Pakistan in Media

Daily Times, Pakistan, Thursday, July 16, 2009
It is high time there was peaceful agreement about this absurd state of affairs. India and Pakistan should withdraw their troops by mutual arrangement and leave Siachen as it was before 1984 — militarily unoccupied and valueless to all but mountaineers

The Musharraf-Vajpayee summit of 2001 took place in Delhi on 14-16 July, and there is a meeting between Prime Ministers Yousaf Raza Gilani and Manmohan Singh in Egypt today, July 16. Perhaps there is something about July that encourages discussion, but it is regrettable that little of substance has emerged from India-Pakistan dialogue in that or any other month.
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Daily Times, Pakistan, Sunday, July 12, 2009
NEW DELHI: Stating that he had not “given up” despite difficulties in dealing with Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh disclosed that representatives of both countries, including the ISI chief, had been involved in recent discussions.

Singh said that after the meeting between him and President Zardari in Russia there had been discussions between the high commissioners of both countries, the ISI chief and the Foreign Office.

Clamping down: India has demanded Pakistan apprehend the groups that it blames for the Mumbai attacks, and that it dismantle infrastructures supporting groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. “If they do that, we are willing to go half the distance to normalise relations,” Singh said. Singh said he had appealed to leaders at the G8 and G5 summits to exert pressure on Pakistan in this regard.

Singh said he had not meant to hurt Zardari’s feelings when he had told him in the media’s presence that “my mandate is limited to telling you that Pakistan’s territory must not be allowed to be used for terrorism against India”. “I simply forgot that the media was present there,” he said.
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The News International, Pakistan, Sunday, July 05, 2009
Ten years ago, the fierce skirmish over Kargil, the strategically important piece of territory disputed between India and Pakistan came to an end. The war, which started as the Pakistan Army came close to cutting off key routes in Kashmir, quickly turned as India responded with unexpected force. The crisis between the two nuclear-armed nations brought on the spectre of the possible use of such weapons or of still further acceleration in the fighting to open-up an all-out war between the two neighbouring countries. Some say the US played up the nuclear threat to force Pakistan to bow down; others say the threat was real.
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Daily Times, Friday, July 03, 2009
COMMENT: Alok Rai
My Pakistani interlocutor assures me that it is the hour before dawn that is the darkest, that the present generation, even in Punjab, is ready to move out of this mutually destructive cycle and start a new chapter in the sad history of our sub-continent

(The present article grew out of a series of exchanges between two friends, one Indian, the other Pakistani. “Kashmir” is a problem with far-reaching consequences for both societies. It is important that members of civil society on both sides of the border talk to each other in a spirit of serious engagement, and so carry forward the people-to-people dialogue beyond the not insignificant level of biryani and banter. It is in that spirit that this view from India is offered.)
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Sunday, Jun 21, 2009

NEW DELHI: It has now become apparent to the international community that the growing influence of the Taliban and radicalisation of Pakistan’s internal politics, and not Jammu and Kashmir, are the reasons for poor New Delhi-Islamabad relations, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) said here on Saturday.

