Musharraf and Zardari lecturing in US
Monday, September 21, 2009
Currently we have one ex-president working the lucrative lecture circuit in the US, whilst the incumbent president is doing the rounds of a less lucrative but perhaps more important set of venues. His latest foray into public speaking was at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, where it is reported that his prepared and scripted speech went well but that the question and answer session was a little less than informative. Much has been made in recent days of the fact that our president has been out of the country for one hundred days out of the last year – which also means that he was in-country for 265 of them. He will doubtless argue that his globetrotting is to chase down the billions that we need to sustain us as a nation; and that it is the job of the prime minister to run the show day-to-day. He would also argue that engagements such as that at the IISS enable him to put our point of view more effectively.
Both arguments hold water. We have what may charitably be described as ‘an image problem’ outside our coterie of very close friends. There is little by way of good news coming out of Pakistan these days and the ‘talking up’ of the win in Swat is dangerously close to the famous – and very premature – George Bush ‘victory’ speech after the fall of Saddam. In a world where communication everywhere is instant our follies, foibles and failings are all too easily paraded, and we need to work hard to counter the largely negative view that much of the rest of the world has of us. We need to promote trade – and Mr Zardari pointed to a need for us to access European markets in his speech – and ‘trade not aid’ is a useful positive headline. He has what is arguably one of the world’s least enviable jobs, and it is unreasonable to expect any government of Pakistan to ‘fix’ its burden of problems within a year or two – or ten. He has put our case to a sceptical audience in London, and there will be other difficult engagements with thorny questions lying in wait wherever he goes, so we wish him well. But we would also add a note of caution – a hundred days out of country may have been productively spent, but how well-spent were the days spent on home soil?
source
Both arguments hold water. We have what may charitably be described as ‘an image problem’ outside our coterie of very close friends. There is little by way of good news coming out of Pakistan these days and the ‘talking up’ of the win in Swat is dangerously close to the famous – and very premature – George Bush ‘victory’ speech after the fall of Saddam. In a world where communication everywhere is instant our follies, foibles and failings are all too easily paraded, and we need to work hard to counter the largely negative view that much of the rest of the world has of us. We need to promote trade – and Mr Zardari pointed to a need for us to access European markets in his speech – and ‘trade not aid’ is a useful positive headline. He has what is arguably one of the world’s least enviable jobs, and it is unreasonable to expect any government of Pakistan to ‘fix’ its burden of problems within a year or two – or ten. He has put our case to a sceptical audience in London, and there will be other difficult engagements with thorny questions lying in wait wherever he goes, so we wish him well. But we would also add a note of caution – a hundred days out of country may have been productively spent, but how well-spent were the days spent on home soil?
source
Labels: Government, Musharraf, Zardari
posted @ 4:30 PM,
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State Gifts and Musharraf
Monday, July 6, 2009
The News International, Pakistan, Monday, July 06, 2009
ISLAMABAD: Part-1 of this report published on Sunday revealed the generosity of the ruling Saudi royalty but that does not by any means suggest that it was the end of former president Pervez Musharraf’s official gifts binge. But the dilemma here is what gifts to list and what to ignore due to space constraints because some items tell us of the criminal undervaluing of valuable national property while there are others that reveal the paucity of character of our self-proclaimed statesmen. An attempt, therefore, has been made to identify a few of both categories, which have one characteristic in common: they expose the pettiness of those involved in national plunder.
More
ISLAMABAD: Part-1 of this report published on Sunday revealed the generosity of the ruling Saudi royalty but that does not by any means suggest that it was the end of former president Pervez Musharraf’s official gifts binge. But the dilemma here is what gifts to list and what to ignore due to space constraints because some items tell us of the criminal undervaluing of valuable national property while there are others that reveal the paucity of character of our self-proclaimed statesmen. An attempt, therefore, has been made to identify a few of both categories, which have one characteristic in common: they expose the pettiness of those involved in national plunder.
