Pakistan in Media

Opinionated Media Coverage

Can Pakistan take on the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba?

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Daily Times, Pakistan, Monday, June 22, 2009
LONDON: If Pakistan’s battle against the Taliban seems difficult, a much tougher challenge lies ahead: deciding what to do about the banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT).

Security experts from the United States and India believe the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency could shut down the group accused of carrying out the Mumbai attacks – if they choose to do so.
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posted @ 11:49 AM, ,

The other Islamist threat in Pakistan

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The Boston Globe, June 17, 2009
THE DANGER of an Islamist takeover of Pakistan is real. But it does not come from the Taliban guerrillas now battling the Pakistan Army in the Swat borderlands. It comes from a proliferating network of heavily armed Islamist militias in the Punjab heartland and major cities directed by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a close ally of Al Qaeda, which staged the terrorist attack last November in Mumbai, India.
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posted @ 11:20 AM, ,

Khalifas from the hills

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Daily Times, Pakistan
Comment, Feisal Naqvi
Tuesday, May 26, 2009

These people deserve to have war waged on them because they reject our Constitution, because they reject the values which Pakistan was founded upon, and because they are trying to stuff a different legal system down the throats of unwilling citizens

People who oppose the ongoing operation in Swat normally make two types of arguments.

The first argument is practical, that military force should only be utilised as a last resort and that this is not the time.

The second argument is philosophical. As one news anchor put it to me, how can we oppose the imposition of sharia law in Swat when Jinnah founded Pakistan in the name of Islam?

The essence of the first argument is that using the army to crush militants is the equivalent of using a sledgehammer to kill a fly. So while it may be effective, military action also comes with a massive cost. Innocent people get killed, families get displaced and entire towns get destroyed.

The answer to this argument is provided, however, by the military action itself. Operation Rah-e-Rast has been underway for almost four weeks. Sixty soldiers have died in the fighting while, according to ISPR, more than 1,100 militants have been killed. And yet, the operation is far from over. As I write these words, soldiers of the Pakistan Army are going door to door in Mingora, trying to blast out the militants who have been using 20,000 Swatis as human shields. And as for the financial cost, who knows?

The ongoing military operation is therefore self-evidently not excessive. Had that been the case, the operation would already have been over.

Opponents of military action can respond in one of three ways. The first is to argue that the army is incompetent. The second is to argue that the entire operation is a sham, the product of a giant conspiracy between Mossad, the CIA and RAW to break up the country and steal Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. And the third is to say that the army was sent in too soon.

I hold no brief for the Army and I know very little about its competence. But to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, you fight with the army you have, not with the army you want. Since we have no other army, accusing the army of incompetence is neither here nor there. Logically, the only other alternative would have been to invite American forces over from Afghanistan to invade Swat for us. In the absence of any support for that option, we have no option but to stick with General Kayani and his men.

So far as the grand conspiracies are concerned, I have no doubt that the CIA, Mossad and RAW would all breathe easier at night if we did not have nuclear weapons. But the fact that they do not want us to have nuclear weapons does not mean that they want to break up Pakistan. An exploded Pakistan would be exponentially more problematic for the international community than Pakistan in its current state.

If anything, the heads of CIA, Mossad and RAW are all praying to their respective deities to keep Pakistan solvent and stable because that is the only way our weapons will stay in sane hands as opposed to being in the hands of those who think that a nuclear exchange is a good idea because all the Muslims who die in the resulting holocaust will go straight to Paradise.

The final contention is that we should have waited longer. My question is: why? Is it not serious enough when a group of armed men rejects our Constitution, attacks our army and kills our citizens? And if that is not the issue, what would extra time have bought us? If anything, extra time would have given greater opportunity to the militants to entrench their positions.

I come now to the question of morality: how do I justify making war on those who are supposedly seeking only to fulfil Pakistan’s destiny?

Simply put, Pakistan’s destiny was not — and is not — to serve as the handmaiden for morons. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was not just a lawyer but one of the finest lawyers produced in the entire history of British India. His vision for Pakistan was not one in which self-proclaimed khalifas descended from the hills to unilaterally impose a vision of Islam in which the worship of God was reduced to beards of stipulated lengths and blowing up women’s schools.