Speaking on foreign policy issues, party president Rajnath Singh said as long as the army in Pakistan did not accept working under a democratic civilian government, resolution of its internal problems would not be possible. He said the “myth” that India-Pakistan relations were linked to the issue of Kashmir was recently exploded, as attention now turned to the growing influence of the Taliban in Pakistan.
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Daily Times, Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Speaking at a Pugwash conference in Islamabad on Monday, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani stressed the importance of resuming the dialogue between Pakistan and India “to address issues that have for long been the reason for tensions between the two countries”. He has referred to issues of “long” gestation and therefore desires a return to the Indo-Pak composite dialogue that started in 2004 and stopped in 2007 without resolving the deeply buried issues to which he alluded.
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The News International, Pakistan
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
YEKATERINBURG, Russia: The eight-month-long Pakistan-India stalled peace process got a fresh lease of life as President Asif Ali Zardari and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan met here on Tuesday on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The two sides agreed for their foreign secretaries to meet on “mutually-convenient dates” to be followed by another meeting of the two leaders on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Egypt in July.
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Daily Times, Pakistan, Tuesday, June 16, 2009
YEKATERINBURG: Islamabad is expected to suggest an intelligence-sharing mechanism with its top investigators to New Delhi in the first meeting of both countries’ leaders since the Indian government suspended dialogue following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. President Asif Ali Zardari and Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh are set to resume formal bilateral contact on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon told reporters. However, official sources said this was merely an opportunity to convey the Indian government’s concerns to Pakistan at the highest level. They said the meeting was organised after the Pakistan high commissioner in India expressed President Zardari’s wish to meet Dr Singh. They said the Indian PM would call upon the Pakistani leadership to take credible action against terrorism. Dialogue was being resumed in line with Dr Singh’s vision of maintaining cordial relations with all of India’s neighbours, they added. iftikhar gilani
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Daily Times, Pakistan
Saturday, June 13, 2009
SRINAGAR: As violence ebbs in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK), India is planning to withdraw some troops from towns across the disputed Himalayan region, India’s home (Interior) minister said on Friday.

A partial withdrawal would mark the first troop reduction in the region’s urban areas since freedom fighters started their campaign 20 years ago.
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Daily Times, Pakistan
Friday, June 12, 2009
By Iftikhar Gilani

NEW DELHI: The US said on Thursday that it wants the Kashmir issue resolved in line with the aspirations of the people of Kashmir – a statement that reflects Pakistan’s stance on the long-standing dispute.

Addressing a press conference after meeting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns – on a three-day visit to India – stunned reporters by saying that the Kashmir issue had to be settled in line with the aspirations of Kashmiris. “It remains our view that a resolution of that issue has to take into account wishes of the Kashmiri people,” he said.

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Dawn, Pakistan
Thursday, 11 Jun, 2009

MR Manmohan Singh’s statement in the Lok Sabha on Tuesday will be seen as the olive branch that is badly needed in the present state of impasse between India and Pakistan. By acknowledging honestly that it was in his country’s vital interest to engage with Pakistan, the Indian prime minister has indicated that the peace process could be revived. What is more significant is Mr Singh’s assurance that New Delhi is prepared to walk more than halfway if Pakistan accepts its share of responsibility in the partnership. This is one of the rare occasions that a silver lining has appeared in the dark cloud that has symbolised ties between the two South Asian neighbours since the Mumbai carnage. In recent weeks Pakistan has proposed the resumption of talks but India’s reservations were too manifest. It is now universally recognised that states should resolve their disputes through negotiations rather than recourse to war and violence. India and Pakistan too have made progress towards peace only when they have been engaged in a dialogue as happened in 2004-2008.

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New Delhi, June 2 (PTI) Angered by the release of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafeez Mohd Saeed, India today said it demonstrates Pakistan's lack of seriousness to fight terror and probe the Mumbai attack amid indications that New Delhi would mobilise world community to put pressure on Islamabad.
Hours after the Lahore High Court ordered the release of Saeed, lined to last November's Mumbai terror attacks, following a six-month detention, External Affairs Minister S M Krishna met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during which the issue is believed to have come up for discussion.

Foreign Secretary Shivshanker Menon was also present at the meeting where the discussions are understood to have focussed on the options India could exercise to put pressure on Pakistan in the wake of JuD chief's release.

US Charge d'Affairs Peter Burleigh also met Krishna during which the latter noted India's concerns over the release of Saeed whose JuD has been banned by the UN Security Council for its involvement in Mumbai attacks.

"It is regrettable that Pakistan has released Hafeez Saeed who has been part of terror outfits in Pakistan. The organisation (JuD) with which he has connections has been declared terrorist organisation by the United Nations Security Council," Krishna told reporters here.

"This only shows that Pakistan's seriousness to fight against terror is still under a cloud," he said.

