The fall of Peochar
Sunday, May 31, 2009
Daily Times, Pakistan
Sunday, May 31, 2009
The Pakistan Army has taken control of Bahrain in Swat and moved on to clear Peochar, known as the Taliban’s den. The terrorists have fled the stronghold, yielding 28 dead, including their infamous commander Khushmir Khan alias Abu Huzaifa, while seven Taliban have been arrested. Despite a lot of unnecessary hype on some TV channels about civilian casualties, only two were injured during the operation. Yet, before Peochar fell, Bahrain saw some of the heaviest fighting to date.
The goods discovered at the Taliban headquarters for Swat included 12 UN-registered vehicles that the Taliban had snatched. There were the typical tunnels where the warlords hid when they were attacked with heavy fire. There was a madrassa complete with four tunnels for storing rations stolen from NGOs and a huge cache of arms. Unfortunately, this victory has come at the cost of over 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The unfortunate dilemma, however, is that without this movement of people away from the battlefield, the victory over the Taliban would not have been possible.
Almost half the people of Malakand Division have fled their homes to enable the Pakistan Army to come in and kill over 1000 Taliban while suffering 80 soldiers dead in the fight in Lower Dir, Buner and Swat. The situation now faced by the country is no doubt grim but it could have been saved had the Musharraf regime decided in 2007 to stand up to the challenge of the terrorists. Even during 2008, the new civilian government dilly-dallied in the face of bad news from Swat and allowed the innocent Swatis to surrender their will to the Taliban.
Regrettably, those who supported the Taliban as “a legitimate reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan by America and Islamabad’s enslavement to American designs” have not given ground even after they were faced by a national consensus against the atrocities of the Taliban and their violation of the Nizam-e Adl accord. For instance, Ambassador Rustam Shah Mohmand insists that the report of the violation of the accord by the Taliban in Buner was actually an “exaggeration” on the part of the government: “But the fear of the Taliban taking control was so vociferously projected in the wake of two vehicles being driven into Buner by a few disorganised youths that it seemed like a deliberate move to create justification for a strong government intervention” (The News, May 30, 2009). The problem is that the resistance the army faced in Buner when it went in to clear the area could not have caused by “two vehicles being driven into Buner by a few disorganised youths”.
It is interesting that Mr Mohmand thinks that the 1994 imposition of shariat in Swat was not fully explained: “It was not explained to the people and to the world that the government is only re-enacting a law that was adopted by the governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif”. But the truth is that this point was drilled home by the press and by the ANP government that backed the Nizam-e Adl accord. If there is one thing that is now well known, it is the fact that the Nizam-e Adl Regulation was a legacy of the 1990s.
What supporters of the Taliban keep insisting on is the “nexus” with America: “Which other nation would get involved in a genocidal war for obtaining [foreign] assistance? Indeed the whole pattern of the [sic!] events would seem to fit in [sic!] the overarching strategic goals of some distant imperial power”. What is ignored is the fact that Peochar was where Baitullah Mehsud sent in the salaries for the warriors of Fazlullah, his “foreigner” warriors from the Uzbek and Chechen jihadi organisations, and the automatic and heavy weapons used against the innocent people of Swat and the Pakistan Army.
The government in Islamabad is unfortunately divided between the Taliban it faces at home and the US-Indian pressure it is facing from across the Durand Line. After every terrorist attack, the first accused are the US and India until the Taliban warlord Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan owns up to the deed. There is much talk of Indian involvement. If that is a fact and Mr Mehsud and his fighters are doing India’s work then this should be proved. However, this would also prove wrong those analysts who insist that the state should not be fighting its own people. This is a “strategic dichotomy” that might hurt Pakistan in the long run as the military operation drags on and the state successfully deals with the challenge to its internal sovereignty. *
Source
The goods discovered at the Taliban headquarters for Swat included 12 UN-registered vehicles that the Taliban had snatched. There were the typical tunnels where the warlords hid when they were attacked with heavy fire. There was a madrassa complete with four tunnels for storing rations stolen from NGOs and a huge cache of arms. Unfortunately, this victory has come at the cost of over 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The unfortunate dilemma, however, is that without this movement of people away from the battlefield, the victory over the Taliban would not have been possible.
Almost half the people of Malakand Division have fled their homes to enable the Pakistan Army to come in and kill over 1000 Taliban while suffering 80 soldiers dead in the fight in Lower Dir, Buner and Swat. The situation now faced by the country is no doubt grim but it could have been saved had the Musharraf regime decided in 2007 to stand up to the challenge of the terrorists. Even during 2008, the new civilian government dilly-dallied in the face of bad news from Swat and allowed the innocent Swatis to surrender their will to the Taliban.
Regrettably, those who supported the Taliban as “a legitimate reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan by America and Islamabad’s enslavement to American designs” have not given ground even after they were faced by a national consensus against the atrocities of the Taliban and their violation of the Nizam-e Adl accord. For instance, Ambassador Rustam Shah Mohmand insists that the report of the violation of the accord by the Taliban in Buner was actually an “exaggeration” on the part of the government: “But the fear of the Taliban taking control was so vociferously projected in the wake of two vehicles being driven into Buner by a few disorganised youths that it seemed like a deliberate move to create justification for a strong government intervention” (The News, May 30, 2009). The problem is that the resistance the army faced in Buner when it went in to clear the area could not have caused by “two vehicles being driven into Buner by a few disorganised youths”.
It is interesting that Mr Mohmand thinks that the 1994 imposition of shariat in Swat was not fully explained: “It was not explained to the people and to the world that the government is only re-enacting a law that was adopted by the governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif”. But the truth is that this point was drilled home by the press and by the ANP government that backed the Nizam-e Adl accord. If there is one thing that is now well known, it is the fact that the Nizam-e Adl Regulation was a legacy of the 1990s.
What supporters of the Taliban keep insisting on is the “nexus” with America: “Which other nation would get involved in a genocidal war for obtaining [foreign] assistance? Indeed the whole pattern of the [sic!] events would seem to fit in [sic!] the overarching strategic goals of some distant imperial power”. What is ignored is the fact that Peochar was where Baitullah Mehsud sent in the salaries for the warriors of Fazlullah, his “foreigner” warriors from the Uzbek and Chechen jihadi organisations, and the automatic and heavy weapons used against the innocent people of Swat and the Pakistan Army.
The government in Islamabad is unfortunately divided between the Taliban it faces at home and the US-Indian pressure it is facing from across the Durand Line. After every terrorist attack, the first accused are the US and India until the Taliban warlord Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan owns up to the deed. There is much talk of Indian involvement. If that is a fact and Mr Mehsud and his fighters are doing India’s work then this should be proved. However, this would also prove wrong those analysts who insist that the state should not be fighting its own people. This is a “strategic dichotomy” that might hurt Pakistan in the long run as the military operation drags on and the state successfully deals with the challenge to its internal sovereignty. *
Source
Labels: Militancy, Military Operation, Peochar, Swat Operation, Taliban, Terrorism
posted @ 10:55 AM,
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