More
Labels: Corruption, Governance, Morality, Musharraf, State Gifts
posted @ 9:21 AM,
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Musharraf and State Gifts
Sunday, July 5, 2009
The News International, Pakistan, Sunday, July 05, 2009
ISLAMABAD: Former president General Parvez Musharraf, following in the footsteps of his hand-picked prime minister Shaukat Aziz, has taken away 168 expensive gifts worth about Rs 40 million (at the pitifully low official price) given by top foreign dignitaries along with him (mostly free of cost) before leaving Pakistan to settle in London. These gifts include dozens of boxes of jewellery, necklaces, pearls, diamonds, four American revolvers, Rolex watches, gold, earrings and rings.
Interestingly, the former president insists that he has not moved abroad permanently and is only there for the convenience of his lecture tour.
More
ISLAMABAD: Former president General Parvez Musharraf, following in the footsteps of his hand-picked prime minister Shaukat Aziz, has taken away 168 expensive gifts worth about Rs 40 million (at the pitifully low official price) given by top foreign dignitaries along with him (mostly free of cost) before leaving Pakistan to settle in London. These gifts include dozens of boxes of jewellery, necklaces, pearls, diamonds, four American revolvers, Rolex watches, gold, earrings and rings.
Interestingly, the former president insists that he has not moved abroad permanently and is only there for the convenience of his lecture tour.
More
Labels: Corruption, Ethics, Governance, Morality, Musharraf
posted @ 9:20 AM,
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SC seeks details about provision of electricity
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
The News International, Pakistan, Wednesday, June 24, 2009
The column pointed out that farmhouses were allotted to provide vegetables and fruits to the citizens of Islamabad but many marvellous bungalows had been constructed on the land in violation of CDA laws.
Electricity connection for agricultural purpose at plot No C-l(B), Park Road, Chak Shahzad owned by former president Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf was installed in Dec 2003 after the payment of full cost of material, including cost of 25 kVA transformer and other accessories amounting to Rs75,579 for an applied load of 20 HP motor.
More
The column pointed out that farmhouses were allotted to provide vegetables and fruits to the citizens of Islamabad but many marvellous bungalows had been constructed on the land in violation of CDA laws.
Electricity connection for agricultural purpose at plot No C-l(B), Park Road, Chak Shahzad owned by former president Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf was installed in Dec 2003 after the payment of full cost of material, including cost of 25 kVA transformer and other accessories amounting to Rs75,579 for an applied load of 20 HP motor.
More
Labels: Farmhouses, Judiciary, Justice, Musharraf, Nepotism, Suo Motu, Supreme Court of Pakistan
posted @ 7:44 AM,
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Will Zardari protect Musharraf’s legal eagles?
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
The News International, Pakistan, Tuesday, June 23, 2009
ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Gilani’s government appears hell-bent upon keeping under wraps the hefty fees paid from the taxpayers’ money to the Pirzadas, Bukharis, Qayyums of this world during the tenure of the ousted dictator, Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf.
It is unclear for the moment whether this overzealous attempt of maintaining the cloak of secrecy is due to the stakes of someone mighty in the current ruling dispensation or is it the consequence of deliberate and sinister bureaucratic foul-play linked with this issue. Whatever the underlying cause, the fact is: the government is steadfastly resisting a formal request to unveil the identity of all those lawyers who made fortunes during Musharraf’s tenure.
More
ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Gilani’s government appears hell-bent upon keeping under wraps the hefty fees paid from the taxpayers’ money to the Pirzadas, Bukharis, Qayyums of this world during the tenure of the ousted dictator, Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf.
It is unclear for the moment whether this overzealous attempt of maintaining the cloak of secrecy is due to the stakes of someone mighty in the current ruling dispensation or is it the consequence of deliberate and sinister bureaucratic foul-play linked with this issue. Whatever the underlying cause, the fact is: the government is steadfastly resisting a formal request to unveil the identity of all those lawyers who made fortunes during Musharraf’s tenure.