Asked whether New Delhi will build international pressure on Pakistan, he said "India will take all possible steps in order to drive home its point." PTI

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Dawn, Pakistan
Wednesday, 03 Jun, 2009

RELATIVES claim the women were tortured, raped and killed after being abducted by Indian security forces. The authorities in Indian-held Kashmir, for their part, are withholding final judgment pending a judicial probe. For the time being, however, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah maintains that “the initial indication does not suggest either rape or murder” but rather death by drowning. The truth — if it is not covered up — is expected to be known within a month. But in the tinderbox that is occupied Kashmir, where souls have been brutalised for decades and passions run high, the verdict on the street is loud and clear. The bodies of the two women were found on Saturday in a shallow stream, which makes the ‘death by drowning argument’ unconvincing for most. India is seen as an occupying power by the majority of Kashmiris. Torture and wanton murder feature prominently in the track record of the forces enforcing New Delhi’s diktat in the region. For this reason, even relatively minor provocations by the security apparatus can trigger massive protests. And there is nothing minor about this latest incident. The alleged rape and murder of two women is a reprehensible crime no matter where it occurs. But when it happens in Kashmir, it is seen not only as a heinous crime but part and parcel of the reign of terror unleashed by occupiers. Quite understandably, horror and humiliation quickly lead to outrage in these circumstances, and it is not surprising that nearly 90 people have been injured in clashes with law-enforcement personnel since the incident came to light.

The Kashmiri struggle today bears little resemblance to the armed insurgency that was at its peak in the 1990s, when foreign militias were present in force in the valley. Cracking down hard on guerrilla fighters, many of them outsiders, is one thing and beating up protesters quite another. The freedom struggle now seen in Kashmir is a home-grown and largely peaceful movement. This is a sensible course to pursue for reports of militants trading fire with Indian forces do not win much support for the Kashmir cause internationally. Footage of civilian protesters facing the wrath of the police conveys the message far more effectively. So do pictures from Srinagar, a city that is often under virtual curfew and where fear stalks the streets in the form of the Indian forces. Times have changed and Delhi must see the need for negotiation and a gentler hand.

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The News International, Pakistan
Tuesday, June 02, 2009

A large delegation of Indian writers, professionals and intellectuals is due in the country soon to resume a process of Track II diplomacy. This is important given that the government-to-government level dialogue has been at a standstill since late last year. The Track II process, peace activists hope, could help push it back onto track again. There has for years been considerable dispute involving Track II diplomacy. It has been argued that it is pointless and in the final run serves no purpose at all. Cynics hold that gatherings such as the one to be held now have continued for years, but had no major impact on altering the broader picture as far as Indo-Pak acrimony goes. They have a point. But the fact is that people-to-people contact is vital to build the foundation of understanding necessary for closer ties. Exchanges between Indo-Pak students in recent years have helped clear misconceptions and in many cases build strong friendships. Pakistani children have benefitted too from Indian health initiatives, at a fraction of what they would cost in the west.

For all these reasons the Track II process should be promoted. This is especially true given that there is a need to sweep away the animosity caused by the process of angry accusations and counter-accusations that followed the Mumbai attacks and various incidents of terrorism in Pakistan. Now that there is talk of resuming the official peace process, anything that can help ease tensions is welcome and the Track II effort is an important step in this direction.

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Editorial, Dawn, Pakistan
Friday, 29 May, 2009

MIXED messages do not aid dialogue. If anything they serve to obfuscate issues or harden black-and-white notions of who is right and who is wrong. India needs to make up its mind on where it stands vis-à-vis Pakistan. Are we or are we not partners in the battle against militancy and terrorism? Or are we to remain perennial adversaries locked in a no-win situation that can benefit neither country? New Delhi hasn’t been terribly clear on this point, possibly because it had been caught up in electioneering where rhetoric does not always reflect facts. But the elections are over now, the Congress has won with consummate ease and Pakistan-bashing should, as such, also end sooner than later. Yet, even as Islamabad embarked on what was possibly its first truly coordinated effort to go after the Taliban, the response from New Delhi remained more or less Mumbai-specific. Not that we need India’s blessings or kudos, far from it. But such sentiments can’t hurt what should be the common cause of fighting militancy.