At the same time, I freely concede that it is the prerogative of a sovereign nation to decide how it wants to govern itself. And if the majority of the people in this country decide through some democratic process that they actually want to be governed by Sufi Muhammad and his ilk, so be it. But they have not done so. Instead, whenever they have been given the option, the people of this country have resoundingly rejected religious parties. Pakistanis have drafted three constitutions for themselves: not one of them has set up a theocratic state.

So, Mr Anchorman, here is my answer: these people deserve to have war waged on them because they reject our Constitution, because they reject the values which Pakistan was founded upon, and because they are trying to stuff a different legal system down the throats of unwilling citizens.

Good enough for you?

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posted @ 9:52 AM, ,

Redeeming Pakistan’s madrassas

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Daily Times, Pakistan
May 23, 2009
COMMENT: Saleem H Ali

Although some of the radical madrassas will still need to be weeded out, embracing Islamic education with an integrated reform strategy is more likely to reduce militancy, rather than lamenting madrassas as arcane institutions

As policy-makers and the media abroad agonise over the situation in Pakistan’s Swat valley, madrassas are back on the front page in papers such as The New York Times. The linkage between extremism and education should be fairly obvious but it seems to still elude most analysts. Indeed the word “Taliban” means “students” in Pashto, suggesting an inherent connection of these militants with some form of “learning”.

Incendiary information at these Islamic seminaries is once again being considered both a symptom and a cause of Pakistan’s problems. The latest mantra appears to be that because government schools have failed, madrassas are filling a social void that offers free education and sustenance for the rural poor but causes massive radicalisation at the same time.

Madrassas in Pakistan are certainly a matter of concern but rather than finding ways to diminish their recruitment, they need to be engaged and internally reformed. These seminaries already have a major physical and financial infrastructure in the country that can be harnessed positively alongside investments in government schools.

Only four years ago, famed terrorism analysts Peter Bergen (among the few western journalists to have interviewed Osama bin Laden) and Swaty Pandey had argued in The New York Times that concern over Islamic education was all a ‘madrassa myth’. Basing their analysis on a controversial World Bank study (co-authored by two Pakistani-American academics) about the actual number of madrassas in Pakistan, Bergen and Pandey had argued that “while madrassas are an important issue in education and development in the Muslim world, they are not and should not be considered a threat to the United States” because of their relatively small number and since terrorists who attacked the West had largely not been educated in madrassas.

However, as many of the suicide bombers in recent months have been traced back to madrassas, the pendulum has swung again, as now analysts discover that civil strife in Afghanistan and Pakistan can be just as dangerous for Western interests. Focusing on the core problem of curricular reform can provide us a path out of this ambivalence about madrassas.

While growing up in Pakistan, I attended a private English-medium school but every afternoon, I would also receive Islamic learning from a religious scholar who hailed from a prominent madrassa in Lahore. As I reflect back on that time, the core problem of contemporary Islamic education remains a general antipathy towards critical thinking.

Similar concerns have existed in other religions as well, but Islamic schools in Pakistan have contended with a host of circumstances that compounded these challenges. The sectarian divide between Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan was accentuated by funding from Iran and Saudi Arabia to specific strains of madrassas, particularly in southern Punjab. Exclusionary doctrines rather than pluralistic interpretations of Islamic texts were preached by both sides to gain more adherents. Religious political parties as well as the Pakistani government and security organisations capitalised on the fruits of radicalisation since unquestioning allegiance was easy to achieve with curricula that portrayed the world in stark terms of good and evil.

But the radicalisation of madrassas should not lead us to give up in despair. In other parts of the world, madrassas have served an appropriate educational purpose. For example in West Bengal, India, a survey of Islamic schools in January 2009 found that because of the higher quality education at madrassas, even non-Muslims were actively enrolling in them. This was remarkably akin to how in Pakistan many Muslim families send their children to Christian schools because of the high quality of teaching and discipline.

Hindu enrolment in several Bengali madrassas, for example, was as high as 64 percent because many of these institutions offered vocational training programmes. Such examples can certainly be emulated in Pakistani madrassas as well. We should not give up on madrassas but rather help bring them back to their heyday of pluralistic learning.

The strategy of ‘draining the swamp’ by establishing sparkling government schools alongside madrassas, which appears to be the current approach from development donors, is likely to have limited success. Madrassas will immediately resort to a defensive strategy of labelling the government schools in conspiratorial terms and still be able to recruit students quite zealously from religious families. Investment to improve education is needed across Pakistan in all kinds of schools, including madrassas.