More
posted @ 9:35 AM,
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The plane again
Monday, June 15, 2009
The News International, Pakistan
Monday, June 15, 2009
More than eight years after the controversy over the alleged ‘hijacking’ of a commercial plane carrying then COAS General Pervez Musharraf made headlines amidst the dramatic overthrowing of the second PML-N government, the issue has crept back out of dusty files. The Sindh government has placed before the apex court documents which reveal the details of the exile accord reached between the Sharifs and the military-led setup, allowing them at the end of 2000 to exchange prison cells for a Saudi palace. There had for years been debate over the contents of the deal, with the Sharifs claiming they went into ‘forced exile’, after being convicted in the plane diversion case by an Anti-Terrorism Court. Mian Nawaz Sharif had at the time refused to appeal a life sentence in the case, upheld by the Sindh High Court, on the basis that he lacked confidence that the judiciary which had taken oath under a PCO was independent.
Read More
More than eight years after the controversy over the alleged ‘hijacking’ of a commercial plane carrying then COAS General Pervez Musharraf made headlines amidst the dramatic overthrowing of the second PML-N government, the issue has crept back out of dusty files. The Sindh government has placed before the apex court documents which reveal the details of the exile accord reached between the Sharifs and the military-led setup, allowing them at the end of 2000 to exchange prison cells for a Saudi palace. There had for years been debate over the contents of the deal, with the Sharifs claiming they went into ‘forced exile’, after being convicted in the plane diversion case by an Anti-Terrorism Court. Mian Nawaz Sharif had at the time refused to appeal a life sentence in the case, upheld by the Sindh High Court, on the basis that he lacked confidence that the judiciary which had taken oath under a PCO was independent.
Read More
Labels: Musharraf, Nawaz Sharif, Plane Hijacking Case, PML(N)
posted @ 9:15 AM,
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Living in denial
Monday, May 25, 2009
Dawn, Pakistan
By Ahmad Faruqui
Monday, 25 May, 2009
DURING a long appearance on the Fareed Zakaria show, Gen Pervez Musharraf proffered his analysis of the war against the Taliban.
While conceding that the threat posed by the Taliban to national security was real, he blamed the problem exclusively on the situation in Afghanistan. He contended that the Taliban were using drug money obtained by the cultivation of poppies to finance the purchase of advanced weapons with which they were making war against the poorly equipped Frontier Corps. The implication was very obvious.
If the Taliban in Pakistan did not have advanced weaponry, they would not be making inroads in Swat and coming within 60 miles of Islamabad. In Musharraf’s narrative, the surge of the Taliban in Pakistan can be traced to the failure of the US to subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ergo, if the US knew how to fight a war, the problem would go away. That bit of revisionist history caught the usually unflappable Zakaria off guard. Musharraf, even though he no longer holds any office in Pakistan, likes to speak as if he still runs the country. And he is as pugnacious as ever.
One has to assume that the general’s increasingly frequent appearances on the US lecture circuit, which he admits most military officers cannot even dream about, have the widespread support of the army. In Pavlovian fashion, the army blames its failures on someone else. Those who have read the Hamoodur Rehman Commission report know that Gen Yahya Khan blamed the army’s defeat in 1971 on the “treachery” of the Indians. And, in his first address to the nation in October 1999, Musharraf said that the army had never let the nation down.
Musharraf knows that without the support of the army, the fledgling Taliban regime that took over Kabul in the mid-1990s could not have survived. Indeed, the Taliban were provided extensive financial and military aid by the army and the ISI. Without such nurturing, the Taliban would be dead. It is also well known why the army went down this misguided path. A deeply Indo-centric mindset had caused it to embark upon a deliberate strategy of fending off an Indian invasion by creating “strategic depth” for itself in Afghanistan.