India’s new foreign minister said on Tuesday that any dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad was dependent on the speedy prosecution of the alleged Pakistani masterminds behind the Mumbai assault last year. Pakistan, it must be said, has arrested some key members of the Lashkar-i-Taiba and is acting on possibly incriminating information provided by India. What does India expect Pakistan to do, summarily prosecute these people or build up a case that will stand up in a court of law? Pakistan is a democracy with an independent judiciary. Any case tarnished even by a shadow of doubt will be thrown out of court. Better then, is it not, to wait until the state is in a position to present a watertight argument? Bringing those who planned the Mumbai attacks to book serves not just India’s interests but also Pakistan’s. Indeed the whole region would be well served if the mass murderers behind that carnage are made to pay for their crimes.

A change of tack was seen on Wednesday when the same Indian foreign minister condemned the suicide attack in Lahore. “… [W]e hope that Pakistan and India could join hands [sic] together to fight this spectre of terror,” said Somanahalli Mallaiah Krishna. The point is this: are we engaged in an ongoing dialogue or not? Is any cooperation from India dependent solely on the outcome of the Mumbai case or is it still possible in the meantime to discuss other outstanding issues? Coordination is needed in the sphere of counter-insurgency, the Kashmir dispute needs to be resolved, Siachen discussed and Sir Creek taken to its fair and logical conclusion. A single-point agenda hinging on the Mumbai attacks will simply not deliver. A holistic approach is in order.

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Daily Times, Pakistan
insight, Ejaz Haider
Friday, May 29, 2009

Pakistan itself has seen more terrorist attacks on its soil than any other country. It would be idiotic to think that the state of Pakistan is prompting these groups to attack its interests — or that the ISI planned an attack on its building in Lahore

The way any mention in the Pakistani newspapers of India in relation to Pakistan gets a rise from the Indian readers, one wishes the articles could be packaged as aphrodisiacs and marketed in that country.

I am thankful to the Indian readers, nonetheless.

That said, the problem I find in the dozens of emails I have received in response to my article (“Debunking arguments against eastern deployment”, Daily Times, May 27) is that most Indian readers, barring some exceptions, have reacted through the Pavlovian nationalist reflex rather than bothering to focus on my arguments.

For instance, one argument thrown at me is that while India may have the capability, it does not intend to attack Pakistan. I am surprised because I never said India was planning to attack Pakistan, just that the strategic calculus always involves capability, never intent. The reason is simple: intentions can change.

However, my argument about capabilities and intentions implied verifiable movement towards building more confidence. That is why I gave a bird’s eye view of numbers on the Indian side. One of the ways in which intentions can be signalled is through actual movement on the ground. Here are three scenarios.

* India retains its current troop levels without any hostile intent (this envisages routine deployments to peace and forward locations); Pakistan does the same. The pattern is familiar.

* India moves troops and equipment to forward locations. That’s mobilisation with possible hostile intent; Pakistan does the same. Given other factors, this could be the escalatory ladder.

* India reconfigures its routine order of battle by pulling back X number of formations (corps, divisions, brigades etc) and Pakistan-specific strike weapons (SRBMs, for instance). That’s a verifiable, positive move towards expressing the intent that India does not want a show of arms and is prepared to increase the cost of any future hostile action for itself. Pakistan does the same. This could even be formalised somewhat along the lines of the erstwhile CFE (conventional forces in Europe) treaty. (This scenario can have many models but a discussion of them is outside the scope of this article.)

Contrary to scenario 3 and more in keeping with 2, India is overtly wedded to a doctrine (Cold Start) that plans to locate independent battle groups (IBGs) close to the border in order to, among other reasons, cut down on mobilisation time for offensive, limited strikes against Pakistan along multiple axes. And while it will be years before India actually acquires the capability to do so, the intention is there.

The Indians may ask: why should India take the lead in effecting scenario 3? Answer: (a) because India has a fourfold numerical advantage in current deployments; and (b) because Pakistan is being asked to move troops to address an “internal” threat even though the Pakistan Army is quite comfortable in handling operations in the west without reducing troop levels in the east.

