain for them as well as for the army. If the heights are secured by landing helicopter-borne troops on them, the insurgents in all probability would be forced down into the valleys, thus exposing themselves to pre-positioned units of the army. But if this doesn’t force them down, a downhill attack would.
Unless the insurgency is defeated in the tribal areas of Pakistan, the insurgency in Afghanistan will not be defeated. Therefore, it would be in America’s interest to provide the requisite number of troop-carrying helicopters and infantry’s night-vision devices to the
Pakistan Army and to redeploy their forces to make it difficult for the Afghan insurgents to cross into the tribal areas.
If they decline they would only reinforce the perception that in their ‘new strategy’, they see their battle for Afghanistan being fought by the Pakistan Army in Pakistan.
Fate has placed the destiny of Pakistan in the hands of the army. It is fighting a brutal enemy programmed by religious pseudso and supported by external elements inimical to Pakistan. The soldiers are fighting with great élan.
They are fighting a battle that has to be won — the battle for Pakistan. Every time a soldier is buried, we should remind ourselves of Pericles’ oration at the funeral of Athenians who died in 431 BC in the Peloponnesian War: “Take these men for your example. Like them remember that prosperity can only be for the free, that freedom is the sure possession of those who have the courage to defend it.”
Labels: Counter Insurgency, Insurgency, Malakand Operation, Militancy, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 2:04 PM,
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