In this tiresome narrative, all threats ultimately can be traced back to New Delhi. Today it is being argued in GHQ that India is out to encircle Pakistan. As evidence we are told that India is setting up a ring of consulates in Afghanistan from which mercenaries are being recruited and sent out to carry missions in Pakistan. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan made the army’s support of the Taliban untenable. But doubts remained. Many analysts, and not just those in the US, felt that the army was still supporting the Taliban. The only difference was that the support was now being provided clandestinely.
How else could it be that a military establishment that counted a million active and reserve troops in its strength, and one that was equipped with sophisticated air weaponry, would not be able to take out a ragtag group of militants who were being pummelled into oblivion by the Americans? When Zakaria asked the general to opine on whether influential voices in the army’s high command were indirectly supporting the Taliban, Musharraf flinched. He said that anyone who distrusted the ISI and the army — i.e. did not take them at their word — did not know much about Pakistan.
Zakaria then gave the general an opportunity to hit a sixer. He asked whether the recent surge of the Taliban was due to the weak leadership being exercised by the new civilian government. Given that opportunity, the general hit the ball out of the park. He said that for months the civilian government had dithered on how to deal with the Taliban and had provided no direction to the army. He went on to say that now that a clear direction had been provided to the army, the problem would be taken care of.
At that point, Zakaria should have asked the general about the direction, clear or otherwise, that he had given to the army during his nine years in power when there was no doubt as to who was in charge. Perhaps the only benefit of military rule is unity of command. Despite this unity, the army failed to subdue the Taliban. In all probability, the generals were divided on whether the Taliban were a friend or a foe. More fundamentally, the high command preoccupied with running the country forgot that the war was largely an ideological one and only secondarily a military one.
It was being waged in mosques all along the border with Afghanistan where illiterate preachers who knew little about how the world worked dished out a hate-laden gospel. They convinced almost an entire generation of Pakhtuns that the troops which had invaded Afghanistan were carrying out Satan’s mission while Osama bin Laden was carrying out God’s mission. Most continued to deny that he had anything to do with 9/11. They did not stop there. They went on to accuse all those who had a different interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah as being agents of Satan and made their followers — the ‘good’ Muslims — duty-bound to take out the ‘bad’ Muslims.
Musharraf and his military regime did little to contain this cancerous doctrine. It was only a question of time before it would lodge itself in the mosques of Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. The battle for the soul of Pakistan was lost when these hate-loving preachers were given a free rein in the Pakistani heartland. It was not lost because the Taliban got their advanced weaponry from across the border. For the war to be won, a lot more will have to be done than to simply take away that weaponry. The time has come for the nation’s security establishment, which continues to be dominated by the army, to look inward and engage in self-criticism.
What good is it to say, as Musharraf did on the Zakaria show, that the army continually engages in threat analysis and knows how to balance the threat coming from India in the east and the threat coming from Taliban in the west? If it did, a nation of 170 million would not be under siege by a few thousand Taliban fighters.
Source
By Ahmad Faruqui
Monday, 25 May, 2009
DURING a long appearance on the Fareed Zakaria show, Gen Pervez Musharraf proffered his analysis of the war against the Taliban.
While conceding that the threat posed by the Taliban to national security was real, he blamed the problem exclusively on the situation in Afghanistan. He contended that the Taliban were using drug money obtained by the cultivation of poppies to finance the purchase of advanced weapons with which they were making war against the poorly equipped Frontier Corps. The implication was very obvious.
If the Taliban in Pakistan did not have advanced weaponry, they would not be making inroads in Swat and coming within 60 miles of Islamabad. In Musharraf’s narrative, the surge of the Taliban in Pakistan can be traced to the failure of the US to subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ergo, if the US knew how to fight a war, the problem would go away. That bit of revisionist history caught the usually unflappable Zakaria off guard. Musharraf, even though he no longer holds any office in Pakistan, likes to speak as if he still runs the country. And he is as pugnacious as ever.