Here I will be remiss if I did not mention another argument trotted out by many Indian readers, most making the point aggressively: sure, India should thin its defences so Pakistan can infiltrate terrorists into India.

Those who made this point did not realise that they were weakening their own case. There are two inter-connected points here:

One, would India hold responsible and consider complicit the state of Pakistan for every terrorist attack on its soil until such time that Pakistan proved its innocence — guilty until proven innocent? If the answer is yes, and if India wants to not only retain its current troop levels but go into the mobilisation mode, then it would in any case be stupid on the part of Pakistan to unilaterally cut down on its force levels in the east and then bear the cost of moving them back to respond to such escalation.

Two, this itself shows that India does not trust Pakistan and therefore, to the extent of this distrust, is not prepared to lower its guard. But that clearly makes it that much more difficult for Pakistan to lower its.

The fact, however, is that Indian civil and military officials are on record as having confirmed that infiltration levels in Kashmir have come down to near-zero. Moreover, infiltration, when it does happen, is not necessarily state-sponsored.

There are a number of groups operating in this region. Pakistan itself has seen more terrorist attacks on its soil than any other country. It would be idiotic to think that the state of Pakistan is prompting these groups to attack its interests — or that the ISI planned an attack on its building in Lahore.

This brings me to another factor. Today’s wars may not be fought directly, especially between two nuclear-armed states. Despite India’s much-hyped doctrine of fighting a limited war and keeping it below the nuclear threshold, it is almost impossible for India to operationalise the concept both for reasons of capability as well as the inability to judge, absolutely accurately, the Pakistani response to any such Indian decision. Perfect information is never available, is not possible, in any situation.

So while states project overt military preparedness, they are likely to use an indirect approach to war-fighting. It makes more sense for X to isolate Y, outflank and out-manoeuvre it diplomatically and economically; and, if the model is conflictual, use proxies against it.

One Indian reader, a former army officer, wrote saying that “Z”, the internal threat, is more pressing and unfolding. True. I never said it was not and have written repeatedly about it. But addressing Z does not mean taking one’s eyes off X. Also, if indirect war is the game in town, X may find it opportune to worsen Z for Pakistan even as Z is not X’s creation.

There is increasing evidence of that now.

That completes the circle. Pakistan faces Z threat; Pakistan also faces X threat. There are linkages between X and Z. So by fighting against the Z threat, Pakistan is also addressing the indirect threat from X.

Nothing to grudge X for. If the model is conflictual and if X thinks that it now has the opportunity to pay Pakistan back, so be it. Only, that makes a hash of arguments against lowering the guard and using cooperative strategies.

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By R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, May 28, 2009

Sometime next year, at a tightly guarded site south of its capital, Pakistan will be ready to start churning out a new stream of plutonium for its nuclear arsenal, which will eventually include warheads for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of being launched from ships, submarines or aircraft.

About 1,000 miles to the southwest, engineers in India are designing cruise missiles to carry nuclear warheads, relying partly on Russian missile-design assistance. India is also trying to equip its Agni ballistic missiles with such warheads and to deploy them on submarines. Its rudimentary missile-defense capability is slated for a major upgrade next year.

The apparent detonation of a North Korean nuclear device on Monday has renewed concerns over that country's efforts to build up its atomic arsenal. At the same time, U.S. and allied officials and experts who have tracked developments in South Asia have grown increasingly worried over the rapid growth of the region's more mature nuclear programs, in part because of the risk that weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists.

India and Pakistan see their nuclear programs as vital points of leverage in an arms race that has begun to take on the pace and diversity, although not the size, of U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition during the Cold War, according to U.S. intelligence and proliferation experts. Pakistani authorities said they are modernizing their facilities, not expanding their program; Indian officials in New Delhi and Washington declined to comment.