The only way to solve the madrassa problem is to engage in a process of reform that focuses on pluralism and conflict resolution skills that should be facilitated by the Pakistani government with the assistance of other Muslim countries and ulema.

There are already some positive moves from the ulema in Pakistan. Religious clerics from both the Deobandi Tablighi Jama’at and the Barelvi Sunni Tehreek have publicly rejected the Taliban approach to Islam. Madrassas such as the venerable Jamia Ashrafia in Lahore are now willing to initiate specific teaching modules that stress the importance of non-violence and respect for other faith traditions.

Momentum elsewhere towards such efforts is exemplified by reforms in places such as Indonesia’s Guluk-Guluk pesantren, where Islamic environmental education is being used to develop peace-building skills. During my visit to central Java last year, I visited several Islamic schools that are producing very balanced and employable young professionals. Indonesia, which is the world’s largest Muslim country, should share some of its success in improving madrassa curricula with Pakistan.

Where Western donors can help is to provide vocational training and apprenticeship programs for madrassa graduates that will be consistent with their religious values. Careers as healthcare apprentices and disaster relief professionals are particularly appropriate in this regard.

Although some of the radical madrassas will still need to be weeded out, embracing Islamic education with an integrated reform strategy is more likely to reduce militancy, rather than lamenting madrassas as arcane institutions to be eroded by naively creating an alternate market for schools.

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posted @ 10:04 AM, ,

Ulema reject Taliban sharia, back operation

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Daily Times, Pakistan
Monday, May 18, 2009

* Ulema convention declares suicide attacks and beheadings haram

By Mahtab Bashir

ISLAMABAD: Hundreds of Sunni scholars on Sunday rejected the Taliban brand of sharia and fully endorsed the ongoing military operation in Swat and other areas of the country.

A convention organised by Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) Fazal Karim Group at the Convention Centre unanimously adopted a nine-point resolution, rejecting the Taliban’s version of sharia and beheading of people in Malakand and fully backing the ongoing military operation.

The resolution demanded an end to the assassinations of clerics, adding shrines should be cleared of terrorists. It said the pro-US foreign policy must be discarded. The resolution said all provinces should be granted sovereignty as per the 1973 constitution.

The resolution also condemned the ostentatious ways of the country’s elite and declared suicide attacks and beheading haram

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posted @ 12:17 PM, ,

Survival without military & mullah

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Editorial, Dawn, Pakistan
By Kunwar Idris
Sunday, 17 May, 2009

ON March 24 The Washington Post quoted a Centcom adviser as saying that Pakistan could collapse within six months and if that happened it would “dwarf all the crises in the world today”. The comment caused some disgust but not much alarm.

But then just eight weeks later, Prime Minister Gilani told parliament that the military campaign in Swat was launched not under US pressure but for “the survival of the country”. The Centcom adviser and the prime minister both were thus on the same grid regarding the threat to the existence of the country — only their perceptions of the outcome differed.

If the adviser is proven right, the collapse is just 19 weeks away. For the conclusion of the military campaign on which the prime minister has staked the survival of the country he is prepared to set no date. The Centcom forecast of imminent extinction is gloomy indeed. But the prime minister’s hope for survival pinned on a military victory hardly dispels the gloom. And to admit that only the military can save Pakistan from falling apart is a troubling thought. The high and still mounting cost in human terms however is enough to fill every citizen with shame and grief even if it does not give rise to apprehensions of a second secession.

After the East Pakistan experience no assurance really holds. Physical distance was then blamed for the defeat. Geography admittedly went against Pakistan. The commanders blamed the ‘logistics’ more than the widespread popular resentment and India’s armed intervention. But it was known from the very birth of the idea to its culmination that Pakistan would not be a consolidated or homogenous state. Reliance was placed, almost entirely, on a common religion to unite diverse races and regions into a single nation-state.

When after the last-minute rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan by Pundit Nehru (that plan was to keep India together with a centre administering only defence, foreign affairs and communications) partition became inevitable, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a great Muslim and a greater exponent of India’s unity, stuck to his conviction that it was “one of the greatest frauds on the people to suggest that religious affinity can unite areas which are geographically, economically, linguistically and culturally different. It is true that Islam sought to establish a society which transcends racial, linguistic, economic and political frontiers. History has however proved that after the first few decades or at the most after the first century, Islam was not able to unite all the Muslim countries on the basis of Islam alone.”