One has to assume that the general’s increasingly frequent appearances on the US lecture circuit, which he admits most military officers cannot even dream about, have the widespread support of the army. In Pavlovian fashion, the army blames its failures on someone else. Those who have read the Hamoodur Rehman Commission report know that Gen Yahya Khan blamed the army’s defeat in 1971 on the “treachery” of the Indians. And, in his first address to the nation in October 1999, Musharraf said that the army had never let the nation down.
Musharraf knows that without the support of the army, the fledgling Taliban regime that took over Kabul in the mid-1990s could not have survived. Indeed, the Taliban were provided extensive financial and military aid by the army and the ISI. Without such nurturing, the Taliban would be dead. It is also well known why the army went down this misguided path. A deeply Indo-centric mindset had caused it to embark upon a deliberate strategy of fending off an Indian invasion by creating “strategic depth” for itself in Afghanistan.
In this tiresome narrative, all threats ultimately can be traced back to New Delhi. Today it is being argued in GHQ that India is out to encircle Pakistan. As evidence we are told that India is setting up a ring of consulates in Afghanistan from which mercenaries are being recruited and sent out to carry missions in Pakistan. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan made the army’s support of the Taliban untenable. But doubts remained. Many analysts, and not just those in the US, felt that the army was still supporting the Taliban. The only difference was that the support was now being provided clandestinely.
How else could it be that a military establishment that counted a million active and reserve troops in its strength, and one that was equipped with sophisticated air weaponry, would not be able to take out a ragtag group of militants who were being pummelled into oblivion by the Americans? When Zakaria asked the general to opine on whether influential voices in the army’s high command were indirectly supporting the Taliban, Musharraf flinched. He said that anyone who distrusted the ISI and the army — i.e. did not take them at their word — did not know much about Pakistan.
Zakaria then gave the general an opportunity to hit a sixer. He asked whether the recent surge of the Taliban was due to the weak leadership being exercised by the new civilian government. Given that opportunity, the general hit the ball out of the park. He said that for months the civilian government had dithered on how to deal with the Taliban and had provided no direction to the army. He went on to say that now that a clear direction had been provided to the army, the problem would be taken care of.
At that point, Zakaria should have asked the general about the direction, clear or otherwise, that he had given to the army during his nine years in power when there was no doubt as to who was in charge. Perhaps the only benefit of military rule is unity of command. Despite this unity, the army failed to subdue the Taliban. In all probability, the generals were divided on whether the Taliban were a friend or a foe. More fundamentally, the high command preoccupied with running the country forgot that the war was largely an ideological one and only secondarily a military one.
It was being waged in mosques all along the border with Afghanistan where illiterate preachers who knew little about how the world worked dished out a hate-laden gospel. They convinced almost an entire generation of Pakhtuns that the troops which had invaded Afghanistan were carrying out Satan’s mission while Osama bin Laden was carrying out God’s mission. Most continued to deny that he had anything to do with 9/11. They did not stop there. They went on to accuse all those who had a different interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah as being agents of Satan and made their followers — the ‘good’ Muslims — duty-bound to take out the ‘bad’ Muslims.
Musharraf and his military regime did little to contain this cancerous doctrine. It was only a question of time before it would lodge itself in the mosques of Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. The battle for the soul of Pakistan was lost when these hate-loving preachers were given a free rein in the Pakistani heartland. It was not lost because the Taliban got their advanced weaponry from across the border. For the war to be won, a lot more will have to be done than to simply take away that weaponry. The time has come for the nation’s security establishment, which continues to be dominated by the army, to look inward and engage in self-criticism.
What good is it to say, as Musharraf did on the Zakaria show, that the army continually engages in threat analysis and knows how to balance the threat coming from India in the east and the threat coming from Taliban in the west? If it did, a nation of 170 million would not be under siege by a few thousand Taliban fighters.
Source
Labels: Afghanistan, India, ISI, Madrassas, Musharraf, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 11:18 AM,
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