"They are both going great guns [on] new systems, new materials; they are doing everything you would imagine," said a former intelligence official who has long studied the region and who spoke on the condition of anonymity. While both India and Pakistan say their actions are defensive, the consequence of their efforts has been to boost the quantity of materials being produced and the number of times they must be moved around, as well as the training of experts in highly sensitive skills, this source and others say.

More vulnerabilities. More stuff in production. More stuff in transit," when it is more vulnerable to theft, said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, formerly the CIA's top official on weapons of mass destruction and the Energy Department's director of intelligence during the George W. Bush administration. U.S. experts also worry that as the size of the programs grows, chances increase that a rogue scientist or military officer will attempt to sell nuclear parts or know-how, as now-disgraced Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan did in the 1980s and 1990s.

Former Indian government officials say efforts are underway to improve and test a powerful thermonuclear warhead, even as the country adds to a growing array of aircraft, missiles and submarines that launch them. "Delivery system-wise, India is doing fine," said Bharat Karnad, a former member of India's National Security Advisory Board and a professor of national security studies at New Delhi's Center for Policy Research. India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998; India first detonated an atomic bomb in 1974.

A senior Pakistani official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said his government has refrained from testing missiles that could carry nuclear weapons because officials do not want to antagonize the Indian and U.S. governments.

U.S. officials say narrow appeals to the two countries to slow their weapons work will probably fail. "We have to think of dealing with the South Asian problem not on a purely regional basis, but in the context of a more global approach," Gary Samore, the senior White House nonproliferation adviser, said after a speech to the Arms Control Association last week.

Samore said the "Pakistani government has always said they will do that in conjunction with India. The Indians have always said, 'We can't take steps unless similar steps are taken by China and the other nuclear states,' and very quickly you end up with a situation where it's hard to make progress."

Some experts worry, however, that the United States may not have the luxury of waiting to negotiate a treaty that would curtail the global production of fissile materials -- a pact that President Obama says he hopes to complete during his first term.

A recent U.S. intelligence report, commissioned by outgoing Bush administration officials, warned of the dangers associated with potential attacks on nuclear weapons-related shipments inside Pakistan, for example

Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told senators days before his retirement in March that "Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapons stockpiles, and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems." He added that although Pakistan has "taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons . . . vulnerabilities still exist."

Although Maples did not offer details of the expansion, other experts said he was referring to the expected completion next year of Pakistan's second heavy-water reactor at its Khushab nuclear complex 100 miles southwest of Islamabad, which will produce new spent nuclear fuel containing plutonium for use in nuclear arms.

"When Khushab is done, they'll be able to make a significant number of new bombs," Mowatt-Larssen said. In contrast, "it took them roughly 10 years to double the number of nuclear weapons from roughly 50 to 100." A third heavy-water reactor is also under construction at Khushab, according to David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security.

Before it can be used in weaponry, the plutonium must first be separated from the fuel rods at a highly guarded nuclear facility near Rawalpindi, about 100 miles northeast of Khushab. Satellite images published by Albright's institute show a substantial expansion occurred at the complex between 2002 and 2006, reflecting a long-standing Pakistani desire to replace weapons fueled by enriched uranium with plutonium-based weapons.

Pakistani officials dismiss suggestions that the building represents an acceleration in South Asia's arms race. "If two are sufficient, why build 10?" asked Brig. Gen. Nazir Ahmed Butt, defense attache in Pakistan's embassy in Washington. "We cannot match warhead for warhead. We're not in a numbers game. People should not take a technological upgrade for an expansion."

Details of precautions surrounding Pakistani nuclear shipments are closely held. Abdul Mannan, director of transport and waste safety for Pakistan's nuclear regulatory authority, said in a 2007 presentation to the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington that Pakistani safeguards are "enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack, and any malicious diversion would be protected in early stages." But Mannan also said the government needed to upgrade its security measures, and warned that "a country like Pakistan is not well equipped" to contain radioactive fallout from an attack on a nuclear shipment.

U.S. officials have said they accept Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear stockpile is adequately safeguarded, but intelligence officials have acknowledged contingency plans to dispatch American troops to protect or remove any weapons at imminent risk.