Ironically, at that very time Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, a staunch opponent of partition, turned into a supporter hoping that Pakistan would not last and the seceding provinces would one day return to the fold of Mother India. The thrust of Azad’s argument against partition was that two areas separated by 1,000 miles could not form one viable country by “religious affinity” alone. Perhaps he would have been less strident in his opposition if Pakistan were to be one compact area as it is today with lingual and cultural differences smoothly merging into each other.

However in the present situation of insurgency in vast swathes and ethnic discontent and religious strife all over, Azad’s view that a common religion alone does not make a viable state has since won many adherents. If it were to be so, the military would not have been in action as it is now in Malakand division and was in Balochistan more than once. Nor would there have been recurring martial laws and sectarian mayhem.

For national cohesion Pakistan’s successive civil and military regimes have relied, besides the bond of Islam, on passion for Kashmir, hatred of India, friendship with China, aid from America and, when the chips are down, on the armed forces. All these props are now falling apart. The Islamic sentiment, in the current conflict, is being invoked by the Barelvi group in support of the armed forces and by the Deobandis to justify militancy.

Passion for Kashmir is giving way to realism and hostility for India to envy for its democracy and spectacular economic growth. China no longer feels compelled to pamper Pakistan as it mends fences with India and Russia. And, finally, the sectarian colour given to the campaign against the Swat militants is sure to persuade the military commanders to tell the government to solve political problems politically and seek a fresh mandate from the people if it cannot.

Henceforth no party in Pakistan, it seems, would be able to win at the polls nor perpetuate itself in office by exploiting religious sentiments, nor by leaning on America or China, nor by inciting hatred against India nor by summoning the armed forces to its aid. Every political party shall have to rely on the support of the people at large and of the state institutions and the provinces by sharing benefits and responsibility with them. Most crucial is the place of the provinces in the federal power structure. At present, they are no more than subordinate units of the centre.

The imperial rulers and Indian statesmen led by Jinnah and Nehru had agreed in 1946 (though Nehru later retracted) that India could be held together by a central government exercising control only on defence, foreign affairs and communications. The stresses caused by global conflicts and the economy would now require the centre to have some more functions. The arch confederalist Mumtaz Bhutto is prepared to cede currency to the centre as well. Dr Mubashir Hasan’s independent commission is inclined to cede foreign trade, income tax, citizenship and immigration too.

Transfer of powers from the centre to the provinces is bound to be a troublesome exercise but is necessary to keep the country united which, we have learnt to our cost, religion, America and the army no longer can.

In the new dispensation, for the tribal areas and Balochistan the state should be more suzerain than sovereign in the conventional sense. That was the imperial way of working when things were better and, as a political agent in the 1960s, this writer can testify it worked even after independence. The all-important question of provincial autonomy however has to be settled first.

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posted @ 11:31 AM, ,

Linked futures

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Analysis, Daily Times, Pakistan
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
It is disappointing that some parties, especially the Islamists, cannot overcome their narrow partisan interests, which makes it difficult for them to fathom the gravest ever threat to Pakistan’s internal harmony and security

The on-going Swat operation is the most difficult internal security assignment for Pakistan’s security forces in a long time. The army is leading the operation with determination to re-establish the authority of state in the areas controlled by the Taliban. This will demonstrate if the Army has upgraded its counter-insurgency capacity. The outcome of this operation will also have implications for the future direction of Pakistani state and society. If this operation fails, it will weaken Pakistan’s resolve and capacity to engage in counter-insurgency in the tribal areas.

Withdrawal of the army and paramilitary forces without restoring the authority of the state is not an option; that would amount to surrendering Swat to the Taliban, and would encourage such elements elsewhere to pursue similar action against the state. This will also give impetus to various Islamist hard-liners in mainland Pakistan to impose their religious and cultural preferences on others.

Pakistan is engaged in an intense struggle to restore its soul, and faces the danger of being overwhelmed by religious and cultural extremism backed by violence. Given Pakistan’s regional, ethnic and cultural diversity, individuals and groups cannot be allowed to operate as self-styled vigilantes to enforce their socio-cultural and political preferences. That would not only destroy the fabric of Pakistani state and society but also invite external intervention by those who would like to contain the fallout from the ascendancy of extremists.

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posted @ 11:11 AM, ,


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