Proximity to Taliban

While Pakistan's nuclear program has lately attracted the most worry, because of the close proximity to the capital of Taliban insurgents, many U.S. experts say that it should not be considered in isolation from India's own nuclear expansion.

Some experts say that a civil nuclear cooperation agreement that Bush signed with India in October benefits the country's weapons programs, because it sanctions India's import of uranium and allows the military to draw on enriched uranium produced by eight reactors that might otherwise be needed for civil power. In a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency last July, Pakistan's ambassador in Vienna warned that the deal would increase "the chances of a nuclear arms race on the sub-continent."

Ken Luongo, a former senior adviser on nonproliferation at the Energy Department who recently returned from meetings with Pakistani officials, said the deal exacerbated Pakistan's fears of losing a technological race; others say that, at the least, it provided a rationalization to keep going.

Feroz Hassan Khan, a retired Pakistani general in charge of arms control, said Pakistan perceives a real risk of a preemptive strike by India. Because of Indian superiority in conventional forces, "Pakistan is compelled to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons to counter the threat," Khan said. "It would be highly foolish not to produce more and better weapons."

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Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Daily Times Monitor

LAHORE: Indian External Affairs Minister S M Krishna on Tuesday ruled out resumption of talks with Pakistan until it shows more commitment in proceeding against terrorist groups responsible for the Mumbai attacks in November last year.

“That is the policy that we are pursuing as of now,” Krishna said when asked whether talks with Pakistan would remain in “deep freeze”. Asked by a private TV channel whether there is any possibility of beginning negotiations with Pakistan in other sensitive areas such as Kashmir, the minister said “we have taken a position that unless this [issue of commitment] is resolved, there could not possibly be any dialogue with Pakistan”.

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Daily Times, Pakistan
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
insight: Ejaz Haider

If Pakistan is asked by the US and other western capitals to pull out troops from the eastern border and deploy them to the west, then perhaps India should also be asked to thin its much-heavier Pakistan-specific deployment

There is much talk in the Western media and also by visiting foreign dignitaries about the Pakistan Army’s east-oriented deployment and threat perception from India at a time when presumably Pakistan faces no threat from India but is grappling with an internal, existential crisis.

The question posed is: why doesn’t Pakistan thin its defences in the east and induct more troops in the west to fight the Taliban? While the question may be genuine, and I am being entirely charitable on this count, is it based on a sound understanding of military strategy?

Short answer: no.

There are two broad issues here. The first relates to Pakistan’s threat perception from India; the second to Pakistan’s ongoing counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism operations. Let’s analyse them in the same order.

The most important factor in threat perception is not the issue of “intention” but of “capability”. The military calculus, therefore, is never based on whether State X wants to attack or harm State Y but whether it has the capability to that end should it choose to do so.

Intentions can undergo a change. Hence the focus on capability. X is a good friend but X has a loaded pistol; I like X but I would keep my loaded pistol on me. It helps me like X even more. And if X is not a friend and has a pistol, I am not about to go to dinner with X without mine.

Here’s a reality check.

The Indian Army, standing at over 1.1 million active-service personnel and 1.8 million reserves, is configured under six area commands (operational) and one Army Training Command (ARTRAC). Three of these area commands — Western, Northern and South-western — are totally Pakistan-specific. The fourth, Central Command, with one corps (1 Corps) is also primarily Pakistan-specific. The Indian Army has thirteen corps, out of which eight, including one from the Central Command, are specific to Pakistan.

But more than the number of corps, it is the number of divisions — infantry, mountain, armoured — as well as independent armoured and artillery brigades that manifest the deployment pattern or order of battle (ORBAT) of the Indian Army. The Pakistan-specific area commands and corps have a much-higher number of lower formations, the actual fighting elements, than the Eastern and Southern Commands.

This is perfectly legitimate if the Indian Army’s threat perception comes from Pakistan.

After the Kargil mini-war, the Indian Army, under General VP Malik, began studying the possibility and feasibility of limited war. Then came the 10-month-long standoff (Dec 2001-Oct 2002) between Pakistan and India. The Indian Army realised that because of shorter internal lines, the Pakistan Army had completed its counter-mobilisation even before the Indian Army could complete its.

That fact, coupled with the need for integrated, quick operations against multiple targets without actually holding ground — a combination of limited, surgical strikes, hot pursuit, salami slicing — forced the Indian Army into rethinking its offensive options. The result of that was the “Cold Start” (CS) doctrine in early 2004, incidentally around the same time that Pakistan and India embarked on a normalisation process!

CS envisages the formation of eight Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) deployed close to the international border. As Brig Naeem Salik (retd) wrote, the doctrine “aims at reducing the mobilisation time by disaggregating the cumbersome strike corps into more handy Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), positioning these forces closer to the international border and gaining a head start by enhancing the ability of the defensive formations now termed as the ‘Pivot Corps’ to undertake limited offensive operations.

“The initial gains made by the pivot corps are supposed to be exploited by the rapidly moving IBGs. The operations by the IBGs are envisaged to be closely supported by the Indian Air Force and, where possible, the Indian Navy. The objectives assigned to the IBGs would be deliberately kept shallow to avoid crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines.” (“Cold Start: hot implications for South Asian security”; The Friday Times, Dec 19-25, 2008)

There can be a number of CBMs, like removing and de-commissioning the Pakistan-specific Prithvi SRBMs, CS or no CS. Interestingly, India may say that it needs this state of preparedness to counter terrorism on its soil. But that very argument, envisaging inter-state escalation, vindicates Pakistan Army’s stance on eastern deployment and war readiness!

This is not a place to either go into details of the Indian Army’s ORBAT or its operational plans — or even what all can be done to improve trust. Those issues need to be treated separately. The point I have tried to make is this: if Pakistan does not face the prospect of a hot war imposed on it by India, neither does India face that prospect any more.

If Pakistan is asked by the US and other western capitals on the basis of this argument to pull out troops from the eastern border and deploy them to the west, then perhaps India should also be called upon to thin its much-heavier Pakistan-specific deployment along the international border, the Line of Control, the working boundary and the actual ground position line.

Comfort levels must be raised on both sides. In any case, Pakistan’s deployment along the eastern border is much thinner, given half the numerical strength of its army compared to India’s. In Kashmir, for instance, Pakistan’s one corps and elements grouped under Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) face India’s three corps! Would India reduce its strength there by, let’s say, two corps? It won’t.

The second issue is the number of troops currently engaged in COIN operations in the northwest, mostly in the tribal agencies but also in Swat and its adjoining areas. The troop strength is currently around 110,000. The kind of war that is going on there does not entirely depend on inducting more troops but making the application of force, where required, effective.

The normal arithmetic for COIN operations is 7 to 10 soldiers to one insurgent. Taking the higher figure of 10 soldiers, that would make the estimated strength of insurgents to stand at 11000. No one knows really. But it could be higher. One guesstimate puts it between 30,000 to 35,000 insurgents.

Whatever the figure, and it’s important to try and get it as close to reality as possible, the main issue, as I have noted, is the correct application of force, not use of force per se, or troop surge just to put more boots on the ground. No doubt, holding ground and effective long-term COIN operations require correct space-to-deployment ratio. But if the intelligence is credible and actionable, a combination of air-to-ground targeting and smaller, rapid action forces can be far more effective against scattered as well as entrenched targets than larger, slow-moving forces.

Finally, the issue is not whether Pakistan should or should not reconfigure its deployment pattern but whether it can. Unilaterally, it can’t.

Also, if the country has to induct more troops in the NWFP and station military elements in the area for a longer deployment, it needs to build infrastructure for doing that. That decision has to be taken at the political level (keeping in mind regional security requirements) and money found for it.

Therefore, before Pakistan is asked to do this or that, its threat perception has to be taken into consideration and money provided it for longer deployment on the west. The first involves pulling in India; the second, opening the purse strings.

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